European Foundation
for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions

European Commission
Directorate-General for
Employment and Social Affairs

QUALITY OF LIFE IN EUROPE

Perceptions of living conditions in an enlarged Europe



Perceptions of living conditions in an enlarged Europe

The following reports constitute part of the Foundation's series on quality of life in Europe.

Low income and deprivation in an enlarged Europe (H. Russell and C. Whelan)
Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe (P. Böhnke)
Life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe (J. Delhey)
Working and living in an enlarged Europe (K. Kovács and B. Kapitány)
Health and care in an enlarged Europe (J. Alber and U. Köhler)
Fertility and family issues in an enlarged Europe (T. Fahey and Z. Spéder)
Migration trends in an enlarged Europe (H. Krieger)

These reports and accompanying summaries are available on the Foundation website at www.eurofound.eu.int/qual-_life

Authors: Jens Alber and Tony Fahey
Research institute: Social Science Research Centre (WZB), Berlin, and Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Dublin
Foundation project: Quality of life in central and eastern European candidate countries
This study has analysed a series of Eurobarometer surveys carried out at the request of the Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs.
Research management: Hubert Krieger, Robert Anderson

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A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int).

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For every tree felled, at least one new tree is planted.

Foreword

The Lisbon Summit highlighted social policy as a core element in Europe's strategy for becoming 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with better jobs and greater social cohesion' by 2010. This objective defines a series of social policy challenges for the EU. The present report, a joint initiative of the Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, addresses several of these key issues, such as social exclusion and poverty, the relationship between quality of life and quality of work, fertility, migration and mobility, satisfaction with quality of life, care and intergenerational support.

Examining quality of life in 28 European countries, including the acceding and candidate countries as well as the current Member States of the EU, the report provides, for the first time, an analysis of the views and experiences of the citizens of the new Europe on selected aspects of living conditions. The analysis is based on data from the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey carried out in the acceding and candidate countries in Spring 2002 and standard EU 15 Eurobarometers.

It represents the first in a series of reports on quality of life in an enlarging Europe that will be published by the Foundation and complements the monitoring activities of the Commission as documented in the annual report on the social situation in the EU.

Willy Buschak
Acting Director
European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

Jerôme Vignon
Director
Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs
European Commission

Country codes in figures and tables

EU Member States (protocol order)	
Belgium	BE
Denmark	DK
Germany	DE
Greece	EL
Spain	ES
France	FR
Ireland	IE
Italy	IT
Luxembourg	LU
Netherlands	NL
Austria	AT
Portugal	PT
Finland	FI
Sweden	SE
United Kingdom	UK
Acceding countries (protocol order)	
Cyprus	CY
Czech Republic	CZ
Estonia	EE
Hungary	HU
Latvia	LV
Lithuania	LT
Malta	MT
Poland	PL
Slovakia	SK
Slovenia	SI
Candidate countries (protocol order)	
Bulgaria	BG
Romania	RO
Turkey	TR
EU 15	15 Member States of the European Union (pre-May 2004)
EU 25	25 Member States of the European Union (post-May 2004)
AC 10	10 countries to accede to the European Union in May 2004
ACC 13	10 acceding countries, plus the three candidate countries

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Introduction

As Europe moves towards enlargement to embrace ten new Member States in May 2004, there is increasing pressure on its policymakers to strike the right balance to ensure a cohesive, strong and productive new European Union. Living conditions and quality of life for citizens play a key role in determining the successful outcome of enlargement. Several recent initiatives to provide information and data on these issues have sought to understand the situation in the context of a 25-country Union or indeed within an enlarged Europe of 28 states.

This report represents one of these initiatives, providing an integrated summary of the findings from a series of comparative studies on quality of life, living conditions, and related areas in the 13 acceding and candidate countries (ACC 13) and 15 Member States of the European Union (EU 15) [1]. The studies were based on a single composite dataset compiled largely from a Eurobarometer survey carried out by the European Commission in the ACC 13 in Spring 2002 (Eurobarometer CC).

The survey covered a diverse range of topics:

1. Several dimensions of living conditions and quality of life: income, deprivation, working conditions, perceptions of social exclusion, satisfaction with various domains of life, and perceptions of certain issues related to health, caring and family issues.
2. Fertility aspirations and outcomes.
3. Migration intentions.

Relevant data from previous standard Eurobarometer surveys carried out in the 15 Member States between 1998 and 2001 were extracted and added to the information already gathered for the ACC 13, thus creating a single data source on the total 28 countries (EU 28).[2] Based on these data, an international team of researchers drafted seven studies on different aspects of the overall quality of life theme, and an additional report covering the technical aspects of the data.

This series of comparative studies represents the launching pad for the Foundation's major research phase of analytical monitoring on quality of life in Europe. The studies based on Eurobarometer data will be shortly complemented by analytical reports on additional topics not covered by Eurobarometer data, including access to public services, housing, commuting, work–life balance and time use, and social capital. This second phase of analysis is based on the recent Foundation 28-country survey on quality of life in Europe carried out in 2003, providing a harmonised dataset based on a survey of around 21,000 respondents.

Aims of the quality of life reports

The main objective of the series of reports was to contribute to the monitoring and analysis of living conditions and quality of life in the ACC 13, based on comparisons with the EU 15. The guiding concept of the work was that of 'quality of life'. This concept, as outlined further below, is based on an understanding of human well-being as multi-dimensional (that is, as embracing factors beyond income and material resources, such as health, education and social relationships) and as encompassing subjective perceptions as well as objective conditions.

It was not intended that the data on which the studies were based would provide a comprehensive view of quality of life, nor was emphasis to be placed on the national and institutional contextual factors (such as the character of political systems or levels of social provision) which have such a strong bearing on the quality of life experienced by individuals. The primary aim was to analyse certain key dimensions of quality of life. This would be done in a way that was consistent across the ACC 13 and to allow for comparisons with the EU 15.

The studies are among the first to bring the EU 15 and ACC 13 together in a unified analysis of prevailing social conditions. They thus provide a social picture of the 'new' rather than the 'old' Europe and are timely in that they reveal the situation on the eve of enlargement, due to take place in May 2004.

The comparison between different country groupings, e.g. AC 10 or CC 3 with EU 15 results, has to take into account the exact meaning and relevance of these averages. The averages are built on the basis of the relative population size of each country. Consequently the AC 10 average is strongly influenced by the Polish results and the CC 3 average by the Turkish results (Poland and Turkey being the biggest population units in each group).

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[1] ACC 13 comprises both the 10 countries at the 'acceding' stage of membership of the EU (AC 10), set to join in May 2004, and the three countries at the 'candidate' stage (CC 3). AC 10: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. CC 3: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. EU 15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

[2] A table of variables used in the dataset and including the specific Eurobarometer sources is attached as an annex to this report.

The subject matter of the studies is of interest both on account of the range of issues covered and their relevance to EU policy concerns. The reports deal with issues such as poverty, social exclusion, working conditions, social integration and migration, all of which occupy a high position on the EU policy agenda. Policy development in these domains will undoubtedly be strongly affected by the accession of the new states. Other issues, such as fertility and family support, are outside the realm of EU policy competence but are of keen interest to many EU national governments. The picture of the 'new Europe' depicted by the studies series should help to provide the context for a number of important policy debates which are developing in tandem with EU expansion.

The aim of the studies is to:

- give a descriptive account of the various dimensions of quality of life covered in the data, with particular reference to patterns within the ACC 13 and comparisons with the EU 15;
- analyse the inter-relationships between key dimensions, and between elements within each dimension, in order to enrich understanding of the nature of quality of life.

The broader purpose was to establish the benefits of a quality of life perspective in comparing the prevailing conditions of the ACC 13 and the EU 15 and to draw out the policy implications.

This report aims to draw together the main findings of all these studies and look at their significance for overall patterns of quality of life and living conditions in the EU 28. Specifically, it draws significant comparisons between the ACC and the EU in this area and considers implications for policy in the wake of enlargement.

The concept of 'quality of life'

The concept of quality of life on which the studies were based is extensively discussed in a paper published by the Foundation (Fahey, Nolan and Whelan, 2003). The key points to note about the concept are:

- It is based on a multi-dimensional view of human well-being, and aims to go beyond a narrow economic focus on income and material conditions as components of welfare.
- There is no consensus on the domains, which should be included in quality of life. Cummins's (1996) analysis of 173 different domain names used in a large number of quality of life studies concluded that most could be included under six different domain headings: relationships with family and friends, emotional well-being, health, work and productive activity, feeling part of one's local community, and personal safety. An alternative broad classification used in a number of the present reports is the distinction drawn up by Allardt (1993) between 'having' (income and material conditions), 'loving' (human relationships and belonging), and 'being' (education, psychological well-being). The selection of domains in a particular analysis is often guided by the purpose for which the analysis is intended (e.g. to address a particular field of policy) rather than by an absolute definition of what constitutes quality of life.
- Quality of life is usually measured using both objective and subjective indicators. The distinction between the two is not always clear-cut, for example in the case of health, where subjective states such as pain or fatigue may rank alongside and interact with objectively observable symptoms such as high temperature or blood pressure as indicators of one's state of health. Furthermore, many so-called objective indicators are based on self-reports which may be distorted by subjective influences (e.g. social desirability bias may influence self-reports of amounts of alcohol consumed). Yet many indicators relate to subjective states (happiness, life satisfaction, fear of crime, trust in government, etc.) which are clearly distinguishable from conditions which, in principle at least, are externally observable (amount of household income, size of dwelling, incidence of burglary in a neighbourhood). Thus, while most indicators are clearly identifiable as either objective or subjective, some occupy a grey area where the distinction between the two is less clear.

The use of subjective indicators is the most contentious aspect of the quality of life approach. Other multi-dimensional approaches to the measurement of human well-being (such as the OECD system of social indicators and the Swedish 'level of living' approach – OECD, 1999; Vogel, 2002) avoid subjective indicators on the grounds that their meaning is too uncertain to provide clear, easily interpretable information. The 18 statistical indicators for social inclusion adopted by the Laeken European Council in December 2001 (the 'Laeken indicators') do not include subjective indicators (see Atkinson *et al*. 2002 where the scientific rationale on which the Laeken indicators were based is set out; for a critique of the absence of a subjective dimension in the Laeken indicators, see Jowell 2003). The position adopted in the present studies is that the subjective dimension is an important part of quality of life but that measures of that dimension need to be explored and evaluated alongside objective indicators in order to establish their significance. In this respect, the results of the report may inform the future debate on the Laeken indicators and more generally the process of the Open Method of Coordination on social inclusion with its 'Joint Report' and 'National Action Plans' (NAPs).

Strengths and limitations of the research

The data on which the studies are based have obvious strengths: they encompass all 28 countries which will eventually make up the enlarged EU and they deal with a number of dimensions of quality of life simultaneously.

At the same time, there are some limitations to the data:

- Response rates for the national Eurobarometers were varied and, in some cases, low. In the Eurobarometer CC 2002, for example, response rates ranged from a low of 38% in Turkey and Slovenia to a high of 65% in Cyprus and the Czech Republic. Extensive re-weighting of the data (by age, sex, region, household size, education and marital status) was carried out to improve the representativeness of the samples.
- At the country level, sample sizes were modest (1,000 cases in most instances with the exception of Poland and Turkey with 2,000 cases). These are adequate for providing general population profiles, but too small to allow for detailed analysis of sub-groups which might be of particular interest from a quality of life or social exclusion point of view (e.g. lone-parent families, the unemployed, immigrants). This problem is exacerbated in connection with population categories, which are likely to be under-represented in general population surveys such as the Eurobarometer surveys. This is the case, for example with the Roma in Slovakia and Romania, where they represent up to 7% of the population. These categories include highly marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities, the homeless and those not living in standard housing (e.g. the Roma) as well as population groups at the other end of the spectrum, such as the very rich. This limitation does not seriously distort the overall representativeness of the samples, since the understated categories are likely to account for small proportions of the total population, but it does mean that they should not be used to reflect the situation of particular small groups who may be in extremely disadvantaged (or advantaged) circumstances.
- While the wide range of topics covered by the data is a strong point, this also implies that none of the topics could be treated in any great depth. Some of the dimensions of quality of life are measured by means of a narrower range of indicators than would be considered adequate in dedicated surveys.
- In the case of the data on the EU 15, variables are drawn from a number of different Eurobarometer surveys (see Annex). This restricts the degree to which variables for those countries can be cross-classified with each other. For example, the variables on household income and on feelings of being left out of society come from different standard Eurobarometers and so, in the case of the EU countries, it is not possible to explore whether these two factors are related to each other. Furthermore, a small number of variables contained in the Eurobarometer CC have no counterparts in standard Eurobarometer EU surveys. Comparisons with the EU are thus not possible on some dimensions.

