Representativeness of the European social partner organisations: Sea fisheries

  • National Contribution:

  • Observatory: EurWORK
  • Topic:
  • Industrial relations,
  • Representativeness,
  • Social partners,
  • Date of Publication: 11 March 2012



About
Author:
Roberto Pedersini
Institution:

This study aims to provide the necessary information for reviewing social dialogue in the sea fisheries sector. The report identifies the national organisations on both sides of industry, and analyses the sector’s European organisations. Following a brief overview of the sector’s economic background, the study describes the social partner organisations in all of the EU Member States (with the exception of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovakia) and then goes on to look at the relevant European organisations, focusing in particular on membership levels and capacity to negotiate. The impetus for these EIRO series of studies on representativeness arises from the European Commission’s goal to recognise the representative social partner organisations to be consulted under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In the sea fisheries sector, a joint committee was established in 1974 and the sea fisheries sectoral social dialogue committee was set up in 1999.

The study was compiled on the basis of individual national reports submitted by the EIRO correspondents. The text of each of these national reports is available below. The national reports were drawn up in response to a questionnaire and should be read in conjunction with it.

Download the full report (392KB PDF)

National contributions may be available


Objectives of study

The aim of this representativeness study is to identify the relevant national and supranational associational actors – that is the trade unions and employer organisations – in the field of industrial relations in the sea fisheries sector, and show how these actors relate to the sector’s European interest associations of labour and business. The impetus for this study, and for similar studies in other sectors, arises from the aim of the European Commission to identify the representative social partner associations to be consulted under the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1.41Mb PDF). Hence, this study seeks to provide basic information needed to set up and support sectoral social dialogue. The effectiveness of the European social dialogue depends on whether its participants are sufficiently representative in terms of the sector’s relevant national actors across the EU Member States. Hence, only European associations which meet this criteria will be admitted to the European social dialogue.

Against this background, the study will first identify the relevant national social partner organisations in the sea fisheries sector, subsequently analysing the structure of the sector’s relevant European organisations, in particular their membership composition. This involves clarifying the unit of analysis at both the national and European level of interest representation. The study includes only organisations whose membership domain is ‘sector-related’ (see below). At both national and European levels, many associations are not considered as social partner organisations because they do not deal with industrial relations. Thus, there is a need for clear-cut criteria to differentiate social partner organisations from other associations.

As for the national-level associations, classification as a sector-related social partner organisation in the context of this study implies fulfilling one of two criteria: the associations must either be

  • party to ‘sector-related’ collective bargaining;
  • a member of a ‘sector-related’ European association of business or labour that is on the Commission’s list of European social partner organisations consulted under Article 154 of the TFEU, and/or which participates in the sector-related European social dialogue.
  • the criterion that a national association can be a social partner if it is affiliated to a European social partner implies that such an association may not be involved at all in industrial relations in its own country. This criterion may seem odd, but a national association does become involved in industrial relations through its membership of such a European organisation.
  • it is important to assess whether the national affiliates to the European social partner organisations are engaged in industrial relations in their respective countries. Affiliation to a European social partner organisation and/or involvement in national collective bargaining are vital to the European social dialogue, since they can systematically connect the national and European levels.

In terms of the selection criteria for the European organisations, this report

  • includes those sector-related European social partner organisations that are on the Commission’s list of consultation.
  • considers any other European association with sector-related national social partner organisations – as defined above – under its umbrella.

Thus, the aim to identify the sector-related national and European social partner organisations applies both a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach.

Definitions

For the purpose of this study, the sea fisheries sector is defined in terms of the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE), to ensure the cross-national comparability of the findings. More specifically, the sea fisheries sector is defined as embracing NACE (Rev. 2) 03.11.

This includes the following activities:

NACE Rev.2

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

03.11

Marine Fishing

The domains of the trade unions and employer organisations and scope of the relevant collective agreements are likely to vary from this precise NACE demarcation. The study therefore includes all trade unions, employer organisations and multi-employer collective agreements which are ‘sector-related’ in terms of any of the following four aspects or patterns:

  • congruence – the domain of the organisation or scope of the collective agreement must be identical to the NACE demarcation, as specified above;
  • sectionalism – the domain or scope covers only a certain part of the sector, as defined by the aforementioned NACE demarcation, while no group outside the sector is covered;
  • overlap – the domain or scope covers the entire sector along with parts of one or more other sectors. However, it is important to note that the study does not include general associations which do not deal with sector-specific matters;
  • sectional overlap – the domain or scope covers part of the sector plus (parts of) one or more other sectors.

Figure 1: Sector relatedness of social partner organisations: domain patterns

Figure 1: Sector relatedness of social partner organisations: domain patterns

Figure 1: Sector relatedness of social partner organisations: domain patterns

Table 1: Domain pattern and scope of the organisation’s domain
Domain pattern Domain of organisation within the sector Domain of organisation outside the sector
 

Does the union/employer organisation’s domain embrace potentially all employees in the sea fisheries sector?

Does the union/employer organisation also represent members outside the sea fisheries sector?

Congruence (C)

Yes

No

Sectionalism (S)

No

No

Overlap (O)

Yes

Yes

Sectional overlap (SO)

No

Yes

Note: The domain pattern results from the answers to the questions on the scope of the domain derived in Table 5 in the annex.

At European level, the European Commission established a Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for the sea fisheries sector in 1999, while a joint committee was established in 1974. The Association of national organisations of fishing enterprises in the EU (Europêche) and the sea fishing-related organisations on the FISH Working Group of COPA-COGECA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations-General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union) on the employer side, as well as the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) on the employee side, participate in the sector’s European social dialogue. Thus, affiliation to one of these European organisations is a sufficient criterion for classifying a national association as a social partner organisation for the purpose of this study. However, it should be noted that the constituent criterion is one of sector-related membership. This is important, in particular, in the case of the ETF, which covers many other sectors. Thus, the study will include only the organisations affiliated to ETF which are related to the sea fisheries sector in terms of worker representation and especially collective bargaining, following the definition of ‘sector-relatedness’ illustrated above. It should be noted here that the COPA-COGECA FISH Working Group also covers aquaculture. However, sea fisheries issues are treated only by representantives of the relevant organisations, which in fact all belong to COGECA. Therefore, in the following text only reference to COGECA will be made.

Collection of data

The collection of quantitative data, such as those on membership, is essential for investigating the representativeness of the social partner organisations. Unless cited otherwise, this study draws on the country studies provided by the EIRO national centres. The EIRO correspondents were provided with standardised questionnaires in both Word and Excel format by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), which they completed through contacting the sector-related social partner organisations in their countries. The contact is generally made via telephone interviews, but might also – in certain cases – be established via email. In case of non-availability of any representative, the national correspondents are asked to fill out the relevant questionnaire based on secondary sources, such as information given on the social partner’s website, or derived from previous research studies.

It is often difficult to find precise quantitative data. In such cases, the EIRO national centres are requested to provide rough estimates rather than leaving a question blank, given the practical and political relevance of this study. However, if there is any doubt over the reliability of an estimate, this will be noted.

In principle, quantitative data may stem from three sources, namely:

  • official statistics and representative survey studies;
  • administrative data, such as membership figures provided by the respective organisations, which are then used for calculating the density rate on the basis of available statistical figures on the potential membership of the organisation;
  • personal estimates made by representatives of the respective organisations.

While the data sources of the labour market and economic figures cited in the report are generally official statistics (and mainly EUROSTAT or national statistical offices), the figures for the organisations are usually either administrative data or estimates. Furthermore, it should be noted that several country studies also present data on trade unions and business associations that do not meet the above definition of a sector-related social partner organisation, in order to give a complete picture of the sector’s associational ‘landscape’. For the above substantive reasons, as well as for methodological reasons of cross-national comparability, such trade unions and business associations will not be considered in this overview report. Yet, these organisations can still be found in the national contributions, which will be published together with the overview report.

Quality assurance

In order to assure the quality of the information gathered, several verification procedures have been put in place.

  • Staff of Eurofound, together with the author of this report, checked the figures provided for consistency, and ensured the organisations listed met the criteria for the scope of this study (see above).
  • Eurofound sent the national contributions to national members of the governing board, as well as to the European-level sector-related social partners’ organisations. The peak-level organisations then asked their affiliates to verify the information. Feedback received from the sector-related organisations was then taken into account, if it was in line with the methodology of the study.
  • The complete study was finally evaluated by the European-level sectoral social partners and Eurofound’s Advisory Committee on Industrial Relations, which consists of representatives from both sides of industry, governments and the European Commission.

Structure of report

The study consists of three main parts, beginning with a brief summary of the sector’s economic background. The report then analyses the relevant social partner organisations in all EU Member States, with the exception of Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, where no activities in the sector where reported.In this respect, it should be noted that, in the absence of sea fisheries activities, some of these countries reported on freshwater fishing and aquaculture (that is, Section 3 of the NACE Rev. 2 classification of activities). These countries are Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Details on industrial relations in these countries can be found in the individual national reports. Since it was not possible to prepare a national report for Bulgaria, only limited information could be collected on this country

The third part of the analysis considers the representative associations at European level.

Each section will contain a brief introduction explaining the concept of representativeness in greater detail, followed by the study findings. As representativeness is a complex issue, it requires separate consideration at national and European level. This is because the method applied by national regulations and practices to capture representativeness has to be taken into account. Furthermore, the national and European organisations differ in their tasks and scope of activities. The concept of representativeness must therefore be suited to this difference.

Finally, it is important to note the difference between the research and political aspects of this study. While providing data on the representativeness of the organisations under consideration, the report does not reach any definite conclusion on whether the representativeness of the European social partner organisations and their national affiliates is sufficient for admission to the European social dialogue. The reason for this is that defining criteria for adequate representativeness is a matter for political decision rather than an issue of research analysis.