None of the problems listed above undermines the overall value of the data, especially in view of the wide breadth of geographical scope and range of topics offered. But they do require a certain degree of caution in the presentation and interpretation of findings. The studies should therefore be regarded as the first steps in the direction of a comprehensive monitoring and analysis of quality of life in the EU 28.

Income and material resources 1

Enlargement of the EU brings the 'having' component of quality of life to the centre of attention, since new Member States will bring extremes of material disadvantage into the Union. At present, GDP per capita in the AC 10 as a whole (adjusted for purchasing power parities) is at 45% of the current EU, and the GDP per capita of the poorest AC 10 states (Lithuania and Latvia) is one-third that of the EU. This represents a lower level of economic development than was encountered in previous enlargements. Greece, Spain and Portugal were at about 60% of the EU mean GDP per capita when they joined in 1981 and 1986 respectively and they have achieved considerable convergence since.

The next wave of enlargement will thus sharply widen the range of inequality across the EU. At present, the richest EU state (Luxembourg) has a GDP per capita 2.8 times that of the poorest (Greece). This is already a wide regional disparity. In the USA, by contrast, the richest states such as Connecticut and Massachusetts have an economic output per capita that is less than twice that of the poorest states such as Mississippi and Arkansas (*Statistical Abstract of the United States 2002*, Table 643). However, when the EU increases to 25 states, the disparity in GDP per capita between Luxembourg and the poorest new state (Latvia) will widen to a 6.5 fold differential.

Moreover, many of the former communist countries in central and eastern Europe experienced sharp economic decline following the collapse of communism in the late 1980s. Some AC 10 countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia weathered the transition relatively well. Large proportions of the population in other countries, however, suffered from economic insecurity and loss of living standards (see Weise *et al.* 2001). Even countries such as Lithuania, currently experiencing rapid economic growth, are still only returning to the level of economic output and macro-economic stability they experienced prior to 1989. Thus, they are not only disadvantaged relative to the EU average but also relative to their past.

Policy implications

So what do these new extremes of economic disadvantage in the enlarged EU mean for Europeans' quality of life and what challenges do they pose for EU policy?

The focus on 'quality of life', as a framework for the measurement and analysis of human welfare, stems largely from dissatisfaction with reliance on income and material conditions alone as yardsticks of human progress. Yet the quality of life approach does not deny the importance of the material dimension. Rather, it assumes that while adequate material resources may not be sufficient for human well-being, they are nevertheless necessary.

Four main perspectives emerge in approaching the material dimension from this perspective:

1. Levels of material disadvantage found in the ACC 13 compared to the EU 15;
2. Segments of population most likely to be disadvantaged;
3. Degree to which these kinds of disadvantage link together at household level to form patterns of multiple disadvantage;
4. Whether or not people who are disadvantaged in an objective sense feel disadvantaged or socially excluded.

Table 1 – Monthly household income in the EU 28 countries

Country	Mean (in euro)	Number
Denmark	2,660.67	868
Luxembourg	2,015.22	299
Sweden	1,879.26	792
Finland	1,570.25	909
Belgium	1,494.97	555
Netherlands	1,403.78	834
UK	1,286.16	782
Germany	1,198.66	1,675
France	1,094.65	741
Italy	996.77	554
Ireland	918.95	431
Austria	914.00	705
Cyprus	826.39	452
Malta	621.19	427
Spain	593.77	554
Slovenia	562.03	813
Portugal	441.39	638
Czech Republic	314.03	710
Greece	255.94	702
Poland	241.06	1,637
Hungary	200.75	875
Turkey	196.90	1,932
Slovakia	187.34	751
Estonia	181.16	817
Latvia	167.66	878
Lithuania	145.65	774
Romania	79.49	931
Bulgaria	73.68	912
Total	**740.65**	

Source: Russell, H. and Whelan, C., *Low income and deprivation in an enlarged Europe.*

Notes: Based on Eurobarometer CC data. Equivalence scale = square root of household size

Table 2 – Proportion of total income controlled for bottom and top quartiles, by country

	Non-equivalised Income (%)		*Equivalised Income (%)*		
	Bottom quartile	**Top quartile**	**Bottom quartile**	**Top quartile**	**Ratio**
Malta	13.1	44.7	12.2	43.7	3.6
Cyprus	9.1	44.6	10.7	45.6	4.3
Czech Republic	15.3	42.3	14.8	42.6	2.9
Slovakia	14.4	40.6	17.3	38.6	2.2
Slovenia	11.5	42.4	13.1	41.8	3.2
Hungary	12.7	40.9	12.4	41.8	3.4
Poland	14.1	43.3	11.8	45.2	3.8
Estonia	10.2	46.1	9.9	46.2	4.7
Latvia	12.1	48.8	11.5	47.4	4.1
Lithuania	10.0	46.9	10.6	46.6	4.4
Turkey	9.0	49.6	7.2	53.0	7.4
Bulgaria	8.9	49.4	9.9	48.9	4.9
Romania	8.1	48.8	8.5	49.5	5.8
Belgium	13.5	45.8	13.1	43.4	3.3
Germany	14.2	38.7	14.2	38.7	2.7
Austria	13.0	42.3	12.1	40.5	3.3
Netherlands	11.6	40.8	11.4	43.2	3.8
Luxembourg	12.6	37.5	10.6	40.7	3.8
France	13.6	40.4	12.9	40.9	3.2
Italy	12.5	41.3	11.5	43.4	3.8
Spain	12.5	36.4	12.2	39.1	3.2
Greece	10.5	42.7	11.0	44.1	4.0
Portugal	8.9	47.4	10.3	48.5	4.7
United Kingdom	7.7	49.1	8.0	51.3	6.4
Ireland	7.8	49.8	8.0	51.3	6.4
Denmark	10.1	40.6	12.0	39.9	3.3
Finland	9.1	45.1	10.1	44.7	4.4
Sweden	10.7	43.4	11.3	43.0	3.8
Total	**11.3**	**43.9**	**11.4**	**44.4**	**3.9**
AC 10	12.3	44.1	12.4	44.0	3.5
ACC 13	11.6	45.4	8.6	50.5	5.9
EU 15	11.2	42.7	11.2	43.5	3.9

Notes: Calculations based on weighted income figures. Means not adjusted for country size.
Source: Russell, H. and Whelan, C., *Low income and deprivation in an enlarged Europe.*

Levels of material disadvantage

Measures of household income in the data were crude and their accuracy was affected by high rates of non-response. They must, therefore, be interpreted with caution.

At face value, they corroborate the disparities between countries indicated by data on GDP per capita but they also suggest that income inequalities within the acceding countries are no greater than in the EU 15. Looking at the shares of total equivalised household income held by the top and bottom quartiles of households, the AC 10 appear, in fact, to be slightly more egalitarian than the EU (see Table 2). The top quartile in the EU has almost four times more income than the bottom quartile, while the corresponding ratio in the AC 10 is only a 3.5 times differential. Eurostat data on the Laeken indicators for the acceding countries[3] show a marginally lower level of income inequality in the acceding countries compared to the EU – for example, the acceding countries have a Gini[4] coefficient of 28 compared to 29 in the EU. Some of the more egalitarian countries in the AC 10 (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) also appear to have income inequalities which compare well with those of the social democratic countries in the EU such as Denmark and Sweden (see table 2). On the other hand, countries such as Estonia and Lithuania approach the levels of inequality found in some EU countries such as Ireland and the United Kingdom.

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[3] The 18 statistical indicators for social inclusion adopted by the Laeken European Council in December 2001 (known as the 'Laeken indicators'). See New Cronos database, Theme 3 (Population and social conditions), Domain: Income and living conditions, Collection: Laeken indicators.

[4] The Gini index provides a measure of income or resource inequality within a population. It is the most popular worldwide measure of income inequality.

The situation is different in the CC 3, partly because of Turkey and its population size which at 67 million inhabitants (compared to Romania's 22 million and Bulgaria's 8 million) could have a disproportionate impact on the results. Income inequalities are wider in Turkey than in any other EU 28 country.

The results suggest that although the AC 10 may be poorer in an absolute sense than the EU – and in the case of many of the former communist states may be poorer now than prior to 1989 – the AC 10 as a whole has not more relative income poverty than the EU. Again, Laeken indicator data produced by Eurostat corroborate this implication. Such data for 2001 indicate that 13% of the AC 10 population were below a relative income poverty line, defined as 60% of median national income in each country. The corresponding poverty rate in the combined EU was slightly higher, at 15%.

Current income provides only a partial indication of households' disposable income. An alternative indicator of households' material situation exists (see table 3). This indicator, based on a seven-item basket of household appliances (including car and television), is a more realistic measure of deprivation than that based on current income, giving a different representation of disadvantage than that shown by national relative income poverty rates. This expectation is confirmed below, revealing the ACC 13 to be in a considerably more disadvantaged position than the EU 15. For example, households in the AC 10 on average lack twice as many goods ($1\frac{1}{2}$ from a list of seven items) as do households in the EU (around $\frac{1}{2}$ item on average). The situation in the CC 3 is even worse where, for example, it is revealed that Romanians do not possess nearly three out of seven items.

It is important, however, not to overstate the level of inequality between ACC 13 households, nor the absolute levels of deprivation involved. For example, the mean number of items lacked by households in the ACC 13 is only slightly above two. This suggests that ownership of major household goods is quite widespread and this is confirmed by data on the level of possession of the individual items. For example, ownership of televisions and refrigerators is almost universal in all countries: 97% of the ACC 13 population own a television and 95% own a refrigerator.

But ownership of less essential goods, such as microwave ovens and personal computers, falls to low levels (10% or below) in the poorer countries. Similarly, just over a third of households in the ACC 13 owns a car or van. Moreover, in many ACC 13 households, major household goods may have been purchased prior to the onset of the economic upheavals associated with the transition from communism, raising questions about their quality or if they function at all. Nevertheless, saying that ACC 13 countries are poor by EU standards does not mean that their populations are widely deprived in an absolute sense.

Table 3 – Level of deprivation on 7-item scale, by country

Malta	0.22
Luxembourg	0.26
Netherlands	0.29
Belgium	0.36
France	0.36
Cyprus	0.45
United Kingdom	0.45
Austria	0.47
Denmark	0.52
Italy	0.53
Slovenia	0.54
Finland	0.56
Germany	0.76
Czech Republic	0.80
Ireland	0.89
Spain	1.15
Greece	1.22
Slovakia	1.29
Hungary	1.37
Poland	1.52
Estonia	1.54
Lithuania	1.79
Portugal	1.99
Latvia	2.07
Bulgaria	2.36
Turkey	2.57
Romania	2.92
AC 10	1.40
ACC 13	2.06
EU 15	0.64

Notes: Country group figures are weighted to adjust for country population size. Items in scale are TV, video recorder, telephone, dishwasher, microwave, car or van, PC.

Source: Russell, H. and Whelan, C., *Low income and deprivation in an enlarged Europe.*

Persons most likely to be disadvantaged

The findings highlight the social categories most prone to poverty and disadvantage in the ACC 13, (again bearing in mind that some marginal groups, such as the Roma and the homeless, were likely to be inadequately represented in the data). According to the research, material disadvantage in the ACC 13 is distributed along the same lines as the EU. This includes the 'traditional' stratification variables that capture education, social class and the nature of households' connection to the labour market. The disadvantaged are thus most likely to be poorly educated, dependent on low-skill employment and vulnerable to unemployment. Other characteristics often considered as major risk factors for social disadvantage, such as household or family structure and age, did not emerge as consistent predictors.

While social disadvantage is thus widely linked to low levels of education in comparisons across individuals and households, it is less clear that the same relationship holds true for cross-country comparisons. For example, AC 10 countries have reasonably high average levels of education – or at least, compared to a number EU Member States, they have a reasonably low incidence of poor education (European Commission, 2001). Although questions remain about the technical and functional quality of educational qualifications in many acceding countries, it would seem that these countries are not educational laggards. Their current low level of economic development, however, appears to be at least partly out of kilter with their level of human capital development.

Patterns of multiple disadvantage

As well as examining inequalities in different aspects of material resources, the analysis also focused on the degree to which individual forms of deprivation combine to create multiply deprived households. In other words, do those households lacking one aspect of material resources also lack others? Or does a lack in one area tend to be compensated for in another?

The conclusion was that multiple deprivation occurs but is far from the norm. Compensation patterns are also widespread. There is a limited degree of overlap in the ACC 13 between two aspects of disadvantage at household level – low income and lack of household goods (see table 4). In the better-off countries in the ACC 13, such as Cyprus, Malta and the Czech Republic, only small minorities were deprived in terms of both income and household goods. Even in the worst-off countries, however, where overall levels of disadvantage were high, the proportions deprived on either one or the other count far exceeded the proportion who were deprived on both. In Bulgaria, for example, one of the poorest countries, 63% were either in the bottom income quartile *or* were lacking at least one deprivation item, but only 22% were both in the bottom income quartile *and* lacking at least one deprivation item.

Perceptions of disadvantage

An important feature of the quality of life perspective on human welfare is that it takes into account how people feel about their situation as well as the objective characteristics of that situation. So how do the objective and subjective dimensions relate to each other and what added insight into people's quality of life is obtained by taking the subjective dimension into account? This question is a permanent motif throughout this report.

The report examines the role of access to money and related material resources (that is, the 'having' dimension) in shaping people's subjective sense of well-being. The findings indicate that the relationship between objective material conditions and subjective states is strongest in connection with one particular measure of subjective well-being – people's reported satisfaction with life. This relationship is particularly important because life satisfaction is often considered to be one of the core indicators (if not the core indicator) of the subjective dimension of quality of life.

When people were asked to rate the factors which contributed most to quality of life, income consistently ranked very high, underlining the importance of 'having' for the subjective sense of well-being. In almost all countries, it ranked in the top three most important factors (along with health and family) as contributors to current quality of life. In 24 of the 28 countries, it was ranked as the most important factor likely to improve current quality of life. Furthermore, when people's propensity to feel socially excluded was examined, it was found that material factors are highly important: low GDP per capita and widespread poverty are among the strongest influences on people's perceptions of social exclusion (unemployment is a further major factor).

Thus, a basic economic indicator such as GDP per capita turns out to have strong predictive power in regard to subjective life satisfaction. This suggests that while GDP per capita may often be criticised as a limited and overly materialistic indicator of the human condition, it nevertheless contains much of what is required to give people a positive sense of well-being.

This is not to say, however, that subjective well-being is wholly dependent on economic influences. Examining other aspects of the subjective dimension reveals that the link between objective conditions of 'having' and subjective feelings of well-being is less clear-cut or can be mediated by non-economic factors. This is particularly the case concerning the role of social support and family integration as buffers against feelings of lack of social integration (these issues are dealt with later in connection with the 'loving' dimension of quality of life).

Table 4 – Distribution of combined income deprivation variable, by country

%	Outside bottom quartile and not lacking any deprivation items	In bottom quartile or lacking at least one deprivation item	In bottom quartile and lacking at least one deprivation item
Malta	68	27	4
Cyprus	58	33	9
Czech Republic	50	39	12
Slovakia	38	45	17
Slovenia	61	27	12
Hungary	37	46	17
Poland	39	43	20
Estonia	32	49	18
Latvia	23	55	22
Lithuania	27	53	21
Turkey	27	52	21
Romania	17	60	23
Bulgaria	16	63	22

Source: Russell, H. and Whelan, C., *Low income and deprivation in an enlarged Europe.*

Social buffers

Social support and family integration resources are found to be as widely present in the AC 10 as in the EU (though they were less present in the CC 3 and they may also be less present in marginalised population sub-groups). Furthermore, when people's subjective sense of poor social integration was analysed – that is, people's feelings of being 'left out of society', of being undervalued by people they meet, and of being looked down upon by others – social buffers were especially important in the acceding countries in moderating the impact of material conditions such as low income or joblessness. The findings concluded that social support effectively mitigates the effects of financial hardship or unemployment on the subjective dimension of social integration, especially in the ACC 13.

Social integration and exclusion 2

The concept of social exclusion should not be understood simply as a synonym for multiple deprivation. It is a concept that refers to a lack of social integration in the form of poor family support systems and/or lack of social networks outside the family, in addition to lack of command over material resources. The concept focuses on the degree to which people are integrated into a web of social relations, capable of participating in the social and political life of the society around them. It has a dynamic connotation, implying a chain of events which, if uninterrupted, leads from one form of deprivation, such as income poverty, to multiple forms of deprivation, and finally to social exclusion in the sense of detachment from social bonds. Ultimately, progressive detachment may lead to the formation of subcultures. These could re-integrate individuals into sub-groups, but would entail splitting society between a mainstream culture and minority no-go areas with their own mores and rules. Bearing in mind the distinction between the 'extent of achievement' and the 'freedom to achieve' (Sen, 1992), the term exclusion should be limited to involuntary ruptures of social relations among those who are deprived. This implies not applying it to single individuals who choose to avoid contact with others despite having the possibility to interact and participate.

Two main factors are at the root of growing social exclusion.

- First, the possible development of a two-speed knowledge-based society where sizeable minorities of unskilled workers can no longer keep pace with the skill demands of the high-tech economy.
- Second, welfare state cuts may impinge disproportionately on disadvantaged groups who fall through both market- and state-provided forms of social integration.

Social exclusion is, therefore, much more than mere deprivation in a system of stratification, where some move into the lead and others bring up the rear but all move together at the same time. The new concern is that societies might split apart so that social relations are ruptured and sizeable minorities become progressively detached from the economic, social and political order of a community (cf. Dahrendorf 1988).

Against this background, the focus of the report on social integration (Böhnke) is on the perception of exclusion as viewed by European citizens. The survey questionnaire asked people to agree or disagree with the following statements:

> 'I don't feel that the value of what I do is recognised by the people I meet';
>
> 'I feel left out of society';
>
> 'I don't feel that I have the chance to play a useful part in society';
>
> 'Some people look down on me because of my income or job situation'.[5]

Perception of social exclusion

The majority of Europeans interviewed perceive themselves to be socially integrated. In 25 out of 28 countries, more than half of the population does not experience any of the four integration deficits listed above. 68% of the EU 25 population and 69% of the EU 15 feel they are fully socially integrated. A further 19% agree with just one of the four items from the exclusion index (see table 5 overleaf). And only a small minority of 1% of the enlarged European population experiences multiple exclusion in the sense of lacking recognition, feeling left out of society, and seeing themselves as worthless and inferior at the same time.

This report defines the population feeling socially excluded as the percentage of those who report two or more of the four integration deficits. By this yardstick, 12% of the population in EU 15 countries, and 14% in acceding countries consider themselves to be outsiders. Following enlargement, the European average will remain at 12%, but the average for the ACC 13 would be considerably higher at 23%, largely on account of reported perceptions found in Turkey and Bulgaria. There is a wide diversity in the proportions who perceived themselves as lacking social integration within the AC 10, ranging from 6% to 27%, as compared to a range from 7% to 14% in the current EU[6].

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[5] Based on these questions, an index was constructed of perceived social exclusion which ranks from 0 (in case of no agreement with any item) to 4 (agree or strongly agree with all four items). The summary of this analysis proceeds in five steps. First it examines how frequently Europeans perceive themselves to be socially excluded. Then it analyses which groups of people are at a particularly high risk of perceived exclusion. Thirdly it analyses to what extent deprivation translates into exclusion and what social buffers offset the effect of deprivation on perceived exclusion. Fourthly, it examines to what extent Europeans have similar ideas on the causes of social exclusion. And finally it reflects on some of the likely consequences of exclusion and possible policy implications.

[6] Interpretation of these figures should take account of the fact that the Roma people represent up to 10% of the population in some of the acceding and candidate countries and are likely to be under-represented in the present data.

Table 5 – Index of perceived social exclusion (% of population reporting number of integration deficits)

	Number of integration deficits					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**2 and more**
Slovenia	81	14	4	1	0	6
Denmark	79	15	4	2	1	7
Spain	77	15	6	2	1	8
Austria	76	14	7	2	1	11
Cyprus	75	14	9	2	1	13
Malta	73	15	9	4	0	13
Ireland	73	16	5	3	2	10
Hungary	72	15	7	5	1	13
Germany	71	17	7	3	1	12
Netherlands	71	22	5	2	0	7
United Kingdom	69	17	8	4	2	14
Finland	69	18	7	3	4	14
Sweden	69	23	7	2	1	8
EU 15	69	19	8	3	1	12
Poland	68	21	8	2	1	11
Greece	68	21	8	3	1	12
Luxembourg	68	22	7	2	0	9
EU 25	68	19	8	3	1	12
Belgium	67	21	7	4	2	12
France	67	19	10	3	2	15
Portugal	65	20	9	5	1	15
AC 10	64	22	9	3	1	14
Italy	62	24	10	3	1	14
Estonia	59	24	12	4	2	18
Romania	59	22	10	6	3	19
Czech Republic	56	25	12	5	2	18
Lithuania	56	28	12	4	1	16
ACC 13	54	24	14	6	3	23
Latvia	53	28	15	4	1	20
Slovakia	45	29	18	7	2	27
Bulgaria	44	26	19	8	3	29
Turkey	39	27	20	10	5	34

Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*

Notes: Social Exclusion Index, summing up agreement with four statements indicating the perception of social exclusion, the respective items are 'I don't feel that the value of what I do is recognised by the people I meet', 'I feel left out of society', 'I don't feel that I have the chance to play a useful part in society' and 'Some people look down on me because of my income or job situation' (agree or strongly agree), weight by weight2 for country group comparison, weight by weight3 for country specific results.

Which groups feel most excluded?

Subjective feelings of social exclusion vary only slightly among different socio-economic groups such as younger and older people or men and women (see table 6). So-called new divides such as gender or generation have little impact on feelings of social integration. Long-term illness is associated with a lack of perceived social integration in all acceding and candidate countries, but the data's limitations prevent a comparison with EU Member States. Traditional inequalities such as income, education, employment status or occupational class influence feelings of exclusion to a higher degree than the new inequalities related to socio-demographic factors. The lower the income, level of education and occupational position, the more people have a self-image of being worthless and excluded from society. In all countries, the unemployed suffer from the perception of social exclusion more than any other group. Non-skilled workers are also significantly more likely to be affected by a perceived lack of social integration than those from higher socio-economic groups.

The degree of polarisation in European societies is calculated by gauging feelings of exclusion in underprivileged groups and in privileged groups. The perception of social exclusion tends to be less socially polarised when precarious living conditions are widespread. The gap between insiders and outsiders is widest where the general level of social integration is high. In other words, deprived people are less likely to experience a lack of social integration in societies where economic hardship is widespread and hence, less stigmatising.

Determinants and buffers

Sizable proportions of European populations have had at least some transitory experience with economic hardship. When asked if they had ever experienced unemployment or economic strain[7], half of the citizens in the ACC 13 and one fifth in the EU nations report having encountered disadvantaged living conditions at some point in time. The percentage of those feeling excluded is, however, much smaller, which is a first indication that objective conditions of hardship do not necessarily translate into subjective feelings of exclusion.