Economic background

Data on marine fishing activities in European countries are available up to 2008. Consequently, there are only some projections and estimates concerning the effects of the recent economic crisis on the sector.

In 2007, the European countries represented around 4.6% of global fisheries and aquaculture production, which made it the fourth biggest producer worldwide. Within the EU, the three largest producers in terms of volume were Spain, France and the United Kingdom. In general, in the last 20 years, total EU production decreased slightly compared to previous years. With regard to fishing production, EU countries accounted for almost 6% of total worldwide production

. In 2007 production declined compared to the previous years. At this time, the leading countries in fisheries activities were:

  • Spain (14.3% of total volume of catches);
  • Denmark (12.7%);
  • the UK (12%);
  • France (10.9%).

As for aquaculture production, in 2007 its share of worldwide production was 2.6% in terms of volume, and 5.1% in terms of value. The main producers in terms of volume were:

  • Spain (21.7% of total production);
  • France (18.1%);
  • Italy (13.8%);
  • the UK (13.3%).

Finally, the total value of the output of fish processing activities amounted, in 2007, to around EUR 23 billion (three times the turnover of the catch sector). According to Facts and figures on the Common Fisheries Policy, published in 2010 by the European Union (4.62Mb PDF) the leading countries were Spain, Italy, France and the UK.

The above document also shows that, during the period 2002–2009, the capacity of the EU fishing fleet has declined at the annual rate of around 2%, in terms of both tonnage and engine power. Despite the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, there were 84,909 vessels in September 2009 (21,000 fewer than in 1995). Greece has the largest number of fishing vessels, although they are, on average, smaller than those of most other EU countries. In 2008, the countries with the largest number of fishing vessels were:

  • Greece (21%);
  • Spain (13%);
  • Italy (16%).

In particular, the largest shares of the total power installed were in:

  • Italy (17%);
  • France (16%);
  • Spain (15%), which also had the biggest total tonnage (25%).

According to the 2010 Annual Economic Report on the European Fishing Fleet, published by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (4.1Mb PDF), most fishing enterprises (around 90%) owned a single fishing vessel, while around 8% of companies owned between two and five vessels. According to the same report, the recent economic crisis has negatively affected the sector in 2009 and 2010. A number of projections and analysis on empirical data suggest that many companies who have also been hit by the recent fluctuation in fuel prices are struggling to survive. Although the situation varies from one country to another, in general, projections show further reductions in fleet capacity and employment.

Employment characteristics

The EU fisheries industry is the fourth largest in the world. Despite the negative effects of the recent economic crisis, fisheries, processing and aquaculture activities provide around 350,000 jobs in European countries. In particular, employment in marine fishing activities, measured in full-time equivalents (FTEs), is concentrated, according to 2007 data, in the following countries:

  • Greece (24,800 FTEs);
  • Italy (25,500);
  • Spain (35,300)

As shown in Tables 3 and 4, sectoral employment is characterised by the prevalence of male workers. In 2009, the countries for which data are available show women reaching 20% of the overall workforce only in Belgium and Greece.. Moreover, the substantial amount of self-employment appears as an additional sectoral key feature. In many cases, self-employed workers represent the majority of the sectoral workforce, and almost invariably they are a quite significant share of total workers. The only notable exceptions are Italy, Latvia and Portugal, where self-employed fishermen do not reach two-digit figures.


National level of interest representation

In many Member States, statutory regulations explicitly refer to the concept of representativeness when assigning certain rights of interest representation and public governance to trade unions and/or employer organisations. The most important rights addressed by such regulations include:

  • formal recognition as a party to collective bargaining;
  • extension of the scope of a multi-employer collective agreement to employers not affiliated to the signatory employer organisation;
  • participation in public policy and tripartite bodies of social dialogue.

Under these circumstances, representativeness is normally measured by the strength of the organisations’ membership. For instance, statutory extension provisions usually allow for extension of collective agreements to unaffiliated employers only when the signatory trade union and employer association represent 50% or more of the employees within the agreement’s domain.

As outlined, the representativeness of the national social partner organisations is of interest to this study in terms of the capacity of their European umbrella organisations for participation in European social dialogue. Hence, the role of the national actors in collective bargaining and public policy-making constitutes another important component of representativeness. The effectiveness of European social dialogue tends to increase with the growing ability of the national affiliates of the European organisations to regulate the employment terms and to influence national public policies affecting the sector. A cross-national comparative analysis shows a generally positive correlation between the bargaining role of the social partners and their involvement in public policy (Traxler, 2004). Social partner organisations that are engaged in multi-employer bargaining are incorporated in state policies to a significantly greater extent than their counterparts in countries where multi-employer bargaining is lacking. This can be attributed to the fact that only multi-employer agreements matter in macroeconomic terms, setting an incentive for the governments to seek the cooperation of the social partner organisations. If single-employer bargaining prevails in a country, none of the collective agreements will have a noticeable effect on the economy due to their limited scope. As a result, the basis for generalised tripartite policy concertation will be absent.

In summary, representativeness is a multi-dimensional concept that embraces three basic elements:

  • the social partners’ membership domain;
  • their strength;
  • their recognised role in collective bargaining as in public policymaking.

Membership domains and strength

The membership domain of an organisation, as formally established by its constitution or name, distinguishes its potential members from other groups which the organisation does not claim to represent. As already explained, this study considers only organisations whose domain relates to the sea fisheries sector. However, there is insufficient room in this report to delineate the domain demarcations of all the organisations. Instead, the report notes how they relate to the sector by classifying them according to the four patterns of ‘sector-relatedness’, as specified earlier. A more detailed description of how an organisation may relate to the sector can be found in Figure 1 and in the annex.

Regarding membership strength, a differentiation exists between strength, in terms of the absolute number of members, and strength in relative terms. Research usually refers to relative membership strength as the density – in other words, the ratio of actual to potential members.

Furthermore, a difference also arises between trade unions and employer organisations in relation to measuring membership strength. Trade union membership simply means the number of unionised persons. However, in this context, a clarification of the concept of ‘member’ should be made. Whereas in most countries recorded membership includes both employees and members who are not in active employment (such as unemployed persons and retired workers) some countries provide information on employed membership only. Hence, two measures of trade union density have to be defined: gross union density (including inactive members) and net union density (referring to employed union members only). In addition to taking the total membership of a trade union as an indicator of its strength, it is also reasonable to break down this membership total according to gender.

Measuring the membership strength of employer organisations is more complex since they organise collective entities, namely companies with employees. In this case, therefore, two possible measures of membership strength may be used – one referring to the companies themselves, and the other to the employees working in the member companies.

For a sector study such as this, measures of membership strength of both the trade unions and employer organisations have also to consider how the membership domains relate to the sector. If a domain is not congruent with the sector demarcation, the organisation’s total density, that is the density referring to its overall domain, may differ from sector-specific density, that is the organisation’s density referring to the sector. This report will first present the data on the domains and membership strength of the trade unions and will then consider those of the employer organisations.

To summarise, this report basically distinguishes between three types of organisational densities, as defined in the following table, which are – depending on data availability – also broken down into net and gross rates.

Table 2: Definition of organisational density figures
Type of density Definition Breakdown
Domain density

Number of employees (companies) organised by the organisation in the sea fisheries sector divided by total number of employees (companies) included in the organisation’s membership domain

Net and gross; Employees (for trade unions); Companies and employees (for employer organisations)

Sectoral density

Number of employees (companies) organised by the organisation in the sea fisheries sector divided by total number of employees (companies) in the sector.

Net and gross; Employees (for trade unions); Companies and employees (for employer organisations)

Sectoral domain density

Number of employees (companies) organised by the organisation in the sea fisheries sector divided by total number of employees (companies) in the sea fisheries sector as demarcated by the organisation’s domain

Net and gross; Employees (for trade unions); Companies and employees (for employer organisations)

Trade unions

Tables 6 and 7 present the trade union data on their domains and membership strength. The tables list all trade unions which meet at least one of the two criteria for classification as a sector-related social partner organisation, as defined earlier. The majority of the 22 countries included in the study record at least one sector-related trade union. The exceptions essentially concern countries where the sector is very small and/or is dominated by self-employed workers, sometimes also due to special sector regulations. These countries include:

  • Cyprus, where the sector included only 115 firms in 2009, of which 104 were self-employed workers, while the other 11 firms employed, on average, two people;
  • Malta, with a similar situation of prevalent self-employment and a significant presence of cooperative work, with no collective bargaining;
  • Estonia and Lithuania, where no sector-related industrial relations are present;
  • Finland, where only an interest organisation is present (the Finland’s Fisheries’ League, SAKL) which mostly associates self-employed workers. The collective agreement of the Cargoship Association and the Finnish Seamen’s Union (SM-U) is applied to the few employees present in the sector (116 estimated in 2009).
  • Sweden, where there is a similar single interest organisation, the Swedish Fishermen Association, (SFR) and no industrial relations are in place, due to the predominant role of self-employed workers in the sector.
  • Greece, where there are no collective bargaining and industrial relations, despite the presence of a quite complex system of trade unions centred around the Hellenic Fishermen Confederation, which is considered the peak interest organisation for Greek fishermen by laws 1361/83 and 2538/97, which regulate the sector. In fact, these trade unions have a general role in providing support to fishermen and not a representation role in collective bargaining.