By crossing good or bad objective conditions with their positive or negative subjective perceptions, there are four situations possible:

a) people are well off and actually feel so;

b) despite being well off they feel a lack of social integration;

c) they live in deprivation and feel socially excluded;

d) they do not feel excluded despite experiencing deprivation (Zapf, 1984).

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[7] In the sense of either being in the lowest income quartile or having experienced long-term financial solvency problems.

Table 6 – Perceptions of social exclusion, by social categories

	% feeling excluded among total population	Men vs. women	Old vs. young	Sick vs. healthy	Low vs. high educated	Non-skilled vs. professional class	Unem-ployed vs. employed	Lowest vs. highest income quartile
		Ratios of % feeling excluded in contrast categories						
Turkey	34	1	0.8	1.1	1.7	-	1.2	2.1
Bulgaria	29	0.9	2	3.4	1.5	1.7	1.5	2.3
Slovakia	27	1	1.3	1.6	1	1.3	1.3	2.1
ACC 13	23	1	0.9	1.4	1.9	1.3	1.6	2.3
Latvia	20	0.9	3.1	8.5	2.1	1.3	1.9	3
Romania	19	0.8	0.9	2.5	1.2	0.6	2.2	2
Czech Republic	18	1.3	2.4	3	1.6	2	1.9	1.7
Estonia	18	1.2	3.1	3.7	1.4	1.9	2.8	3.1
Lithuania	16	1	2.2	5.2	2.1	1.6	1.6	2.6
France	15	1	1.2	-	1.7	2.7	2.5	5
Portugal	15	0.7	1.7	-	1	1.5	1.2	1.5
Italy	14	1.8	1	-	1.2	0.9	2	1.4
United Kingdom	14	0.9	0.7	-	2.8	4.5	4.6	1.8
Finland	14	1	1.6	-	1.2	0.4	2.4	10
AC 10	14	1.2	2	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.6	2.4
Hungary	13	1.4	2.5	3.8	1.3	1.1	1.6	1.8
Malta	13	1	0.5	4.3	1.9	-	2.8	1.6
Cyprus	12	1.4	1.6	1.7	3.5	2.5	9.2	4.2
Belgium	12	1.3	1.7	-	1.8	2.1	2.9	5.3
Germany	12	0.8	0.7	-	1.2	1.8	4.2	6
Greece	12	0.8	1.4	-	1.3	2.1	1.5	3.1
EU 25	12	1	1		1.5	1.9	2.9	2.9
EU 15	12	1	1		1.6	1.9	2.5	2.9
Poland	11	1.2	2	2.3	1.5	2.3	2.1	3
Ireland	10	1.3	1.8	-	3.4	3.8	5.7	4.4
Austria	10	1	1.5	-	1.2	2.4	3.6	4.8
Luxemb0urg	9	1	1.6	-	1.7	3.3	2.5	3.7
Spain	8	1	1.4	-	2	4	0.6	3.8
Sweden	8	0.5	0.5	-	1	1.6	2.3	1.8
Denmark	7	1	2.3	-	1.5	2.7	7.3	4.7
Netherlands	7	1	0.6	-	1.8	3.5	4.2	3
Slovenia	6	1	1	1.4	1.4	1.8	1.5	2.2

Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*

Notes: 'Ratio 'lowest vs. highest income quartile' refers to percentages of excluded among the lowest income quartile as a multiple of percentages of excluded among the highest income quartile; old vs. young: 55+ vs. 15-24; sick vs. healthy: self-reported health vs. self-reported long-standing illness (health data are not available for the Member States); low educated vs. high educated: finishing education after 15 years vs. finishing education after more than 20 years; Weight by weight2 for country group comparison, weight by weight3 for country specific analysis. (-) indicates number of cases below 30.

Table 7 (overleaf) shows how respondents are distributed over these four categories. In most cases, subjective perceptions realistically reflect objective conditions, but in a minority of cases this does not apply. There are more people who feel socially integrated despite living in some hardship than people who do not live in precarious circumstances but perceive themselves to be not socially integrated.

Throughout Europe, those who adapt to adverse conditions with a positive outlook outnumber those with a negative attitude, but this adaptability facility is greater in the CC 3 and AC 10 countries than in the EU 15. This suggests that the citizens in acceding and candidate countries find it easier to cope with economic strain than those in the EU. Even though precarious living conditions are more widespread in acceding and candidate countries, they seem to be less strongly associated with feelings of social exclusion than in the EU. So what protective mechanisms shield people from social exclusion when they are experiencing economic hardship?

Figure 1 on page 23 ranks countries according to their protective capacity by indicating what percentage of people who are living in precarious circumstances feel excluded.

Table 7 – Objective conditions of integration and their subjective perception, (% of population aged 15 to 65 in each category)

	Objective situation			
	Privileged		**Deprived**	
Subjective perception	**subjectively integrated**	**subjectively excluded**	**subjectively integrated**	**subjectively excluded**
Ireland	79	7	10	5
Austria	77	5	13	5
Netherlands	77	5	15	3
Denmark	74	3	19	4
Sweden	74	6	17	3
Luxembourg	73	6	18	3
Spain	72	5	20	3
Belgium	71	7	18	5
Cyprus	71	6	19	5
Germany	71	6	16	6
Finland	70	7	16	8
Slovenia	69	3	25	3
EU 15	67	7	19	6
United Kingdom	67	8	19	7
EU 25	66	6	21	6
France	65	8	20	7
Italy	65	7	21	7
Malta	65	9	22	5
Greece	62	5	27	6
Portugal	59	7	28	6
Czech Republic	58	10	24	8
Estonia	53	6	31	11
Lithuania	52	6	33	9
AC 10	51	6	35	8
Poland	51	3	38	8
Slovakia	49	16	23	13
Latvia	46	6	36	12
Hungary	43	4	43	9
ACC 13	42	9	35	15
Romania	41	6	41	13
Turkey	32	13	33	21
Bulgaria	31	8	39	22

Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*

Notes: The population at employment age was chosen, because unemployment forms part of the definition of objective disadvantage. Integration in objective terms is measured as neither experiencing unemployment or an insufficient financial situation (lowest income quartile or self-reported long-term financial difficulties); integration is measured with the self-reported evaluation of belonging: feeling integrated or excluded (two and more items from social exclusion index).

There are two significant results:

- First, throughout Europe only a minority of people surveyed who live in precarious conditions feel themselves to be outsiders.
- Secondly, there is a wide degree of country-specific variation in the way in which economic hardship translates into feelings of exclusion. The range in Europe is from 11% in Slovenia to 39% in Turkey. Within the EU, the range is from 13% in Spain to 35% in Finland.

The group averages show the capacity to cope with economic pressures to be more developed in acceding countries than in EU Member States: 24% of those experiencing adverse conditions in the EU, but only 19% in acceding countries feel left out of society. The perception of being an outsider is more prevalent within the ACC 13, but this is largely due to the strong feelings of exclusion in Turkey which impacts heavily on the calculation due to its population size.

Two types of social factors help to explain the wide country-specific variations in perceived exclusion under similar socio-economic circumstances. First, biographical events such as marriage, divorce, widowhood or illness have an impact on social integration and on the sense of belonging. Secondly, social buffers such as support

Figure 1 – Degree of protection in European countries (% of disadvantaged people aged 15-65 reporting perception of social exclusion)



Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*
Notes: The analysis is restricted to people aged 15-65. Disadvantage is defined as unemployment or economic strain; the percentages indicate how many of the thus defined disadvantaged population perceive themselves as socially excluded (two and more items of the social exclusion index); the lower the percentages, the higher the level of protection from social exclusion when living under disadvantaged conditions.

networks inside and outside the family may dampen the effect of deprivation on alienation to different degrees in various countries.

Unemployed people and people with financial difficulties are much more likely than the population at large to feel socially excluded. The absence of social support outside the household clearly adds to the feeling of marginalisation in a situation of economic deprivation. The difference between people in economic hardship and the population at large is smaller than the difference between people in hardship who have access to social support systems and those who cannot resort to help from others under identical circumstances.[8] In short, lack of social support impacts on subjective feelings of exclusion to the same degree as various economic deprivation factors.

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[8] An analysis of how multiple forms of economic deprivation interact with lack of social support is not possible, because the number of cases becomes very small.

Table 8 – Perceived social exclusion in various risk groups (% of population)

	Total population	No integration deficits[1]	Financial difficulties[2]	Unemployed/ temporarily inactive	Financial difficulties and lack of social support	Unemployed/ temporarily inactive and lack of social support
Turkey	34	29	39	41	48	49
Bulgaria	30	21	34	39	49	47
Slovakia	27	24	33	35	-	-
ACC 13	23	17	29	32	44	44
Latvia	20	13	28	29	32	-
Romania	19	12	24	28	37	-
Czech Republic	18	15	25	31	-	-
Estonia	18	12	25	39	42	-
Lithuania	16	12	23	23	35	-
France	15	12	24	33	-	-
Portugal	15	11	21	16	34	-
Italy	14	11	21	26	-	-
United Kingdom	14	10	26	32	-	-
Finland	14	9	39	31	-	-
AC 10	14	10	20	21	37	38
Hungary	13	9	18	19	42	-
Malta	13	13	12	37	-	-
Cyprus	12	8	21	46	32	-
Belgium	12	9	23	26	24	-
Germany	12	9	24	42	39	54
Greece	12	8	18	17	26	28
EU 25	12	9	21	29	34	41
EU 15	12	9	22	25	33	42
Poland	11	7	17	19	35	39
Austria	11	7	26	40	-	-
Ireland	10	8	22	32	-	-
Luxembourg	9	8	12	25	-	-
Spain	8	6	15	4	-	-
Sweden	8	7	13	16	-	-
Denmark	7	4	14	22	-	-
Netherlands	7	6	14	21	-	-
Slovenia	6	4	10	9	-	-

Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*

Notes: [1] no integration deficits (no financial difficulties, no unemployment experience, social support available) [2] Financial difficulties (low income quartile or self-reported long-term deprived living conditions); weight by weight2 for country group analysis, weight by weight3 for country specific analysis.

The research analysed the relationship between five different factors that can determine social integration and the perception of social exclusion. Being part of the labour market and having control over basic financial resources were included as socio-economic drivers of integration; social network support outside the family, family integration, and perceived participation chances were included as social factors. The analysis confirmed that solvency problems and unemployment are of less importance for the perception of integration when social buffers are available. The impact of social support networks and perceived family integration is particularly strong in acceding and candidate countries where it exceeds, by far, the influence of material living conditions such as low income or joblessness (see figure 2 opposite which shows the strength of each factor in different country groups).

It should be noted that this analysis may overstate the impact of social factors, because our information on social buffers such as perceived family integration is only available in subjective form. This may, to some extent, mirror subjective measures of social exclusion. However, the analysis also showed that having children almost halved the risk of feeling excluded. The conclusion is that social support effectively mitigates the consequences of financial hardship or unemployment.

Unemployment has a greater effect on feelings of exclusion in EU Member States than in the acceding and candidate countries. In the ACC, employment status plays an even smaller role as a determinant of perceived

Figure 2 – Economic and social predictors of perceived social exclusion



Sources: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*
Notes: Multiple Regression Analysis is restricted to 15-65 years old. The dependent variable is the index on social exclusion ranging from 0 indicating no perceived integration deficits to 4 indicating agreement with four related statements.
The explanatory variables are as follows: *Family*: feeling left out of family; *Participation*: felt lonely during last two weeks and dissatisfied with social life; *Support*: cannot rely on social support outside the household in case of depression and lack of money; *Income*: experiencing serious solvency problems; *Job*: unemployed or temporarily not working.

exclusion when social buffers are included. Country-specific analyses reveal that joblessness also has a significant impact on perceived exclusion in a majority of EU Member States, but in only a minority of the ACC. This may signal the greater importance of the shadow economy, but it could also indicate that joblessness has a different psychological impact in societies with widespread unemployment and limited opportunities. Deprivation is presumably less stigmatising in societies where it is more widespread and customary. In societies where ample opportunities are available, the poor are more likely to lose self-confidence and blame themselves rather than collective forces for being poor.

Perceived causes of social exclusion

By and large, the citizens of EU Member States have fairly similar views concerning the concrete social drivers of poverty. Choosing from a list of 16 items which might explain why people are poor or socially excluded,[9] Europeans are united in seeing long-term unemployment as the root cause of poverty (see table 9 overleaf). Alcoholism, sickness, family break-ups and drug abuse come next on the list of frequently mentioned causes. Social welfare cuts, however, are perceived as determinants of social exclusion in the acceding countries, but not in EU Member States, where only a minority of the poor shares this view. Respondents in the EU are more likely to see lack of education as an important cause. Poor people are less likely to attribute poverty or exclusion to personal failure (such as laziness, insufficient planning for the future or alcoholism) than the general respondent. Only a small minority throughout Europe believe the poor have deliberately chosen their fate.

The respondents were also asked to choose one of four general reasons why people live in need. The list included reasons that emphasise external or collective factors :

- injustice in society;
- inevitable part of progress;
- lack of luck;
- laziness and lack of willpower.

This question about general attitudes to poverty reveals huge differences between acceding and candidate countries on the one side and EU Member States on the other (see figure 3 on page 27). In both contexts, most respondents perceive social injustice in society as the main driver of social exclusion processes, but in the EU only 35% holds this view. In contrast, an absolute majority hold social injustice responsible in acceding and candidate countries. Of this group, only the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Malta come close to the western hesitation to blame society. In all other countries at least 45% of the respondents place it as the primary cause of poverty. This underpins earlier research revealing that the acceding and candidate countries downplay individual responsibility and emphasise government responsibility (Fuchs, 2001). It also sustains the idea that people are less

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[9] The questionnaire did not draw a distinction between poverty and exclusion.

Table 9 – Europeans' perceptions of the most common reasons why people are poor or socially excluded (% of population choosing each item)

	EU 25	EU 25 poor	ACC 13	ACC 13 poor	EU 15	EU 15 poor	AC 10	AC 10 poor
Long-term unemployment	52	59	63	66	50	54	62	69
Alcoholism	36	27	36	21	32	19	55	44
Sickness	31	33	27	24	30	29	38	43
Family break-up	28	27	29	25	27	26	31	29
Drug abuse	24	17	6	3	27	22	10	7
Lack of education	22	18	27	32	23	20	17	14
Social welfare cuts	14	24	25	26	12	21	20	30
Laziness	14	8	13	9	14	8	14	9
Losing community spirit in society	13	14	12	14	14	16	9	12
Their parents were poor	10	15	17	23	10	14	12	17
They live in a poor area	10	10	14	21	10	12	6	6
They don't plan for the future	9	5	7	7	10	6	7	4
They are immigrants	8	6	1	2	9	9	1	1
They have too many children	6	10	9	14	6	11	5	7
They have chosen to be like this	6	5	3	2	6	5	5	4
Lack of concern amongst neighbours	5	6	3	4	5	7	2	2

Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*

Note: 'Poor' is captured as experiencing serious solvency problems, weight by weight2.

likely to blame themselves for being excluded in countries where unemployment and economic hardship are widespread.

Within the EU countries, it should be noted that people in Finland and Sweden on the one side, and Denmark on the other, hold very different views concerning the reasons for need. Whilst the former two blame injustice in society, people in Denmark are least likely to do so, attributing the causes of poverty rather more to individual responsibility. This is a strange finding as sociologists usually believe cultural attitudes to be rooted in institutional structures and Nordic countries are usually classified as belonging to the same category of welfare state regimes with very similar institutions (Esping-Andersen 1990).

Policy implications

- The results show that unemployment is a root cause of social exclusion. The fight against unemployment should thus be intensified.
- Within the current EU at least, citizens have also become increasingly aware that lack of education is a poverty risk and that employment in the knowledge society requires the promotion of education and lifelong learning. Lacking specific skills or training entails a high risk of being cut off from opportunities for participation.
- However, the notion that a lack of social participation and feelings of exclusion are predominantly dependent on unemployment and economic strain must be expanded. Family integration and having children is shown to have a stabilising effect on self-confidence and on feelings of belonging to society. Families should be seen as the basic form of social integration, which mediates between the individual and society providing the individual with the emotional stability necessary to deal with the challenges of a complex world (Berger and Berger, 1984). In this context, combating social exclusion also requires measures to strengthen the family and other social support systems.
- In policy terms, a successful fight against exclusion cuts across established administrative divisions of labour among various government agencies. It requires a revitalisation of civil society action, but also calls for policy coordination – including employment, education and family policies as well as housing and neighbourhood policies (not covered here).

Figure 3 – Perceptions of the reasons why people live in need, by country



Source: Böhnke, P., *Perceptions of social integration and exclusion in an enlarged Europe.*

Employment and social relations 3

Positive effects of economic activity

There is general consensus on the view that European societies should be knowledge-based, provide full employment with high quality and productivity at work, and be socially cohesive. Realising this triple goal is not always easy, as tensions between these objectives can exist. A technologically advanced society may have difficulty providing jobs for those with low skills. Likewise, the goal of full employment, in an effort to sustain pension schemes, may under specific circumstances weaken the demographic base of sustainable pensions due to the increasing participation of women in the labour force. This is because dual employment households appear to have more difficulties raising children and combining work and family obligations (an opposing trend appears only in the US).

If labour markets are to function effectively, the institutional arrangements surrounding them must be geared to the changing realities in the world of work. This involves considering many aspects from a social policy perspective. Who takes care of children when both parents work? Who takes care of them when schools or childcare institutions are on holidays? Who keeps the social networks alive when everybody is at work?

In considering the impact of work on quality of life, it must first be noted that work fulfils many positive economic and social functions. As a source of income and purchasing power, it empowers people and thus combats exclusion. As a source of income, status and social contacts, it serves as a basis of social recognition and self-esteem. It is an important mechanism of social integration. Finally, in terms of structuring people's daily lives and their life path and subjecting them to continuous group observation, it is also an important mechanism for social organisation.

The results reflect these positive aspects of employment in many ways. The data on income showed that households where the main earner is not employed have an elevated risk of low income. Traditional factors reflecting the respondents' attachment to income, status and level of education were shown to be the strongest influences on the household's relative income position. Country variations in deprivation reflected employment and income to a much higher degree than differences in age, household type or marital status.

Impact on social integration

Unemployment was identified as a major driver of perceived lack of social integration. In the acceding and candidate countries, 21% of unemployed and 18% of retired persons, as compared to 13% of employed persons, report at least two (out of four) symptoms of perceived lack of social integration. Most Europeans also believe unemployment to be the most important reason for poverty and need. In nine of the 13 acceding and candidate countries, and in 11 of the EU countries, unemployment was the factor most commonly identified as a cause of poverty or social exclusion.

Europeans are, however, united in ranking 'having a good job' as one of the main necessities for a good life. The findings also show that general life satisfaction is also much higher among people with jobs than among the unemployed. The satisfaction gap between the employed and unemployed proved to be bigger than the gaps related to other social characteristics such as gender, age, education or income. In a multivariate analysis for the ACC 13, income and employment proved to be the two most important determinants of general life satisfaction, when other factors remained constant. In the EU Member States, employment influenced life satisfaction even more than income, and unemployment was shown to have a negative effect on satisfaction even if income remained constant. This suggests that it is not only the lack of income that matters to the unemployed but the lack of a job as such.

The report on fertility and family (Fahey and Spéder) revealed that the fight against unemployment is perceived as one of the most important means of improving the economic and social conditions of family life. These conclusions regarding the importance of work are in line with similar findings from previous survey research. For example, one panel study found unemployed people to be particularly prone to feeling depressed and unhappy (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). This is noteworthy for two reasons: it runs counter to the idea that unemployed persons relax and exploit the welfare state, and it underlines the integrative and psychologically positive functions of employment.

Possible negative social side-effects

There is, however, a down side. Work can wear people out, and pressures for increased productivity in a competitive world economy can render work more intensive, demanding and stressful. As people spend a large part of the day at the workplace, employment has considerable opportunity costs in terms of time, and this can create role conflicts for people who have to juggle work and family obligations. Thus, while paid work provides a valuable basis for social integration, working all day or all week can, without adequate counterbalancing arrangements,

Figure 4 – Self-reported stress by economic activity (% reporting that they feel stressed regularly, classified by employment status)



Source: Alber, J. and Kohler, U., *Health and care in an enlarged Europe.*

also make it difficult for people to perform their family functions, maintain social contacts with friends and neighbours, and engage in voluntary civic action.

As societies move towards full employment and high activity rates, it becomes increasingly useful to have a system of social indicators which can show the desired and undesired social effects of work out of individual control. Within most European countries the long-term trend, based on current analysis, is an increase in female employment rates and a decline in fertility levels. Yet in countries with higher female activity rates, the downturn in fertility was less marked and the overall negative association becomes weaker over time (OECD, 2003). This is usually related to the better availability of childcare facilities in these countries (Esping-Andersen, 2002).

The report on health and caring (Alber and Kohler) showed informal care activities to peak at working age and economically active people to be almost as active as caregivers as are non-working people. This suggests that not only childcare but also care for the elderly frequently coincides with work. Relieving economically active people from such dual burdens might therefore contribute to increasing the productivity of work.

Europeans across the continent perceive work as stressful. On average, the proportion reporting regularly feeling stressed is about 15 percentage points higher than those in employment compared to those who are not working (see figure 4). Work reportedly causes more stress in the EU than in the ACC 13. Despite this, however, in general those who have a job find life more stressful than people who are not economically active. Only Cyprus and Malta deviate from this general rule. Life is generally perceived as least stressful among those who are both economically inactive and have a high income, whereas stress is perceived to be highest among those who combine employment with a low income.

Stress is, of course, only one dimension of quality of life. This must be weighed against other aspects, such as sufficient income. Analysis on the social consequences of work focused on two aspects: the perceived intensity and stress of work.

There is a limitation to this analysis. Both working conditions, on the one hand, and social relations on the other, are measured on the basis of people's perception or evaluation of the situation rather than on reports of objective properties of the work setting or of social relations. Hence, resulting statistical associations must be interpreted with caution. They may reflect the impact of a third factor: people's generally positive or negative outlook concerning their circumstances.

Comparison of working conditions

Previous research has shown working conditions to be far less advantageous in the ACC 13 than in the EU (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2003). In the transition economies, most of the formerly giant industrial plants went bankrupt. Since the trade unions were political bodies rather than organisations focused on improving work conditions, many informal lobby networks flourished, but these were dissolved together with the old unions in the process of transformation. Nowadays many people in the ACC work long hours or have parallel jobs in order to make ends meet. Results based on sample surveys may give an overly positive view of actual conditions, as workers with very adverse working conditions are more difficult to contact and may be underrepresented in national samples. This is especially true in countries where people in low-income categories must take several jobs in order to make ends meet.

The differences in working conditions found in the report can be summarised as follows (but note a high degree of country-specific diversity around the reported group averages)[10]:

- An index of physical working conditions[11] showed a much higher prevalence of adverse physical conditions outside current EU borders. On average 12% of the EU workforce, but 21% in the AC 10 and 24% in the ACC 13 feel themselves to be working under unfavourable physical conditions.
- An index of psychological working conditions[12] showed 23% of employed people in AC 10 countries, 27% in ACC 13 and 16% in the EU 15 to be working under psychologically adverse conditions.
- An index of work autonomy[13] gave a prevalence of low-autonomy jobs of 23% in AC 10 as well as in ACC 13 countries, compared to 14% in the EU 15.
- The percentage of people working more than 48 hours a week is twice as high in AC 10 countries as in the EU (30% compared to 15%).
- An index of work intensity[14], however, showed the intensity of work to be higher in the EU 15. On average, 18% of the EU workforce, as compared to 13% in AC 10 and 12% in the ACC 13 reported working in high-pressure situations.
- The self-reported experience of unemployment over the past five years is about 2-3 times higher than the official unemployment rate for a given year. It is also on average about ten percentage points higher in AC

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[10] Due to data restrictions the report cannot apply the European Commission's concept of quality of work.