In total, 45 sector-related trade unions could be identified. Of the 44 organisation for which information could be collected, two (5%) have demarcated their domain in a way which is congruent with the sector definition. This low proportion underscores the fact that statistical definitions of business activities rather differ from the lines along which employees identify common interests and band together in trade unions. It should be noted here that the Bulgarian Seamen’s Syndicate is excluded from the calculations because no information on the membership domain could be collected. It is only known that it organises and represents fishers involved in high seas industrial fisheries (Source: ETF). Domain demarcations resulting in overlap in relation to the sector occur in 27 (or 61%) of the cases. This is the commonest situation in the sea fisheries sector. Overlap generally arises from two different modes of demarcation. The first one refers to general (cross-sectoral) domains (such as ver.di in Germany). The second mode in the sector relates to various forms of multi-sector domains, covering contiguous sectors, frequently in the broader agriculture segment of the economy (such as Flai-Cgil in Italy) or in the transport industry (such as RMT in the UK or FGTE-CFDT in France). Sectional overlaps involve 11 (trade unions 25%). This mode usually emanates from domain demarcations which focus on certain categories of employees which are then organised across several or all sectors. Employee categories are specified by various parameters, such as distinct occupations (such as engineers or officers in the case of the Portuguese SEMM and OFICIASMAR), and geographic region (such as. FGAMT-CIG and ELA of Spain, which are each active only in Galicia and the Basque Country respectively). Finally, sectionalism, which ensues from the existence of sector-specific trade unions, which represent and organise only certain categories of employees in the sector, can be found in four cases (9%). These include, for instance, STPN and STPDC in Portugal, where they cover the North of the country and the district of Coimbra (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Sea fisheries sector-related trade unions and their domain patterns (N=44)

Figure 3: Sea fisheries sector-related trade unions and their domain patterns (N=44)

Source: EIRO national contributions (2011)

As the domains of the trade unions often overlap with the demarcation of the sector, so do their domains with one another in the case of those countries with a pluralist trade union ‘landscape’ in the sea fisheries sector. Table 6 also shows these inter-union domain overlaps. Inter-union overlaps of domains are endemic. In all countries with more than one sector-related trade union, the domain of any of them overlaps with the domain of all or most of the others. Depending on the scale of mutual overlap, this results in competition for members. Inter-union competition is recorded in some countries, such as Belgium, France, Italy (in part), and Portugal. In many cases, however, trade unions cooperate in joint collective bargaining at sectoral and decentralised levels.

On average, female employees represent a minority of trade union members in the unions covered by this study (with a simple mean of 35%), but the information is available only in a minority of cases (13).

Membership of the sector-related trade unions is voluntary in all cases of the Member States under consideration.

The absolute numbers of trade union members differ widely, ranging from about 2.2 million (in the case of Germany’s ver.di) to less than one hundred. This considerable variation reflects differences in the size of the economy and the comprehensiveness of the membership domain as well the small size of the sea fisheries sector in most of the EU countries, rather than the ability to attract members.

Certainly, density is the measure of membership strength which is more appropriate for a comparative analysis. In this context it should be noted that density figures in this section refer to net ratios, which means that they are calculated on the basis of active employees, rather than including union members who are not in work. This is mainly because union densities are more informative compared to gross densities, since they better reflect the capacity to represent workers in their relationship to employers and also because the latter depends on the decision to extend membership beyond active workers, which can vary considerably across countries and national models of union representation.

Membership rates (of active workers) are available for almost 30 of the sector-related organisations. Domain density (27 cases) tends to be relatively low at 15%, with eight unions under 5% and six above 20%. For density rates, if a range of values was given instead of an exact figure, calculations used the lowest value. For instance, for the 0%–9% range, 0% was used, and for the 10%–25% class, 10% was used. Compared with their overall domain densities, the sector-related trade unions’ density in the sea fisheries sector tends to be significantly lower with a mean of 5% (28 cases).

In fact, when looking at sector density (again referring only to active members), it is important to differentiate between the trade unions’ sectoral density on the one hand and their sectoral domain density on the other. Whereas the former measures the ratio of the total number of members of a trade union in the sector to the number of employees in the sector (as demarcated by the NACE classification), the latter indicates the total number of members of a trade union in the sector in relation to the number of employees who work in that part of the sector as covered by the union domain, see Table 2. This means that the sectoral domain density must be higher than the sectoral density if a trade union organises only a particular part of the sector – that is where the trade union’s membership domain is either sectionalist or sectionalistically overlapping in relation to the sector.

When taking the trade unions’ sectoral domain density into account, the trade unions’ density in the sea fisheries sector tends to be lower compared with the density ratio referring to their domain on aggregate, down from a simple mean of 15% (27 cases) to 6% (12 cases). Such relative weakness of trade unions in the sea fisheries sector appears to be linked to the specificity of the sector, which shows a prevalence of self-employed workers and a consequent low union representation and collective bargaining, so that there are also cases where the sector-related unions do not have, in fact, any members in the sea fisheries sector. This happens, for instance, in the UK, Romania, and in Slovenia. It should be noted that in Romania and Slovenia the relevant unions do indeed sign a sectoral agreement which is applied to sea fisheries, even if it has a broader scope, ‘Agriculture, aquaculture and fisheries’ in Romania and ‘Agriculture and the food-processing industry’ in Slovenia.

Employer organisations

Tables 8 and 9 present the membership data for the employer organisations in the sea fisheries sector. As is the case of the trade union side, for the majority of the 22 countries under consideration at least one sector-related employer organisation is documented, with the exception of Bulgaria, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania. In these countries no significant industrial relations activities in the sea fisheries sector are recorded, with the exclusion of Latvia, where the presence of company-level bargaining was reported. No information could be collected on sector-related industrial relations in Bulgaria. According to the report Fisheries in Bulgaria by the Directorate-General for Internal Policies for the European Parliament, ‘“There are no producer”. organisations in Bulgaria in the sense of the European legislation (Regulation EC 104/2000). Nevertheless, there are several fishermen or fish producers’ associations with a status of NGOs” (p. 38). None of the organisations mentioned in the report is affiliated to Europêche or COGECA

In at least ten of the countries where sector-related organisations are present, a proportion of the listed employer/business organisations are not a party to collective bargaining (see Table 9). According to our selection criteria outlined above, only the organisations affiliated to Europêche and COGECA, the EU-level sectoral employer association, are considered in the study. As mentioned before, more employer associations may be included in national reports, but they are excluded in this study because neither are party to national sector-related collective bargaining (the bottom-up approach) nor are they affiliates of the relevant EU-level organisations.

Eight of the 17 countries, for which employer associations were identified, have one or more employer organisations engaged in sector-related collective bargaining. The remaining nine cases include five countries where no collective bargaining takes place (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Sweden and UK) and four countries in which collective bargaining takes place at company level (Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Spain), although information on the effective extent of collective bargaining is lacking in Ireland and Spain.

Generally, business interest organisations may also deal with interests other than those related to industrial relations. Organisations specialising in matters other than industrial relations are commonly defined as ‘trade associations’ (see TN0311101S). Such sector-related trade associations also exist in the sea fisheries sector. In terms of their national scope of activities, all of the associations, which are not involved in collective bargaining according to Table 9, either primarily or exclusively act as trade associations in their country. It is the conceptual decision to include all associational affiliates to Europêche or COGECA, regardless of whether they have a role in national bargaining, which gives them the status of a social partner organisation within the framework of this study. At least 14 of the 36 employer/business organisations listed in Tables 8 and 9, belong to this group.

In nine of the 18 countries for which information on the sector-related associational landscape is given, only one single employer has been identified (Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden). A single representation pattern is therefore equally important as a pluralist representation landscape in the sector on the employers’ side, while on the trade unions’ front there were only six countries, out of 15, with single representation. This feature probably reflects the already underlined relatively small size and rather homogeneous nature of the sector, usually centred around small-owners and self-employed fishermen.

The employer organisations’ domains tend to be narrower than those of the trade unions (Figure 4). First, the two types of overlap cover 42% of cases for which the relevant information is available, compared with almost 90% in the case of unions. Congruence is more present as it concerns 17% of employer organisations instead of 5% of trade unions; similarly, sectionalism involves 41% of cases compared to 98%. This pattern is essentially linked to two features of employer representation. Trade associations tend to focus on quite specific economic activities, since they essentially act in the political arena and they can benefit from relatively high specialisation in terms of more homogeneous interests and clearer objectives. However, in the case of sea fisheries (but even if we consider the broader fisheries and aquaculture industry) the relatively narrow sectoral definition can favour the presence of overlapping representational domains, especially in the case of organisations covering the broad agriculture sector. In fact, the two types of overlap involve half of all employer organisations.

Representation of different sizes or forms lead to either sectionalism or sectional overlap, depending on the sectoral scope of representation. The most evident case of sectional overlap in the sector refers to the representation of cooperative companies in Italy, where a number of employer associations cover the cooperative sector in whole of the fisheries and aquaculture sector or even in agriculture.

Among the employer organisations covered by this study, the Slovenian SCAF has mandatory membership. However, this applies only above certain size thresholds.

Figure 5: Sea fisheries sector-related employer organisations/business associations and their domain patterns (N=30)

Figure 5: Sea fisheries sector-related employer organisations/business associations and their domain patterns (N=30)

Source: EIRO national contributions (2011)

In those countries with a pluralist structure in relation to employer organisations, these associations have often managed to form collaborative relationships. In fact, they often jointly negotiate on multi-employer agreements.

As the figures on density show (Table 9), membership strength in terms of companies widely varies with regard to both the membership domain in general and the sector-related densities. The same holds true of the densities in terms of employees. In general, both the domain and the sectoral domain densities in terms of companies tend to be a lot lower than the densities in terms of employees. This reflects the usual higher propensity of the larger companies to associate, as compared to their smaller counterparts.

The overall domain densities, in terms of employees of the employer/business organisations in the sector, tend to be higher compared with trade union densities (see above). For the associations for which related data are available (15 cases), it is not unusual to register a sectoral density higher than 50%. This refers to six organisations, that is 20% of all listed employer associations. In general, the findings suggest that in the sea fisheries sector the employers are well organised in terms of both companies and employees represented. The average sectoral density in terms of companies is 23% (20 cases) and it reaches 42% when employees are taken into account (15 cases). It must be underlined, however, that, since the employer/business association density data are available only for a limited number of countries, the data set should again be treated cautiously.

Collective bargaining and its actors

The small size and the prevalence of the self-employed and fishermen’s cooperatives significantly influences the features of collective bargaining in the sea fisheries sector. In a significant number of countries, collective agreements do not seem to be the main regulatory tool defining the terms and conditions of employment. Union representation and collective bargaining are certainly important in the larger and more organised undertakings, like those which engage in high-sea fishing. As a consequence, company bargaining also tends to prevail in cases where the traditional bargaining structure is centred on industry-wide agreements.

Tables 7 and 9 list respectively all of the trade unions and the employer associations which engage in sector-related collective bargaining. The data presented in Table 10 provide an overview of the system of sector-related collective bargaining in the 22 countries under consideration. The importance of collective bargaining as a means of employment regulation is measured by calculating the total number of employees covered by collective bargaining, as a proportion of the total number of employees within a certain segment of the economy (Traxler et al., 2001). Accordingly, the sector’s rate of collective bargaining coverage is defined as the ratio of the number of employees covered by any kind of collective agreement to the total number of employees in the sector.

To delineate the bargaining system, two further indicators are used: The first indicator refers to the relevance of multi-employer bargaining, compared with single-employer bargaining. Multi-employer bargaining is defined as being conducted by an employer organisation on behalf of the employer side. In the case of single-employer bargaining, the company, or its divisions, is the party to the agreement. This includes the cases where two or more companies jointly negotiate an agreement. The relative importance of multi-employer bargaining, measured as a percentage of the total number of employees covered by a collective agreement, therefore provides an indication of the impact of the employer organisations on the overall collective bargaining process.

The second indicator considers whether statutory extension schemes have been applied to the sector. For reasons of brevity, this analysis is confined to extension schemes which widen the scope of a collective agreement to employers not affiliated to the signatory employer organisation; extension regulations targeting the employees are therefore not included in the research. Regulations concerning the employees are not significant to this analysis for two reasons. On the one hand, extending a collective agreement to the employees who are not unionised in the company covered by the collective agreement is a standard practice of the ILO, aside from any national legislation. Secondly, employers have good reason to extend a collective agreement concluded by them, even when they are not formally obliged to do so; otherwise, they would set an incentive for their workforce to unionise.

In comparison with employee-related extension procedures, schemes that target the employers are far more significant for the strength of collective bargaining in general and multi-employer bargaining in particular. This is because the employers are capable of refraining from both joining an employer organisation and entering single-employer bargaining in the context of a purely voluntaristic system. Therefore, employer-related extension practices increase the coverage of multi-employer bargaining. Moreover, when it is pervasive, an extension agreement may encourage more employers to join the controlling employer organisation; such a move then enables them to participate in the bargaining process and to benefit from the organisation’s related services in a situation where the respective collective agreement will bind them in any case (Traxler et al., 2001).

Collective bargaining coverage

In terms of the sector’s collective bargaining coverage, six of the 16 countries for which related data are available, record a very high coverage rate of 80% or higher (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Romania); with four of them recording coverage rates of (practically) 100%. Conversely, there are six countries where no collective bargaining is reported (Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Sweden, and the UK). In the remaining countries, we find three cases of industry-wide bargaining and relatively high coverage rates (ranging from about 50% to 70%): Denmark, Netherlands and Slovenia, and one case of single-employer bargaining and lower coverage rates: Germany (15%). For four more countries, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Spain, the presence of single-employer agreements was reported, but no indication on collective bargaining coverage could be made.

These findings show a significant polarisation between countries where collective bargaining plays an important role and those where no collective agreements are in place. Some basic feature of bargaining systems seem to influence the presence of high coverage rates, like the prevalence of sectoral bargaining and the utilisation of extension practices. Also the existence of well-established national industrial relations systems can play a role. However, in the case of sea fisheries, the structural characteristics of the sector seem to be more important to sustain the presence of collective bargaining, like the absolute size of the sector, the presence of small - medium-to-large size companies, and the share of employees in overall employment.

Extension procedures are not widely used in the sector, even if they could be (such as in France, and Slovenia). They are used in Belgium, Finland, and Romania. A functional equivalent to statutory extension schemes can be found in Italy. According to the country’s constitution, minimum conditions of employment must apply to all employees. The country’s labour court rulings relate this principle to the multi-employer agreements, to the extent that they are regarded as generally binding.

Participation in public policymaking

Interest associations may participate in public policy in two basic ways:

  • they may be consulted by the authorities on matters affecting their members;
  • they may be represented in tripartite committees and boards of policy concertation.

This study considers only cases of tripartite consultation and participation which explicitly relate to sector-specific matters. Consultation processes are not necessarily institutionalised and, therefore, the organisations consulted by the authorities may vary according to the issues to be addressed and also over time, depending on changes in government. Moreover, the authorities may initiate a consultation process on an occasional rather than a regular basis. Given this variability, in Tables 7 and 9 only those sector-related trade unions and employer organisations are flagged that are usually consulted.

Trade unions

Trade unions are regularly consulted by the authorities in at least 13 of the 15 countries where sector-related trade unions are recorded. Two countries cite a lack of regular consultation of any of the trade unions (Portugal and the UK). In most countries with a multi-union system where a noticeable practice of consultation is observed, all the existing trade unions take part in the consultation process.

Employer organisations

The great majority of the sector-related employer/business organisations for which related data are available are involved in consultation procedures. Only in three countries (Cyprus, Greece, and Portugal) are no employer associations consulted on sector-related policies.

Tripartite participation

Turning from consultation to tripartite participation, the findings reveal that a sector-specific tripartite body has been established in several countries (see Table 11). They are mostly bodies with general competencies on sectoral policies. Sometimes they cover the whole of the agriculture sector, with subcommittees on fisheries. Such bodies are established in Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.


European level of interest representation

At a European level, eligibility for consultation and participation in the social dialogue is linked to three criteria, as defined by the European Commission. Accordingly, a social partner organisation must have the following attributes:

  • be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories, and be organised at European level;
  • consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member States’ social partner structures and which have the capacity to negotiate agreements, as well as being representative of all Member States, as far as possible;
  • have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation process.

Regarding social dialogue, the constituent feature is the ability of such organisations to negotiate on behalf of their members and to conclude binding agreements. Accordingly, this section on European associations of the sea fisheries sector will analyse these organisations’ membership domain, the composition of their membership and their ability to negotiate.

As outlined in greater detail below, one sector-related European association on the employee side – namely, ETF – and two on the employer side – namely, Europêche and COGECA – are particularly significant in the sea fisheries sector; they are listed by the European Commission as social partner organisations consulted under Article 154 of the TFEU. Hence, the following analysis will concentrate on these three organisations, while providing supplementary information on others which are linked to the sector’s national industrial relations actors.

Membership domain

ETF, which is affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), organises the whole transport sector and covers also fisheries. Therefore its membership domain overlaps with the sea fisheries sector. On the employers’ side, Europêche associates fishery enterprises in the European Unions, so that its representational domain largely coincides with the specific focus of the present study. COGECA organises agricultural cooperatives, so that its representation covers the whole agriculture sector. Both employer associations organise employer and business organisations.

Membership composition

In terms of membership composition, it should be noted that the countries covered by ETF and COGECA extend beyond the 22 countries examined in this study. However, the report will only consider the members in these 22 countries.

For ETF, Table 12 documents a list of membership of sector-related trade unions. In the case of ETF, there is at least one affiliation in most of the countries under consideration. Sector-related unions are not affiliates of ETF in Latvia, Romania and Slovenia. In general, this is linked to the fact that, in these cases, the relevant national organisations cover the agriculture sector. In some countries – such as Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, and Portugal – multiple memberships occur.

On aggregate, ETF counts 25 direct affiliations from the countries under examination and three indirect ones. More than half of the trade unions listed in Table 6 and Table 7 are directly affiliated to ETF. From available data on the relative strength of sectoral membership of the national trade unions, one can conclude that ETF covers the sector’s most important labour representatives. Seventeen of the 28 direct and indirect members of ETF for which information is available are involved in collective bargaining related to the sea fisheries sector. They cover seven countries (Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal). It can be noted, moreover, that the sectoral agreement which is applied in Finland in the sea fisheries sector, the Cargoship agreement, is actually signed by an affiliate of ETF, the Finnish Seamen’s Union (SMU) and the Cargoship Association, which are not covered by this study. This decision was made on the grounds that the agreement focuses on transport and it is applied to the sea fisheries employees (116 employees out of 364 workers) only for analogy. Moreover, neither of the two signatory organisations are involved in social dialogue in the sector. The only notable exceptions are the unions of the three countries where ETF has no sector-related affiliates, and collective bargaining is present in the sea fisheries sector. It should be noted, in fact, that the presence of collective bargaining at either sectoral or company-level was reported in 13 of the 22 countries covered by the study.

Table 13 lists the members of Europêche. Of the 18 countries with identified employer associations, Europêche has 18 direct affiliates in 11 countries (and three other organisations are linked to Europêche indirectly, through their affiliation to members, or by having affiliates among their members). Multiple membership is found in Spain, Italy and the UK. COGECA, whose member associations in the sea fisheries sector are listed in Table 14, has 15 affiliates in 11 countries (considering both direct affiliations and indirect links). Multiple membership is found only in Italy. National organisations affiliated to both EU-level organisations can be found in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. If we combine the two memberships, of the 18 countries for which employer associations could be identified in the sea fisheries sector, the only countries which are not covered by Europêche and COGECA are Portugal and Romania. From the available sectoral membership data of the respective organisations one can say that important national associations are affiliated.