[11] The physical working conditions index was based on three items: work in dangerous or unhealthy conditions; work resulting in muscular pain; and headaches as a result of work. Conditions were ranked as unfavourable if the 'always' answer was given at least once, or if respondents said 'always' or 'often' for at least two of the three items.

[12] This psychological working conditions index was based on four statements: 'find work stressful'; 'get verbally abused at work'; 'come home exhausted'; 'find it difficult to unwind at the end of a working day'. Conditions were ranked as unfavourable if the 'always' answer was at least given once or if the 'often' answer was given to at least three of the four statements.

[13] This was measured on the basis of two statements: 'I have a great deal of influence in deciding what tasks I do'; 'I have a great deal of influence in deciding how to do my tasks'. Low autonomy was assumed in case of disagreement with both statements.

[14] The index of work intensity was constructed on the basis of five items: 'Working very hard'; 'not having enough time to get everything done in the job'; 'often working extra time beyond formal hours'; 'almost always working at high speed'; 'almost always working to tight deadlines'. Respondents had five possibilities to react to this statement, ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. Respondents who strongly agreed with at least one statement and at least agreed with the four remaining ones were classified as suffering from high work intensity.

Figure 5 – Percentage of economically active persons reporting troubled family/friendship relations due to work



Source: Kovacs, K. and Kapitány, B., *Working and living in an enlarged Europe*.

10 countries (29%) than in the EU (19%). Among the three candidate countries, Bulgaria is noteworthy for the exceptionally widespread experience of prolonged unemployment (50%).

Impact on social relations and quality of life

Examining the adverse social side-effects of economic activity confirmed the negative effects of extended unemployment (that is, having been unemployed for two years or more, over the past five years). Those with such unemployment experience report distinctly lower satisfaction with life in general, with family life, with social life, and with health than those who have been in continuous employment. In this sense, having a job implies control over an essential resource, which provides income, but also social contacts and a better quality of life.

Even though the employed have a higher quality of social life than the unemployed, the quality of job also matters. People who work overtime, in high intensity jobs, or in jobs that are physically or psychologically demanding, tend to rate their family life and social relations negatively. These factors and the degree of autonomy people experience at work also affect general life satisfaction. The detrimental effects of burdensome working conditions was highlighted in five areas:

- self-reported relationship with friends and family;
- satisfaction with family life;
- satisfaction with social life;
- health satisfaction;
- satisfaction with life in general.

An index was constructed to measure the impact on social relations based on four items:

- job prevents one from giving the desired time to partner and family;
- too tired after work to enjoy things at home;
- too tired after work to go out with friends;
- partner/family get fed up with the job pressures.[15]

By this measure, about one out of five working Europeans suffers from troubled social relations due to work. This

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[15] For each statement the respondents had five response options: ‘always’, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’, ‘never’. The report considered respondents who chose the ‘always’ option at least once and those who chose the ‘often’ option at least twice as having troubled social relations due to work.

Table 10 – Effects of adverse working conditions on various dimensions of social relations

Effects on social relations

% with disrupted social relations	Yes	No	Percentage point difference
Intense work	48.5	15.7	32.8
Working overtime	35.9	13.4	22.5
Psychologically poor conditions	61.3	11.8	49.5
Physically poor conditions	54.1	15.3	38.8
Low autonomy	23.3	20.4	2.9
Severe unemployment	30.6	20.8	9.8

Effects on satisfaction with family life

% dissatisfied with family relations	Yes	No	Percentage point difference
Intense work	13.5	8.9	4.6
Working overtime	11.0	7.5	3.5
Psychologically poor conditions	14.9	8.5	6.4
Physically poor conditions	13.9	8.9	4.0
Severe unemployment	17.8	8.8	9.0

Effects on satisfaction with social life

% dissatisfied with social life	Yes	No	Percentage point difference
Intense work	24.1	15.3	8.8
Working overtime	22.2	13.8	8.4
Psychologically poor conditions	29.3	13.9	15.4
Physically poor conditions	30.8	14.3	16.5
Low autonomy	22.3	15.4	6.9
Severe unemployment	37.5	18.8	18.7

Effects on general life satisfaction

% dissatisfied with life in general	Yes	No	Percentage point difference
Intense work	20.8	15.3	5.5
Working overtime	21.9	11.8	10.1
Psychologically poor conditions	29.6	12.9	16.7
Physically poor conditions	31.8	13.3	17.5
Low autonomy	27.1	13.4	13.7
Severe unemployment	47.1	18.7	28.4

Figure 6 – Age, working conditions and proportion dissatisfied with health



Source: Kovacs, K. and Kapitány, B., *Working and living in an enlarged Europe*.

figure is higher in acceding and candidate countries than in the current EU. The AC 10 average of 24% compares to a mean of 19% in the EU (with an average of 27% in the ACC 13 group) (see figure 5).

Working conditions

Adverse physical and psychological working conditions and high work intensity also significantly increase the risk of having difficult relations with family and friends. 61% of those who have psychologically burdensome jobs, but only 12% of those without such adverse conditions report having problematic social relationships with friends or family (see table 10). More than half of those with physically demanding jobs complain about troubled social relations, and similarly, almost 50% of those working with high intensity report the same problem.

The crude number of working hours impacts less immediately on social relations. The major threshold with respect to working time is not between those working full time and part time, but between those who work normal hours and those who spend more than 48 hours on the job. Less than one in five full-time workers, but more than one in three overtime workers reports having disrupted social relations.

The degree of autonomy in the work sphere is not significantly related to unsatisfactory social relations. It is worth noting that the index of social relations with friends and family is the only dimension in the analysis more adversely affected by burdensome work conditions than by the experience of long-term unemployment during the past five years.

Satisfaction with family and with social life

Unfavourable working conditions also have a clear effect on satisfaction with life in general and with specific domains.[16] Self-reported satisfaction with family life is least affected by adverse experiences in the work sphere (see table 10). This is in line with the analysis documented in the report on perceptions of social integration and social exclusion (Böhnke, 2004), which highlighted the role of the family as a buffer against social exclusion. It also conforms with the sociological notion of the family as the ‘haven in a heartless world’ (Lasch, 1975; see also Berger/Berger, 1983). Even though many of those complaining about adverse working conditions are aware of social sacrifices and limited opportunities in the private sphere, they hesitate to declare their family life as unsatisfactory.

Satisfaction with social life outside the family decreases most sharply in the case of those experiencing long-term unemployment. However, employment enhances satisfaction only if working conditions are favourable. Those who work excessively long hours or those who work in very demanding conditions report lower satisfaction levels than those who work in favourable conditions.

Satisfaction with health

Amongst age groups, adverse physical or psychological work conditions have as great a negative effect on health satisfaction as does the experience of long-term unemployment (see figure 6). Multiple regression analysis confirms the detrimental effect of physically or psychologically unfavourable working conditions on health satisfaction. In general, the type and extent of the impact of unfavourable work on health satisfaction and social life are equally present in the ACC 13 and the EU. Physically or psychologically burdensome work conditions prove to be most detrimental when they interact with other dimensions of disadvantage such as low income, or unskilled work.

Regional differences

Certain differences in the impact of unfavourable working conditions on life satisfaction are evident when comparing the EU with the AC 10, based on a multivariate analysis.

First, the experience of long-term unemployment influences dissatisfaction with life more strongly in the EU than in the AC 10. This may be the case because people have become better able to cope with unemployment in the AC 10 or experience it as less stigmatising because it is more easily considered to be an unavoidable feature of the economic transition.

Second, work autonomy has an important effect on life satisfaction in the EU, but this has much less significance in the AC 10. This may mean that for AC 10 citizens income from employment matters relatively more than for their EU counterparts. The latter may attribute more importance to post-materialist issues of job quality and are cushioned by more developed social security systems.

Third, the intensity of work is higher in the EU, and it impinges more directly on life satisfaction in the EU than in the acceding or candidate countries.

Implications for collective bargaining

Attributing more importance to the quality of working conditions, citizens inside the current EU may be characterised as having a more ‘post-materialist’ outlook.

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[16] All satisfaction measures are based on a four-point scale which ranged from ‘very satisfied’ to ‘not satisfied at all’.

This may have implications for the future collective bargaining process, which could follow different logics in the 'old' and 'new' Europe. People in acceding and candidate countries are relatively more dependent on income from work. They may therefore be more willing to accept a certain tolerance regarding adverse work conditions in exchange for higher incomes. In the EU, on the other hand, qualitative aspects of the work environment have gained in importance for people's life satisfaction. They are therefore far less likely to accept such a trade-off and may rather opt for wage restraint in favour of improved work conditions.

This scenario would have two implications:

- Investors moving from one part of Europe to the other would need to be aware of different cultures with different priorities.
- There is an implicit potential for a widening quality gap in working conditions inside and outside the current EU.

Being limited to only two questions concerning subjective perceptions of the quality of work and of social relations, these analyses should only be seen as a first attempt to draw attention to the importance of studying the link between working conditions and the quality of social relations.

The results suggest that the positive and negative effects of work on income and self-esteem spill over into the field of social relations. Hence, ways of ensuring social integration work best when a high level of employment coincides with high quality jobs that keep physical and psychological demands within reasonable limits.

Measuring life satisfaction 4

Economic development in the ACC 13 is generally lower than the EU, as shown by indicators such as GDP per capita. But to what extent does this lower level of affluence translate into lower levels of subjective well-being?

There are three aspects to be considered.

1. As money is the basis of exchange for purchasing goods, the level of satisfaction can be expected to reflect the level of control over economic resources.
2. Quality of life incorporates several dimensions of well-being such as good health, social integration with family, friends and fellow citizens as well as freedom to pursue one's own goals. It might therefore, be expected that the level of satisfaction will vary, independently of material living conditions, even if it is ultimately rooted in objective social conditions.
3. People's aspirations develop at the same speed or even faster than objective living conditions. Thus, subjective and objective well-being might prove to be fairly unrelated. In this case, better living conditions would be accompanied by more ambitious yardsticks of evaluation. This would mean satisfaction levels would stand still – or perhaps even decline – despite the improvement of objective conditions.

This part of the report describes how general satisfaction with life and with various life domains in the ACC 13 compares to satisfaction levels in the EU. The driving

Figure 7 – Life satisfaction by country



Source: Delhey, J., *Life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe.*

Notes: The population averages (vertical lines) refer to the proportion of citizens satisfied with life (fairly and very satisfied combined).

Question: Please tell me whether you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with each of the following? Your life in general.

forces behind subjective well-being are then analysed through attempting to answer the following three questions:

- Do all Europeans have similar or different ideas concerning the necessities for a good life?
- What conditions do they identify as the major prerequisites for a satisfactory life?
- What factors shape country or group-specific differences in satisfaction levels in a statistical analysis?

Satisfaction by country

The surveys asked people whether they were ‘very satisfied’, ‘fairly satisfied’, ‘not very satisfied’ or ‘not at all satisfied’ with their life in general. This life satisfaction question is widely used in research on subjective well-being and is usually interpreted as providing a comprehensive assessment of individuals’ living conditions. It is, however, widely debated as to whether this assessment identifies the actual living conditions or rather the respondent’s aspirations and normative yardsticks (see Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2003; Easterlin, 2001; Diener and Oishi, 2000; Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith, 1999). In the case of life satisfaction, the survey data offer no information on individual aspiration levels or comparative yardsticks. So, how people evaluate their life circumstances is not clear. Is it by reference to their neighbours’, to their own past experience, or to universal standards of well-being which all citizens share?

Figure 8 – Relationship between national income level and average life satisfaction



Source: Delhey, J., *Life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe*.
Note: Life satisfaction scale: 1 = not at all satisfied; 4 = very satisfied

Some indirect inferences are, however, possible. To the extent that aspirations increase in line with rising living standards, there should be no differences in self-reported satisfaction levels in richer and poorer countries. Comparison between the ACC 13 and EU 15 shows that this is not the case.

Differences with respect to subjective well-being are no less marked than differences in objective living standards. On average, only about 60% of citizens in the ACC 13 as compared to roughly 90% in the EU declare themselves at least fairly satisfied with their lives (see figure 7). Nine of the 13 acceding and candidate countries have satisfaction scores below the level of Portugal and Greece, which lag behind the rest of the EU. Yet the average satisfaction score in the European Union merely shrinks by three percentage points after enlargement, from 88% to 85%. This conceals the magnitude of the change, however, due to smaller population sizes in the AC 10. In short, most of the ACC 13 levels of satisfaction are distinctly below those in the EU.

Greater diversity in ACC

There is also much higher diversity within the ACC 13 than in the EU 15. The better-off countries, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia have fairly high satisfaction scores, on par with some EU countries. On the other hand, the poorer countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Romania, have much lower levels. In Bulgaria and Romania, dissatisfaction with life is even more widespread than satisfaction. Similar levels of discontent within the EU were registered only once since Eurobarometer was launched in 1973 (1993 in Greece – see Delhey, 2001). The new east–west gap will thus be far wider than the traditional divide between northern and southern Europe within the EU.

When we look at Europe as a whole, country-specific variations in average life satisfaction basically reflect differences in national wealth. Richer countries usually report higher levels of satisfaction and no affluent country reports dramatically low satisfaction scores. In the same way, no poor country has a population which is very satisfied. This suggests that the reported satisfaction scores reflect objective living conditions rather than aspiration levels which supposedly vary with the standard of living. In this sense they reveal something about the ‘liveability’ in various countries (Veenhoven, 1997).

However, this does not necessarily mean that aspiration levels are irrelevant. Aspirations may grow even if incomes stagnate at very low levels. The gap between visibly displayed new potentials (such as new advertising and products) and limited opportunities (for the less well-off

ACC citizen) is presumably a major cause of the lower levels of satisfaction in acceding and candidate countries. Moreover, countries on very similar levels of affluence – such as Bulgaria and Turkey or France and the Netherlands – may differ considerably with respect to the reported level of satisfaction (see figure 8). This suggests that the impact of material conditions may be influenced by other factors such as health or education, the quality of social relations or the degree of political freedom.

Compared to current EU countries, the ACC 13 not only have lower levels of average satisfaction but also much more internal dispersion of satisfaction. In general, the degree of internal dispersion is higher in countries with low levels of average satisfaction. Growing average satisfaction and a more egalitarian distribution of satisfaction usually go hand in hand. This result confirms the findings by economic historians that income inequalities tend to decrease as the levels of incomes rise (at least after an initial phase of growing disparities - Kuznets, 1963; Kraus, 1991).

Examining the relationship between income inequality and satisfaction dispersion in European countries shows that countries with a higher Gini index of income inequality also have higher inequalities in satisfaction. The level of income as measured by GDP per capita also has a strong (negative) impact on satisfaction dispersion. A multivariate analysis shows this effect to be even stronger than the effect of income distribution. Contrary to the idea that relative deprivation always negatively affects life satisfaction, this result suggests that living in relative poverty in affluent societies has less detrimental effects on subjective well-being than being at the bottom of the income distribution in poor countries. This is possibly because the relatively poor in richer societies have sufficient command over resources to prevent profound dissatisfaction.

Analyses of group-specific inequalities in life satisfaction yield two major insights.

1. Social inequalities in terms of life satisfaction are more marked in the ACC than in the EU Member States.
2. Throughout Europe, vertical forms of inequality – income, education or employment – usually have a stronger impact on life satisfaction differences than horizontal forms of inequality – such as gender, region or age.

Horizontal inequalities

Gender gaps in satisfaction are usually small throughout Europe. Rural-urban gaps are more important in the ACC 13 than in the EU. Inhabitants of large cities are usually more satisfied than town or country people. This suggests that the potentially higher aspiration levels in cities do not impact on satisfaction levels to the same extent as the less favourable living conditions in the countryside. Once income, education, age and other factors are controlled for in a multivariate analysis, however, the higher aspiration levels in cities are shown, as urban residents then have lower levels of satisfaction than the rural population. Age is an important determinant of satisfaction, especially in the acceding and candidate countries. Older people are usually less satisfied than younger people, but the generation gap is particularly high in post-communist countries. This may be because the young have benefited hugely from the transition while older people find it harder to adapt to the new situation.

Vertical inequalities

Occupational class is the only dimension of inequality which leads to higher satisfaction gaps in the EU than in acceding and candidate countries. This reflects the lasting impact of the ideology of the classless society which shaped people’s thinking in Eastern Europe, leading to higher levels of self-esteem among workers as well as to a higher tendency among academics and members of the middle classes to identify themselves as belonging to the ‘working class’ (for a respective comparison of East and West Germany, see Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999).

Income gaps in satisfaction are much wider in acceding and candidate countries than in the EU. This again suggests that income differences are more acute in poorer countries where a position in the lowest income quartile is usually associated with more severe hardship.

Unemployment is a major contributor to dissatisfaction in Europe. In the ACC 13 and EU 15 alike, unemployed people (including those who are temporarily not working) stand out as being more dissatisfied than the working population. In the EU, unemployment is the form of disadvantage which leads to the highest satisfaction gap. A multivariate analysis shows that the unemployed are more dissatisfied than employed people, even when including income and other variables. What matters to the unemployed is not merely the loss of income but the lack of a job, as employment is about more than self-esteem, it is also an important basis of social integration.

To sum up, enlargement will continue a trend towards growing diversity within the EU. Already, the Scandinavian countries currently stand out on account of the small satisfaction differences between various social groups. The largest satisfaction spreads are found in the south of Europe, notably Portugal. This former north–south divide will now be superseded by a dominant

Table 11 – Domain satisfactions by country (% satisfied)

	Home	Family life	Neigh-bourhood	Health	Social life	Personal safety	Employ-ment	Income	Health care system	Average
Denmark	96	95	94	91	96	96	88	86	76	91
Austria	96	92	93	89	91	95	85	79	85	89
Luxembourg	93	94	91	89	92	85	88	85	77	88
Netherlands	94	94	94	89	93	84	88	84	74	88
Finland	96	92	89	84	90	94	79	68	75	85
Sweden	96	93	95	86	92	92	80	73	60	85
Cyprus	86	94	95	88	87	90	81	71	62	84
Belgium	91	89	88	83	89	81	81	69	79	83
Malta	96	92	89	90	87	69	77	71	73	83
France	92	90	87	86	87	84	72	63	79	82
Ireland	94	96	91	91	90	88	76	65	50	82
Slovenia	94	93	90	80	89	91	71	62	58	81
United Kingdom	92	93	86	86	85	87	72	69	57	81
Germany	94	88	89	79	86	83	74	72	51	80
Spain	94	93	89	77	90	85	70	57	49	78
Italy	89	90	83	81	82	70	68	62	27	72
Portugal	83	87	86	69	86	79	70	54	25	71
Czech Republic	85	86	86	71	77	69	60	40	60	70
Greece	89	92	85	85	79	64	59	57	19	70
Poland	79	85	84	65	80	68	46	33	32	64
Turkey	83	89	83	79	65	73	46	39	17	64
Hungary	87	84	84	60	68	70	53	28	31	63
Estonia	82	79	82	63	66	69	52	30	32	62
Slovakia	85	84	82	66	71	66	54	31	17	62
Lithuania	82	78	86	67	65	31	56	35	28	59
Romania	80	81	86	59	60	54	40	25	23	56
Latvia	75	72	82	63	48	58	46	27	22	55
Bulgaria	74	79	80	60	40	44	35	13	23	50
EU 15	92	91	88	83	87	82	73	67	54	80
AC 10	83	84	84	66	76	67	51	34	35	64
ACC 13	82	85	84	69	68	66	47	33	27	62
EU 25	91	90	87	80	86	80	70	62	51	77

Source: Delhey, J., *Life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe*.
Note: Countries are ranked according to average domain satisfaction.

west–east divide, as several new Member States are marked by higher degrees of internal inequality than the southern European members.

Components of satisfaction

People were asked how satisfied they were with nine domains covering a broad range of areas of life:

- economic aspects such as financial situation;
- their employment situation;
- relational aspects such as family life;
- social life;
- their neighbourhood;
- their home and personal safety;
- their own health;
- their country's health care system.

Three results stand out and these are discussed below.

Lower satisfaction in the ACC

First, this is confirmed across all domains (see table 11). The satisfaction gap between the ACC and the EU 15 is particularly marked with respect to financial situation, employment situation, health care system, and personal safety. In most of the acceding and candidate countries, dissatisfaction with these realms prevails. In the EU, in contrast, we find predominant satisfaction even in these spheres.[17]

Similarities in satisfaction domains

Secondly, when domains are ranked according to average satisfaction levels, the resulting rankings are remarkably similar throughout Europe. In the ACC and EU Member States alike, respondents tend to be most satisfied with their family life, their home or their neighbourhood. In other words, people tend to focus on building their own private worlds in which they can enjoy some degree of autonomy and control. On the other hand, respondents are least satisfied with their employment situation, their financial situation, or with their country's health care system. These are domains beyond their immediate control which are influenced either by market forces or by state action (Headey/Wearing, 1992). Within the group of acceding and candidate countries, satisfaction levels vary considerably from country to country and from domain to domain, but the ranking is quite similar in all countries. A large majority of respondents in the ACC 13 feel satisfied with home, family life, neighbourhood and personal health. In five countries, a majority of respondents report dissatisfaction with their employment situation; in nine countries, dissatisfaction with the health care system; and in ten countries, dissatisfaction with the income situation. Within EU countries, a very similar ranking occurs, albeit at higher levels of satisfaction.

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[17] The health care system is the only domain where some western countries report predominant dissatisfaction (Italy, Portugal, and Greece).

More diversity within the ACC 13

Thirdly, there is much more diversity among ACC 13 than among EU countries. Country differences in the acceding and candidate country region tend to be strongest in those domains where people are least satisfied (health care, income, employment). The smallest country differences in satisfaction are shown for neighbourhood, home and family, where a vast majority of people are content in all countries. The ranking of countries is fairly stable across domains. Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia tend to have the most satisfied population, whereas Bulgarians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Romanians are usually among the most dissatisfied. In the EU group, most domains show north–south differences in subjective well-being. Health care is the only field where diversity is higher in Member States than in acceding and candidate countries.

This reiterates two important messages:

- The new Member States are not a monolithic bloc, but display a very high degree of diversity.
- Enlargement will entail growing cross-national disparities in subjective well-being which go far beyond the standard pattern of diversity within the EU.

Different perceptions about requisites for a good life

The relevant question read: 'Not everybody has the same idea about what the necessities for a good life are. Please tell me if each of the following is absolutely necessary for leading a good life?'

The list contained 14 items and people were asked whether they regarded them as 'absolutely necessary' for leading a good life or as 'not absolutely necessary'. To borrow Allardt's concept (1993), the 14 items could be classified as covering the dimensions of material well-being ('having'), social bonds ('loving'), and opportunities for self-development and social recognition ('being').[18] Judging from the answers to this question, Europeans have remarkably similar ideas about what things make for a good life.

First, it is significant that people usually have a multi-dimensional concept of what makes for a good life in the sense of considering aspects of having, loving and being as equally indispensable. Thus, in the acceding and candidate countries region, on average 10 of the 14 requisites are mentioned as absolutely necessary by at least three-quarters of the population. A similar picture appears in the Member States (see table 12).

Second, Europeans agree to a large extent about the relative importance of various requisites for a good life. In the ACC, 'having a good job', 'living with a partner', and 'sufficient accommodation' are viewed as most necessary. In the EU Member States, 'having a good job' and 'sufficient accommodation' are on average viewed as the most essential requisites of a good life, followed by 'enough leisure time and the means to enjoy it'. Country differences in the ranking of the most important necessities are rather small. The major difference between the two sets of countries shows up in attitudes regarding children and family. 'Having children' typically ranks as much more important in the acceding and candidate countries than in the EU (rank 5 as compared to rank 12). 'Living with a partner' ranks as the second most important necessity of a good life in the ACC; but it only ranks seven in the EU countries. A 'good job' and a 'successful career' are also accorded a higher value in the ACC. By and large, people in ACC 13 appear to be more traditional in the sense of being more family-centred, more work-oriented and less individualistic than people in the EU (see table 13).