In Portugal and Slovenia, the employer associations which engage in collective bargaining are not affiliates of the two EU-level organisations. There are also some countries (Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, and the UK) where the affiliate/s of Europêche and COGECA is/are not engaged in bargaining. Employer/business organisations which are not involved in collective bargaining may regard themselves as trade associations rather than as being actively involved in industrial relations. Of the affiliates of Europêche, at least nine are involved in sector-related collective bargaining. As for COGECA, five of the affiliates participate in sector-related collective bargaining. Taking into consideration the four common affiliates of the two EU-level organisations which engage in collective bargaining, 10 affiliates of the two organisations are parties to sector-related collective bargaining.

Europêche covers, with its affiliates, collective bargaining in five countries; COGECA’s members do the same in three countries. If we take into consideration the three countries where both their affiliates (usually the same) take part in collective negotiations, we have a consolidated figure of five countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and Netherlands). It should be remembered that multiemployer bargaining is present in nine of the 22 countries covered by this study (see Table 10), including the already mentioned peculiarity of Finland.

Capacity to negotiate

The third criterion of representativeness at the European level refers to the organisations’ capacity to negotiate on behalf of their members. ETF, Europêche and COGECA represent their members in matters of the European sectoral social dialogue.

ETF has a permanent mandate to negotiate on behalf of its members, but decisions on strategies and agreements are always subject to the approval of the internal structures (in the case of sea fisheries, the competent body is the fisheries section). Moreover, ETF’s affiliates are always involved in any kind of continuing negotiations with employers. Europêche proceeds with an ad hoc mandate from its member organisations on a case by case basis

As a final proof of the weight of ETF, Europêche and COPA-COGEPA, it is useful to look at other European organisations which may be important representatives of the sector. This can be done by reviewing the other European organisations to which the sector-related trade unions and employer associations are affiliated.

For the trade unions, these affiliations are listed in Table 7. Accordingly, a number of European organisations other than ETF are associated with a significant proportion of both sector-related trade unions and countries. For reasons of brevity, only those European organisations which cover at least three countries are mentioned here.

This criteria allows us to identify only one EU-level organisation, the European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism Sectors and Allied Branches (EFFAT). EFFAT shows eight affiliations covering four countries. Apart from Italy, where the major trade unions are affiliated to both ETF and EFFAT, this situation corresponds to the country where the sea fisheries sector falls within the representational domain of agriculture organisations, on both sides of industry. It should be underlined that ETF and EFFAT can have common affiliates, but, in principle, these affiliates declare membership according to the relevant European sectoral federation which organises each specific sector of those they operate in, so that sea fisheries workers are generally declared only to ETF. As a consequence, genuinely relevant affiliations to EFFAT should be regarded as only those where sector-related unions which engage in collective bargaining covering the sea fisheries sector and are affiliated only to EFFAT, as in the cases of Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia.

It should be noted that the affiliations listed in Table 7 may not necessarily be exhaustive. Nevertheless, and despite the large number of affiliations to European organisations other than ETF, this overview underlines the principal status of the latter association as the sector’s labour representative.

An analogous review of the membership of the national employer/ business associations can be derived from Table 9. Most of them entertain rather few affiliations to European associations other than Europêche and COGECA. In fact, on the employers’ side the presence of COGECA covers the situations where agriculture is the reference sector for sea fisheries. Only a handful of other EU-level organisation is present and none of them covers three countries or more.

In conclusion, ETF, Europêche, and COGECA appear to be the most important sector-related European organisations.


Commentary

The sea fisheries sector is certainly an uncharacteristic sector, since it covers just a small segment of the labour market, is highly regulated – in terms of ‘effort limitation’ (that is restriction on the fleet that sets out to sea and the amount of time that it can spend fishing), fishing quotas, times and methods of fishing – and is characterised by the prevalence of self-employed fishermen, sometimes organised in cooperatives. Its small size and the predominence of self-employed workers are probably the main reasons for the polarisation of sectoral industrial relations, with many of the 25 countries studied having no collective bargaining. Collective agreements at any level – sectoral, territorial, and company – were reported only in 13 countries. Most of these show a well-established system of negotiation with high coverage rates, despite the usually small size in terms of employment. Policy making, because of its direct impact on the environment and fishing resources, is usually accompanied by consultation with sectoral interest organisations – even if there is no collective bargaining – and tripartite bodies are relatively widespread.

Overall, ETF, Europêche and COGECA have to be regarded as the most important EU-wide representatives of the sector’s employers and employees.

Roberto Pedersini, Università degli Studi di Milano


Bibliography

Traxler, F. (2004) ‘The metamorphoses of corporatism: From classical to lean patterns’, in European Journal of Political Research, Wiley Online Library, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 571-598

Traxler, F., Blaschke, S. and Kittel, B. (2001) National labour relations in internationalized markets, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press


Annex: Tables 3 to 15

Table 3: Total employers and employment in Sea fisheries, 1999 and 2009
  Year Number of companies Total employment Male employment Female employment Total sectoral employment as % of total employment in economy
BE

1999

n.a.

691

n.a.

n.a.

0

BE

2009

86

551

412

139

0

BG

1999

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

BG

2003

n.a.

3,430

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

CY

1999

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

CY

2009

115

138

n.a.

n.a.

0.04

DE

1999

n.a.

2,515

1,965

55

0

DE

2009

n.a.

1,150

n.a.

n.a.

0

DK

2000

1,860

4,605

4,473

132

0

DK

2009

1,061

2,088

2,008

80

0

EE

2005

121

2,700

2,500

n.a.

0.4

EE

2007

86

2,100

1,600

n.a.

0.3

ES

2001

n.a.

63,916

54,328

9,589

0

ES

2008

n.a.

47,751

39,631

7,982

0

FI

1999

442

172

145

27

0

FI

2009

303

364

321

43

0

FR

1999

5,971

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR

2007

5,187

25,000

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

GR

2008

899

11,127

10,000

1,127

0

GR

2009

1,076

12,338

11,200

1,138

0

IE

2003

n.a.

4,000

n.a.

n.a.

0

IE

2009

n.a.

2100

n.a.

n.a.

0

IT

2004

6,748

35,069

30,860

4,209

0.14

IT

2008

8,897

29,349

25,827

3,522

0.12

LT

2006

152

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

0

LT

2010

134

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

0

LV

1999

119

1,795

1,563

232

0.23

LV

2009

73

829

700

129

0.1

MT

2002

488

552

530

22

0

MT

2008

564

1,203

1,163

40

0

NL

1999

470

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

NL

2009

395

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PL

2000

1,004

7,007

n.a.

n.a.

0

PL

2009

1,181

3,004

n.a.

n.a.

0

PT

1998

195

5,078

4,435

643

0

PT

2008

1,190

8,783

7,712

1,071

0

RO

1999

n.a.

5,000

n.a.

n.a.

0.06

RO

2008

28

3,000

n.a.

n.a.

0.03

SE

1999

826

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

SE

2009

1,255

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

SI

1999

90

193

178

15

0.025

SI

2009

56

105

94

11

0.012

UK

1999

n.a.

13,374

12,861

513

1.0

UK

2009

1,715

10,256

10,256

0

1.0

‘0’ indicates that there is actual employment, but it represents an unspecified figure below 1% of total employment

n.a. = not available

Source: EIRO national centres (2011), European Parliament (2011) for Bulgaria. Reference years are for employment data; those for number of companies may vary. For detailed description of sources and reference years for number of companies please refer to the national reports.

Table 4: Total employees in Sea fisheries, 1998 and 2008
  Year Total employees Male employees Female employees Total sectoral employees as % of total employees in economy
BE

1999

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

BE

2009

473

352

121

0

BG

1999

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

BG

2009

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

CY

1999

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

CY

2009

34

n.a.

n.a.

0

DE

1999

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

DE

2009

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

DK

2000

2,464

2,388

76

0

DK

2009

881

828

53

0

EE

2005

1,100

n.a.

n.a.

0.2

EE

2007

1,300

n.a.

n.a.

0.2

ES

2001

39,059

36,487

2,572

0

ES

2008

27,329

25,432

1,897

0

FI

1999

117

94

23

0

FI

2009

116

92

14

0

FR

1999

21,666

n.a.

n.a.

0

FR

2007

16,126

n.a.

n.a.

0

GR

2008

3,451

2,500

951

0

GR

2009

3,705

2,700

1,005

0

IE

2003

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IE

2009

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IT

2004

34,232

31,493

2,739

0.19

IT

2008

28,649

26,357

2,292

0.14

LT

2006

2,072

n.a.

n.a.

0

LT

2010

1,463

n.a.

n.a.

0

LV

1999

1,758

1,531

227

0.22

LV

2009

824

695

129

0.1

MT

2002

70

n.a.

n.a.

0

MT

2008

221

n.a.

n.a.

0

NL

1999

2,100

1,800

300

0

NL

2009

700

600

100

0

PL

2000

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PL

2009

6,000

n.a.

n.a.

0

PT

1998

4,933

4,307

626

0

PT

2008

8,032

7,019

1,013

0

RO

1999

4,000

n.a.

n.a.

0.08

RO

2008

2,000

n.a.

n.a.

0.04

SE

1999

325

n.a.

n.a.

0

SE

2009

269

n.a.

n.a.

0

SI

1999

78

n.a.

n.a.

0.012

SI

2009

39

n.a.

n.a.

0.005

UK

1999

2,524

2,289

235

0

UK

2009

4,343

4,343

0

0

‘0’ indicates that there are sectoral employees, but they represent an unspecified figure below 1% of total employment

n.a. = not available

Source: EIRO national centres (2011).

Table 5: Determining the ‘sector relatedness’ of an organisation

Scope

Question in the standardised questionnaire

Possible answers

Notes

Domain of the organisation within the sector

Does the union/employer organisation’s domain embrace potentially all employees in the sea fisheries sector?

Yes/No

This question has not been asked directly in the questionnaire, but is considered to be ‘Yes’ if the replies to all of the five following sub-questions are ‘yes. It is considered to be ‘no’, if at least one of the replies is ’no’.

   

.

…cover ‘basically all’ groups of employees (min.: blue collar, white collar) in the Sea fisheries sector?

Yes/No

This question refers to the organisation’s scope of the sector with regard to different types of employment contracts. As the contractual forms are rather heterogeneous, the minimum requirement to answer this question with ‘yes’ would be the fact that both blue-collar and white-collar workers are potentially covered by the organisation’s domain.

…cover the ‘whole’ Sea fisheries sectorin terms of economic activities, (i.e. including all sub-activities)

Yes/No

This question refers to the economic sub- activities of the NACE code chosen. In the spreadsheet part of the questionnaire, correspondents have been provided a detailed breakdown of sub-activities to the four-digit level.

… cover employees in all types of companies (all types of ownership: private, public…) in the Sea fisheries sector?

Yes/No

This question refers to ownership. Some organisations might limit, for instance, their domain to domestically owned, or to public sector companies/employees only.

… cover employees in enterprises of all sizes in the Sea fisheries sector?

Yes/No

Often, organisations limit their domain to enterprises by size class (for example,SMEs only).

…cover all occupations in the Sea fisheries sector?

Yes/No

Some organisations (notably trade unions) limit their domain to certain occupations only. This sub-question intends to identify these occupational organisations.

Domain of the organisation outside the sector

Does the union also represent members outside the sea fisheries sector?

Yes/No

This question is again being asked directly to the correspondents.

Source: Standardised Excel-based questionnaire, sent to EIRO National correspondents (2011).

Table 6: Domain coverage and membership of trade unions in sea fisheries, 2009/10
 

Union

Membership

Domain coveragea

Membership

Members total

Members active

Members sector

Members sector active

Female member-ship (%) of total member-ship

BE*

ACV-Transcom

Overlap

Voluntary

84613

65529

300

200

14

BE*

BTB-UBOT

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

40000

300

200

n.a.

BE*

ACLVB-CGSLB

Overlap

Voluntary

260000

n.a.

30

20

n.a.

BG

Seamen’s Syndicate

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

DE

ver.di

Overlap

Voluntary

2138200

n.a.

2000

n.a.

51

DK

3F

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

362700

n.a.

1000

n.a.

ES*

FSC-CC.OO

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ES*

TCM-UGT

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

325000

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ES*

ELA Hainbat

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

22937

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ES*

FGAMT-CIG

Sectional overlap

n.a.

9309

8004

9309

843

39

FR*

FMNS-CGT

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR*

FGTE-CFDT

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR*

FFPSM-M

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR*

SMPP-FNAM

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR*

SMP-CFTC

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR*

FEETS-FO

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IE

SIPTU

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IT*

Flai-Cgil

Overlap

Voluntary

283642

n.a.

283642

n.a.

n.a.

IT*

Fai-Cisl

Overlap

Voluntary

199000

199000

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IT*

Uila-Pesca

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IT*

FISALS CONFSAL

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

7500

6500

500

500

55

IT*

PESCA CONFSAL

Overlap

Voluntary

1500

1500

1500

1500

25

IT*

FESICA CONFSAL

Overlap

Voluntary

375000

375000

1560

1560

40

LV

LLPNA-LATU

Overlap

Voluntary

1938

1852

140

140

64

NL

CNV Vakmensen

Overlap

Voluntary

140000

140000

170

170

n.a.

PL*

KSM MiR NSZZ Solidarność

Overlap

Voluntary

6000

3500

1000

500

3

PL*

FZZ MiR

Overlap

Voluntary

3443

2200

n.a.

500

n.a.

PT*

SIMAMEVIP

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PT*

STPN

Sectionalism

Voluntary

200

200

200

200

n.a.

PT*

STPDC

Sectionalism

Voluntary

20

20

20

20

n.a.

PT*

STPC

Sectionalism

Voluntary

100

100

100

100

n.a.

PT*

SLPPA

Congruence

Voluntary

200

200

200

200

n.a.

PT*

STPS

Sectionalism

Voluntary

150

150

150

150

n.a.

PT*

UGT Pescas

Congruence

Voluntary

50

50

50

50

n.a.

PT*

SINDEPESCAS

Overlap

Voluntary

300

300

300

300

n.a.

PT*

SITEMAQ

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PT*

SINCOMAR

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PT*

SEMM

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PT*

Oficiaismar

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PT*

SOEMMM

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

RO*

AGROSTAR

Overlap

Voluntary

50000

50000

0

0

40

RO*

CERES

Overlap

Voluntary

42000

42000

0

0

30

SI*

TUAFIS

Overlap

Voluntary

11500

11500

0

0

50

SI*

TUSF

Overlap

Voluntary

4000

4000

0

0

40

UK

RMT

Overlap

Voluntary

79499

n.a.

0

0

11

a= Please find a more detailed description of the trade unions’ membership domain with regard to the sector in Table I in the ANNEX.

* = Domain overlap with other sector-related trade unions.

n.a. = not available

Table 7: Density, collective bargaining, consultation and affiliations of trade unions in sea fisheries, 2009/10
 

Trade unions

Union densities (%)

CB

SD

National affiliation

European affiliation

Domain total

Domain active

Sector

Sector active

Sectoral domain

Sectoral domain active

BE

CSV-Transcom

n.a.

26-50

n.a.

26-50

n.a.

26-50

Yes

Yes

ACV-CSC

ETF

BE

BTB-UBOT

n.a.

26-50

n.a.

26-50

n.a.

26-50

Yes

Yes

ABVV-FGTB

ETF

BE

ACLVB-CGSLB

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

10-25

Yes

Yes

 

ETF

BG

Seamen’s Syndicate

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ETF

DE

ver.di

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

DGB

ETF, UNI-Europa

DK

3F

n.a.

80

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

50

Yes

Yes

LO

ETF; NTF; EMF; EFFAT; EPSU; EMCEF; EWB; UNI Europa

ES

FSC-CC.OO

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

 

ETF

ES

TCM-UGT

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

 

ETF

ES

ELA Hainbat

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

 

ETF

ES

FGAMT-CIG

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

     

ETF

FR

FMNS-CGT

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

CGT

ETF

FR

FGTE-CFDT

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

ETF

FR

FFSPM-M

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

   
FR

SMPP-FNAM

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

ETF

FR

SMP-CFTC

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

ETF

FR

FEETS-FO

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

ETF

IE

SIPTU

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

ETF

IT

Flai-Cgil

19.2

19.2

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Cgil

ETF, EFFAT

IT

Fai-Cisl

14.2

14.2

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Cisl

EFT, EFFAT

IT

Uila-Pesca

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Uil

ETF, EFFAT

IT

FISALS CONFSAL

n.a.

n.a.

1.7

1.7

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

No

Confsal

CESI

IT

PESCA CONFSAL

4.3

4.3

5.2

5.2

5.2

5.2

Yes

Yes

Confsal

CESI

IT

FESICA CONFSAL

18.8

18.8

5.4

5.4

5.4

5.4

Yes

Yes

Confsal

CESI

LV

LLPNA-LATU

1.6

1.6

16.9

16.9

16.9

16.9

No

Yes

LBAS

EFFAT

NL

CNV Vakmensen

n.a.

n.a.

24.0

30.0

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

CNV

ETF

PL

KSM MiR NSZZ Solidarność

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

No

Yes

NSZZ Solidarność

ETF

PL

FZZ MiR

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

No

Yes

OPZZ

ETF

PT

SIMAMEVIP

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

Yes

No

FSSP; CGTP

 
PT

STPN

6.7

6.7

2.5

2.5

6.7

6.7

Yes

No

FSSP; CGTP

 
PT

STPDC

0.7

0.7

0.2

0.2

0.7

0.7

Yes

No

FSSP; CGTP

 
PT

STPC

3.3

3.3

1.2

1.2

3.3

3.3

Yes

No

FSSP; CGTP

 
PT

SLPPA

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

Yes

No

FSSP; CGTP

 
PT

STPS

5.0

5.0

1.9

1.9

5.0

5.0

Yes

No

FSSP; CGTP

 
PT

UGT Pescas

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

Yes

No

UGT

 
PT

SINDEPESCAS

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

Yes

No

UGT

 
PT

SITEMAQ

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

Yes

No

FESMAR; UGT

(ETF)

PT

SINCOMAR

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

Yes

No

FESMAR; UGT

(ETF)

PT

SEMM

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

Yes

No

FESMAR; UGT

(ETF)

PT

Oficiaismar

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

No

No

CGTP; FECTRANS

ETF

PT

SOEMMM

n.a.

10-25

n.a.

0-9

n.a.

0-9

No

No

UGT

ETF

RO

AGROSTAR

31.4

31.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Yes

Yes

BNS

EFFAT

RO

CERES

28.0

28.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Yes

Yes

Cartel Alfa

EFFAT

SI

TUAFIS

50.0

50.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Yes

Yes

ZSSS

EUL; EFFAT

SI

TUSF

9.0

9.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

No

Yes

   
UK

RMT

n.a.

n.a.

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

No

n/a

TUC

ETF

CB = Collective Barganining, SD = Social dialogue, consultation

a = National affiliations put in italics; for the national level, only cross-sectoral (i.e. peak-level) associations are listed; for the European level sectoral associations only; affiliation put in parenthesis means indirect affiliation via higher-order unit.

n.a. = not available

Table 8: Domain coverage and membership of employer/business organisations in sea fisheries, 2009/10
 

Employer Organisation

Domain coveragea

Type

Membership

Companies

Companies in sector

Employees

Employees in sector

BE

Rederscentrale

Congruence

Voluntary

86

86

450

450

CY

Panagrotikos Farmers’ Union

n.a.

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

DE

DFV

Overlap

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

3,000

n.a.

DE

DHV

Sectionalism

Voluntary

4

4

260

260

DK

Danish Fishermen's Association

Sectionalism

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

EE

EPKK

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ES

CEPESCA

Sectionalism

Voluntary

1,625

1,600

21,300

21,000

ES

FEOPE

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ES

FEABP

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ES

FNCP

Sectionalism

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

225

n.a.

ES

UNACOMAR

Sectionalism

Voluntary

200

n.a.

10,000

n.a.

FR

UAPF

Congruence

Voluntary

20

20

2,500

2,500

FR

SNCEP

Congruence

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR

COOP MARITIME

Congruence

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FR

FFSPM

Congruence

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

GR

PEPMA

Sectionalism

n.a.

400

400

10,000

10,000

GR

PASEGES

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IE

IFPO

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IE

FIF

Sectionalism

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

IT

FEDERPESCA

Overlap

Voluntary

2,500

2,200

20,000

18,000

IT

FEDERCOOPESCA

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

472

430

20,475

n.a.

IT

LEGAPESCA

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

477

376

15,000

12,000

IT

AGCI AGRITAL

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

1,001

600

12,619

7,400

IT

ANAPI PESCA

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

1,800

1,620

2,800

2,592

IT

UNCI PESCA

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

450

450

5,500

5,500

MT

KM

Sectional overlap

Voluntary

60

2

4,500

599

NL

RVZ

Sectionalism

Voluntary

4

4

477

477

NL

SNV

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

PL

PAOP

Sectionalism

Voluntary

2

2

n.a.

n.a.

PT

ADAPI

Sectionalism

Voluntary

43

43

2,200

2,200

RO

FNPAR

Overlap

Voluntary

28

0

13,600

0

SE

SFR

Overlap

Voluntary

1,330

1,223

n.a.

n.a.

SI

CCIS-CAFE

Overlap

Voluntary

245

3

12,000

10

SI

SCAF

Overlap

Mixed (Mandatory over a certain size threshold)

111,500

15

115,000

35

UK

NFFO

Sectionalism

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

UK

SFF

Sectionalism

Voluntary

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

a= Please find a more detailed description of the employer organisations’ membership domain with regard to the sector in Table II in the ANNEX

n.a. = not available

Table 9: Density, collective bargaining, consultation and affiliations of employer/ business organisations in sea fisheries, 2009/10
 

Employer organisation

Density (%)

CB

SD

National affiliations

European affiliationsa

Companies

Employees

Domain

Sector

Sectoral domain

Domain

Sector

Sectoral domain

BE

Rederscentrale

100

100

100

90-100

90-100

90-100

Yes

Yes

 

Europêche; EAPO

CY

Panagrotikos Farmers’ Union

n.a.

60

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

No

 

COGECA

DE

DFV

91-100

n.a.

n.a.

91-100

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

Deutscher Raiffeisen Verband

Europêche; (COGECA)

DE

DHV

91-100

n.a.

n.a.

91-100

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

DFV

(Europêche)

DK

Danish Fishermen's Association

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

None

Europêche

EE

EPKK

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

 

COGECA

ES

CEPESCA

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

CEOE

(Europêche)

ES

FEOPE

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

CEPESCA

Europêche

ES

FEABP

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

CEPESCA

Europêche

ES

FNCP

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

 

Europêche

ES

UNACOMAR

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

10

10

No

Yes

CEPES

COGECA

FR

UAPF

0.4

0.4

0.4

10

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

Europêche

FR

SNCEP

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

FEAP

FR

COOP MARITIME

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

COGECA

FR

FFSPM

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

 

Europêche

GR

PEPMA

51-75

51-75

51-75

55

70.0

14.0

No

No

None

Europêche; MEDISAMAK

GR

PASEGES

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

 

COGECA

IE

IFPO

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

FIF

COGECA

IE

FIF

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

 

(COGECA)

IT

FEDERPESCA

50.0

24.7

44.0

66.7

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Confindustria. Federmare. Federop.it

Europêche; MEDISAMAK

IT

FEDERCOOPPESCA

n.a.

4.8

n.a.

n.a.

41.89

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Confcooperative

(COGECA); Europêche

IT

LEGAPESCA

n.a.

4.23

n.a.

n.a.

25.83

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Legacoop

(COGECA); Europêche

IT

AGCI AGRITAL

n.a.

6.74

7.06

n.a.

9.05

22.56

Yes

yes

Agci

COGECA; Europêche

IT

ANAPI PESCA

n.a.

18.21

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

Confapi

 

IT

UNCI PESCA

n.a.

5.06

19.2

n.a.

49.7

100

Yes

Yes

Unci

 

MT

KM

100

0.4

100

100

68

91-100

No

Yes

UHM

CoopsEurope; CECOP; COGECA

NL

SNV

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

 

Europêche; COGECA

NL

RVZ

91-100

1

91-100

91-100

0-9

0-9

Yes

Yes

SNV

(Europêche); (COGECA)

PL

PAOP

66

0-9

66

 

27.40

55.00

No

Yes

None

Europêche

PT

ADAPI

21.50

3.60

21.50

55.00

0

0

Yes

No

None

None

RO

FNPAR

66.18

0

0

30

n.a.

n.a.

Yes

Yes

CPISC

 

SE

SFR

76-90

91-100

91-100

 

25

9

No

Yes

None

Europêche

SI

CCIS-CAFE

7

5

5

52

90

90

Yes

Yes

CCIS

CIAA

SI

SCAF

99

27

27

85

51-75

51-75

No

Yes

 

COGECA

UK

NFFO

26-50

26-50

26-50

51-75

51-75

51-75

No

Yes

MPA Fishing Coalition. UK Marine Stakeholders Forum

Europêche

UK

SFF

26-50

26-50

26-50

51-75

n.a.

n.a.

No

Yes

n.a.

Europêche

CB = Collective Barganining, SD = Social dialogue, consultation

a= National affiliations put in italics; for the national level, only cross-sectoral (i.e. peak-level) associations are listed; for the European level sectoral associations only; affiliation put in parenthesis means indirect affiliation via higher-order unit.

Note: The figures have rounded in all cases. Densities reported as 0% hence refer to a figure of 0.49% to more than 0%.

n.a. = not available

Table 10: System of sectoral collective bargaining (2009/10)
 

CBC (%)

(estimates)

Share of MEB in total CBC (%) (estimates) Extension practicesa
BE

100

100b

2

CY

No collective bargaining

   
DE

15

0

 
DK

>50

100

0

EE

n.a.

   
ES

n.a.

0d

 
FI

100

100

2

FR

100

100b

1

GR

No collective bargainingc

   
IE

n.a.

0d

 
IT

90

100b

(2)

LT

No collective bargaining

   
LV

n.a.

0d

 
MT

No collective bargaining

   
NL

68

100e

0

PL

n.a.

0d

 
PT

84

77b

1

RO

100

100

2

SE

No collective bargaining

0

 
SI

64

100

0

UK

No collective bargaining

   

CBC = collective bargaining coverage: employees covered as a percentage of the total number of employees in the sector

MEB = multi-employer bargaining relative to single-employer bargaining

SEB = single-employer bargaining

Extension practices (including functional equivalents to extension provisions, i.e. obligatory membership and labour court rulings):

a= 0 = no practice, 1 = limited/exceptional, 2 = pervasive. Cases of functional equivalents are put in parentheses.

b= supplemented/complemented by single-employer agreements

c= The only exception is the employment contract concluded with Egyptians workers (seasonal workers), which is a prerequisite in order for an Egyptian fisherman to be granted a residence permit as well as to be registered with the Agricultural Insurance Organization

d= Data on CBC is not available, but the presence of single-employer agreements is reported

e= Sub-sector of trawlers including 4 employers and 14 vessels

n.a. = not available

n/a = not applicable

Table 11: Tripartite sector-specific boards of public policy (200/10)
  Name of the body and scope of activity Origin Trade unions participating Business associations participating
BE

Technical working group on fisheries of the Strategic Advisory Council for Agriculture and Fisheries. Consultation on regional policies in Flanders

Statutory

ACV-Transcom

BTB-UBOT

ACLVB-CGSLB

Rederscentrale

EE

Estonian Qualifications Authority (Kutsekoda), Food Industry and Agriculture Professional Council

Statutory

Estonian Fishers’ Association (Eesti Kalapüüdjate Ühing)a

Estonian Association of Fishery (Kalaliit) and Estonian Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce (EPKK)

ES

Marine Social Institute (Insituto Social de la Marina)

Statutory body part of the Ministry of Labour

CCOO

UGT

CIG

ELA

CEOE

IT

Central Advisory Commission for Fishing and Aquaculture

Statutory at the Ministry of Ministry of Agricultural Policies and Forestry

Flai

Fai

Uila

Federpesca

Federcoopesca

Lega Pesca

Agci Agrital

Anapi Pesca

LV

Fisheries Consultative Council

Statutory at the Ministry of Agriculture

LLPNA

LZA

PL Tripartite Team for Seafaring and Sea Fishery (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Żeglugi i Rybołówstwa Morskiego)

Agreement. It was established within the Tripartite Commission for Socio-Economic Affairs (Komisja Trójstronna ds. Społeczno-Gospodarczych, TK)

KSM MiR NSZZ Solidarność

FZZ MiR (OPZZ)

The Nationwide Trade Union of Officers and Seafarers (Ogólnopolski Związek Zawodowy Oficerów i Marynarzy, OZZ OiM)

Trade Unions’ Forum (Forum Związków Zawodowych, FZZ)

ZAP

RO Commission for social dialogue Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Ministerul Agriculturii şi Dezvoltării Rurale, MADR)

Statutory

AGROSTAR, CERES

FNPAR

SI The Council of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food

Agreement

TUAFIS

CCIS-CAFE

The Slovenian Employers’ Association

The Agricultural Institute of Slovenia

Table 12: ETF Membership related to Sea Fisheries (2011)+
  Members

BE

ACV-CSC Transcom

BE

BTB-ABVV

BE

CGSLB

BG

Seamen’s Syndicate

DE

Ver.di

DK

3F

ES

FSC-CC.OO

ES

FGAMT-CIG

ES

ELA Hainbat

ES

TCM – UGT

FR

CFTC

FR

CGT Maritime

FR

FGTE-CFDT

FR

FO-FEETS

IT

FAI-CISL

IT

FLAI-CGIL

IT

UILA-PESCA

NL

CNV Vakmensen

PL

NSZZ Maritime

PL

FZZ MIR (SFTUF)

PT

FESMAR

PT

Oficiaismar

PT

SOEMMM

UK

Unite the Union

UK

RMT

+ Membership list confined to the sector-related associations of the countries under consideration

* Involved in sector-related collective bargaining

** No information available on collective bargaining involvement

Table 13: Europêche Membership (2011)+
 

Members

BE

Rederscentrale

DE

Deutscher Fischerei Verband

DK

Danmarks Fiskeriforening

ES

Federación Española de Organizaciones Pesqueras – FEOPE

ES

Federación Española de Armadores de Buques de Pesca – FEABP

ES

Federación Nacional de Cofradías de Pescadores

FR

Union des Armateurs à la Pêche de France

FR

Fédération Française des Syndicats Professionnels Maritimes

GR

PEPMA Panhellenic Union of Middle Range Fisheries Shipowners

IT

Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Pesca - FEDERPESCA

IT

Confederazione Cooperative Italiane – FEDERCOOPESCA

IT

Lega Nazionale Cooperative e Mutue - LEGAPESCA

IT

Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane - AGCI AGRITAL

NL

Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij

PL

North Atlantic Producer Organisations

SE

Sveriges Fiskares Riksförbund

UK

National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations

UK

Scottish Fishermen’s Federation

+ Membership list confined to the sector-related associations of the countries under consideration; associations in parentheses are indirectly affiliated to Europêche via higher-order units

* Involved in sector-related collective bargaining

** Collective bargaining involvement via lower-level unit(s)

Table 14: COGECA Membership related to Sea Fisheries (2011)+
  Members
CY

Panagrotikos Farmers’ Union

DE

Deutscher Fischerei Verband (through the Deutscher Raiffeisen Verband)

EE

Estonian Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce (EPKK)

ES

Unión Nacional de Cooperativas del Mar de España (UNACOMAR)

FR

Coopération Maritime

GR

Confédération Panhellénique des Unions des Coopératives Agricoles (Paseges)

IE

Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation (IFPO)

IT

Confederazione Cooperative Italiane (FEDERCOOPESCA)

IT

Lega Nazionale Cooperative e Mutue (LEGAPESCA)

IT

Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane – AGCI AGRITAL

MT

Kooperativi Malta

NL

Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij

SI

Chamber for Agriculture and Forestry of Slovenia

+ Membership list confined to the sector-related associations of the countries under consideration; associations in parentheses are indirectly affiliated to COGECA via higher-order units

* Involved in sector-related collective bargaining

** Collective bargaining involvement via lower-level unit(s)

Table 15: List of organisations
  Abbreviation Name
Supranational level

 

AEPM

Association Européenne des Producteurs de Molusques

 

BSRAC

Baltic Sea Regional Advisory Council

 

CECOP

The European Confederation of Workers’ Cooperatives, Social Cooperatives and Social and Participative Enterprises

 

CIAA

European Confederation of Food and Drink Industries

 

COGECA

General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union

 

CoopsEurope

Cooperatives Europe

 

COPA-COGECA

Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations - General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union

 

EAPO

European Association of Fish Producers Organisations

 

ESCA

European Shipowners Community Associations

 

ETF

European Transport Workers' Federation

 

Europêche

Association of national organisations of fishing enterprises in the EU

 

FEAP

Federation of European Aquaculture Producers

 

GEOPA-COPA

Employers’ Group of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union

 

ICA Coop

International Cooperative Alliance

 

ICFA

International Coalition of Fisheries Associations

 

ITF

International Transport Workers' Federation

 

LDRAC

LD Regional Advisory Council

 

Medisamak

Association des professionnels du secteur de la pêche des pays riverains de la Méditerranée

 

North Sea RAC

North Sea Regional Advisory Council

 

NSRAC

North Sea Regional Advisory Council

 

NWWRAC

North Western Waters Regional Advisory Council

 

NWWRAC

North Western Waters Regional Advisory Council

 

Pelagic AC

Pelagic AC

 

PRAC

Pelagic Regional Advisory Council

 

RAC MED

Regional Advisory Council for the Mediterranean

National level

BE

Rederscentrale

Central of Shipowners (Rederscentrale)

BG

Seamen’s Syndicate

Seamen’s Syndicate

BG

KSNB

Confederation of Independent Syndicates in Bulgaria

CY

PANAGROTIKOS

Panagrotikos Farmers’ Union

DE

DFV

Deutsche Fischereiverband

DE

DHV

Deutsche Hochseefischereiverband

DK

DF

Danmarks Fiskeriforening (Danish Fishermen's Association)

EE

EPKK

Estonian Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce

EE

EKL

Estonian Fish Breeders’ Association

EE

Kalaliit

Estonian Association of Fishery

ES

CEPESCA

Fishing Spanish Confederation

ES

FEOPE

Federación Española de Organizaciones Pesqueras

ES

FEABP

Federación Española de Armadores de Buques de Pesca

ES

FNCP

National Federation of Fisherman’s Association

ES

UNACOMAR

National Union of Sea Cooperatives

ES

CEOE

Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales

ES

CEPES

Confederación Empresarial Española de Economía Social

FR

CGT

General Confederation of Labour (Confédération générale du travail)

FR

UAPF

Union des Armateurs à la Pêche de France

FR

SNCEP

Syndicat National des Chefs d'Entreprise à la pêche Maritime

FR

COOP MARITIME

Cooperative Maritime

FR

FFSPM

Fédération Française des Syndicats Professionnels Maritimes

FR

FMNS-CGT

Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Maritime

FR

FGTE-CFDT

Fédération Générales des Transport et de l’Equipement

FR

SMP-CFTC

Syndicat national des Marins Pêcheurs

FR

FEETS-FO

Fédération de l’Equipement de l’Environnement des Transports & des Services

FR

SMPP-FNAM

Syndicat méditerranéen des pêcheurs professionnels - Fédération nationale des activités

IE

IFPO

Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation

IE

FIF

Federation of Irish Fishermen

IT

FEDERPESCA

Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Pesca

IT

FEDERCOOPPESCA

Confederazione Cooperative Italiane

IT

LEGAPESCA

Associazione Nazionale delle Cooperative di Pesca

IT

AGCI AGRITAL

Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane

IT

ANAPI PESCA

Associazione Nazionale Autonoma Piccoli Imprenditori della Pesca

IT

Unci Pesca

Unione Nazionale Cooperative Italiane Pesca

IT

Confindustria

Italian Employers' Confederation

IT

Federmare

Italian Fishing and Sea Confederation

IT

Federop

Federazione delle organizzazioni di produttori della pesca e dell’acquacoltura italiane (Italian Fishing and Aquaculture Federation)

IT

Confcooperative

Confederazione Cooperative Italiane, (Confederation of Italian Cooperatives)

IT

Legacoop

Lega nazionale delle cooperative (National Association of cooperatives)

IT

Agci

Associazione generale cooperative italiane (General Association of Italian Cooperatives)

IT

Confapi

Confederazione italiana della piccola e media industria (Italian Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Industry)

IT

Unci

Unione Nazionale Cooperative Italiane (National Union of Cooperatives)

MT

KM

Koperattivi Malta

MT

UHM

Union of United Workers

NL

RVZ

Redersvereniging voor de Zeevisserij

NL

SNV

Stichting van de Nederlandse Visserij

PL

ZAP

Polish Shipowners Association (Związek Armatorów Polskich)

PL

PAOP

North Atlantic Producers Organisation (Północnoatlantycka Organizacja Producentów)

PL

Pracodawcy RP

Employers of Poland

PT

ADAPI

Associação dos Armadores das Pescas Industriais (Association of Industrial Fishery)

PT

CONFAGRI

Confederacão Nacional das Cooperativas Agrícolas e do Credito Agrícola de Portugal (National Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives and of Agricultural Credit of Portugal)

RO

FNPAR

The National Agriculture Producer Federation from Romania (Federaţia Naţională a Producătorilor Agricoli din România)

RO

CPISC

Industry, Services and Commerce Employers' Confederation from Romania (Confederaţia Patronală din Industriei Servicii şi Comerţ din România)

SE

SFR

Sveriges fiskares riksförbund

SI

CCIS-CAFE

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia –Chamber of Agricultural and Food Enterprises

SI

SCAF

Slovenia’s Chamber of Agriculture and Forestry

SI

CCIS

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia

UK

NFFO

National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations

UK

SFF

Scottish Fishermen's Federation

UK

MPA Fishing Coalition

Marine Protected Areas Fishing Coalition

UK

 

UK Marine Stakeholders Forum

EF/11/80/EN

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