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[18] The six items deemed to capture the 'having' dimension were 'having a good job'; 'having sufficient accommodation for everyone to have their own space'; 'having a good education'; 'having sufficient leisure time and the means to enjoy it'; 'being able to go out with friends or family'; 'having at least one holiday a year'. Four items can be seen to epitomise the 'loving' dimension: 'Living with a partner with whom one has a good relationship'; 'seeing friends regularly'; 'being on friendly terms with neighbours'; 'having children'. Finally, four items were seen as belonging to the 'being' dimension: 'Being able to be useful to others'; 'feeling recognised by society'; 'having a successful career'; 'participating in the activities of associations, trade unions or political parties'. Unfortunately, income and health, two important components of satisfaction, were not listed.

Table 12 – Necessities for a good life, by country group (% of population saying that the respective item is absolutely necessary)

	AC 10	ACC 13	EU 15	EU 25
1. Having				
Having a good job	95	97	90	91
Having sufficient accommodation	84	88	90	89
Having a good education	79	85	85	84
Having sufficient leisure time	74	79	84	83
Going out with friends or family	65	77	82	79
Having at least one holiday a year	74	81	68	69
2. Loving				
Living with a partner	84	90	79	80
Seeing friends regularly	57	68	75	72
On friendly terms with neighbours	69	79	69	69
Having children	73	80	57	60
3. Being				
Being able to be useful to others	75	82	81	80
Feeling recognised by society	60	68	68	67
Having a successful career	51	67	55	54
Participation in associations etc.	14	25	24	23

Source: Delhey, J., *Life satisfaction in an enlarged Europe.*

Table 13 – Most important necessities for a good life, by country

Country	Most important	Second most important	Third most important
Bulgaria	job	partner	children
Czech Republic	job	partner	holiday
Latvia	job	partner	education
Romania	job	partner	accommodation
Slovenia	job	partner	accommodation
Estonia	job	holiday	education
Hungary	job	accommodation	partner
Poland	job	accommodation	education
Lithuania	job	education	partner
Malta	job	education	partner
Turkey	job	education	partner
Slovakia	accommodation	job	partner
Cyprus	useful to others	partner	job
Spain	job	education	useful to others
Germany	job	accommodation	leisure time
Italy	job	accommodation	education
Luxembourg	job	accommodation	education
Austria	job	accommodation	education
Belgium	accommodation	job	partner
France	accommodation	education	able to go out
Ireland	accommodation	able to go out	leisure time
United Kingdom	accommodation	leisure time	able to go out
Netherlands	leisure time	seeing friends	useful to others
Sweden	leisure time	holiday	able to go out
Finland	holiday	accommodation	useful to others
Portugal	able to go out	job	useful to others
Denmark	useful to others	seeing friends	leisure time
Greece	useful to others	partner	job

Data: Eurobarometer report CC, EB 56.1.

Question: Not everybody has the same idea about what the necessities for a good life are. Please tell me if each of the following is absolutely necessary for leading a good life?

The oldest age group (65+) consistently puts more emphasis on having children and on good relations with neighbours while the youngest group (under 25 years) regards seeing friends and taking a holiday as more important. In the EU, much less importance is attributed to living with a partner. In this sense, this reflects a trend towards a more individualistic and more hedonistic outlook among younger people which conforms to the diagnosis of a trend towards post-materialist values as documented in the work of Inglehart (2000). In general, the generation gap is much bigger in acceding and candidate countries. Among the younger generation in both groups of countries, differences are usually less marked.

Factors contributing to quality of life

Respondents were asked to name the three factors which they felt contributed most to their current level of quality of life. Choosing from a list of 16 items – health and income were added to the original 14 – all Europeans came to remarkably similar conclusions.

'Being in good health' is found to contribute most to quality of life. On average it is ranked among the top three items by two-thirds of the population in the acceding and candidate countries, and by three-quarters in the Member States. Health is followed by 'sufficient income to meet my needs' and by 'having family members who are there when I need them'. This finding reveals two important insights.

First, people usually have multi-dimensional concepts of a good life, with income, health and good social relations being simultaneously identified as indispensable ingredients. Second, people attribute major importance to the small world around them. In their world view, life is made up of immediate concerns such as making a living, having a family life, and being in good health rather than remote political or societal concerns (Easterlin, 2001). Hence for most respondents, items such as 'satisfactory environment', 'living in a safe area', 'good health services', 'good transportation facilities', or 'access to social and cultural activities', are of minor importance. In other words, the fact that dissatisfaction levels increase the further people move away from their private life must not be considered a threat to political stability, because the importance of these kinds of dissatisfaction to individual citizens is low.

When people are asked what factors would most improve their current quality of life, their answers tend to reflect scarcities. Those items or domains are likely to be mentioned as potential improvers of quality of life which are perceived as significant and where current satisfaction levels are lowest. Thus, the more dissatisfied people are with their income, the more likely they are to mention income among the top three items needed to improve their quality of life. The correlation between domain-specific dissatisfaction scores and the frequency with which the respective item is mentioned as necessary to improve the quality of life is similarly strong in the ACC 13 and EU 15.

Across Europe, people seem to follow the rule 'first things first' in the sense of wanting most what they lack most. Lacking a particular item 'most' is of course a relational concept. What one perceives as 'most lacking' is not simply a function of the absolute gap between the level of current supply and the level of aspirations within a particular domain. It is, rather, an expression of the size of the gap in this realm relative to the size in other domains. In other words, whether people at a given level of income poverty perceive income, health, or social relations as most necessary to improve their quality of life depends not only on their level of income, but also on the degree of deprivation in other dimensions.

The determinants of life satisfaction can also be observed indirectly by means of a statistical analysis which measures the association between domain satisfactions and general life satisfaction. In acceding and candidate countries, general satisfaction hinges most on the degree of satisfaction with the individual's financial situation. In other words, it is income that matters most to people in countries which are currently still outside the EU. Next to income, satisfaction with health, family life, and social life matters most to people in acceding and candidate countries. This confirms once again that personal life circumstances in people's immediate vicinity rather than more remote factors beyond one's control are decisive for human well-being.

On the other hand, nowhere in the EU is income the strongest determinant of life satisfaction. Usually satisfaction with family life, social life or health has the strongest impact on general satisfaction. In line with Maslow's idea of a hierarchy of needs reflecting scarcities (Maslow, 1970), it can be concluded that in acceding and candidate countries where the command over material resources is still low, 'having' has central importance for people's well-being, while in the EU 'loving' and self-improvement have become prime sources of satisfaction. In both contexts, however, quality of life is obviously understood as a multi-dimensional concept depending on several components rather than just one particular ingredient of well-being.

Policy challenges 5

A number of topics covered in the data were included on account of their general policy interest rather than their relevance to the quality of life perspective. These topics, including fertility and family issues, migration trends and health and caring, have some connection with quality of life issues and these were explored in part in the reports. The main focus, however, is on their policy significance.

Fertility and family aspects

Patterns of low fertility are now found in all EU 28 countries, except Turkey. The policy issue highlighted in the research is the challenge of an ageing population and population decline which are direct consequences of low fertility. Moreover, it underlines the longstanding European disadvantage in this regard vis-à-vis other major regions, especially the United States where fertility is now 40% higher than in Europe. While it is possible that Europe's very low levels of fertility may be temporary (Bongaarts, 2001), there is concern that European governments may need to take concerted action to raise birth rates. At the same time, the right to control one's own fertility is regarded as a private matter. At the macro level, therefore, low fertility would seem to be bad for the future of Europe, in the long run at least. At the micro level, however, it amounts to an individual choice and so cannot easily be altered on that account.

Low fertility rates

The descriptive account of patterns of low fertility in the ACC 13 and EU 15 is based on information on fertility outcomes contained in the dataset. This shows, first, that while European countries differ in their fertility rates and in the patterns of reproduction which give rise to low fertility, those differences do not break down along the lines of an ACC-EU divide. The AC 10 have slightly lower fertility than the EU 15, but it is the common decline in fertility figures across regions rather than differences in overall rates which stand out. The only exceptional case in this regard is Turkey, with a current total fertility rate of 2.6 births per woman. This is 80% higher than the EU average, making Turkey the only country in the study with above-replacement fertility.

Three aspects of reproductive patterns are likely to affect fertility rates:

- the growing percentage of women remaining childless,
- the increasing average age of women at the birth of their first child,
- the rising propensity of women to remain single.

Confirming the findings of other research, it shows that these aspects do not combine together in a consistent way across countries to give rise to model patterns of low fertility. In some countries (such as Germany), a rise in the incidence of childlessness has been an important contributor to the decline in fertility while in other countries childlessness has had little or no effect on fertility trends. In some countries (especially Ireland), fertility rates are relatively high despite a late average age among women at the birth of their first child, while in other countries an early average age at first birth has not prevented fertility from falling to very low levels. The tendency to remain single had a major effect on fertility rates in Europe in the past, but with the rise in the incidence of parenthood outside marriage, the incidence of single parenthood has no consistent effect on national fertility rates.

Fertility aspirations

A second major issue covered in the fertility data is respondents' fertility aspirations. Previous research has indicated that women in developed countries generally report having fewer children than their ideal. The data contained no information on how strongly people felt about what they stated as their ideal family size. It is worth noting in this regard that the analysis which examined people's views on the necessities of a good life found that 'having children' ranked lower in people's priorities in the EU 15. This could suggest that family size ideals are not necessarily strongly held ideals and so may not be powerful influences on behaviour.

Focusing mainly on women with completed fertility (since it is only in their case that final fertility outcomes can be specified), a number of questions connected with the gap between ideal and actual fertility were explored. These included how wide that gap is, whether it appears to be increasing across the generations, what reasons respondents give for the gap, what social characteristics predict the gap, and whether the gap shows any significant relationships with indicators of subjective well-being such as global life satisfaction and satisfaction with family life.

The key findings are as follows:

1. Among women with completed fertility aged 40-64, actual family size on average fell slightly short of ideal size in all countries, except for Turkey. In the EU 25, the mean ideal family size was 2.34 children while the mean actual family size was 2.05 children, yielding a gap between the two of 0.29 children.
2. The average gap between ideal and actual fertility is a composite of three different components which, across

Figure 9 – Actual versus ideal number of children among women with completed fertility (ages 40-64)



Source: Fahey, T. and Spéder, Z., *Fertility and family issues in an enlarged Europe*.
Note: Countries in descending order of 'actual children less than ideal'.

Europe as a whole, can be broken down as follows: a) a majority of about 55%-60% of women who attain their ideal family sizes, b) a minority of about one-third who under-attain (i.e. fall short of) their ideal, and c) a smaller minority of 11%-12% who over-attain their ideal. Figure 9 shows this breakdown for all countries.

3. Based on analysis of age-bands of women aged 40 and over with completed fertility, the gap between actual and ideal fertility would appear to have widened slightly over time (see figure 10). For example, the shortfall shown in Figure 9 for the EU is twice as large among 45-49 year old women (-0.23) as it is among women aged 75 and over (-0.11). However, closer inspection of the widening of the actual–ideal gap showed that it is a statistical artefact. It is not caused by an increase in the proportion of women who fall short of their fertility ideal but by a decrease in the proportion of women who over-attain their fertility ideal. The compensating effect of over-attainment on under-attainment weakens across age groups, thereby causing the under-attainment gap to appear wider as one moves from the older to the younger age groups.

4. When women who do not fulfil their fertility aspirations were asked why they had fewer children than they had wanted, they pointed mainly to reasons of a broadly economic character: financial issues, the cost of children and problems with accommodation. Health and relationship factors (own health, partner's health and problems with partner) also feature prominently. (The surveys did not ask women who had over-attained their fertility ideals why this had taken place.)

Figure 10 – Differences between ideal and actual number of children among women of different age groups with completed fertility



Source: Fahey, T. and Spéder, Z., *Fertility and family issues in an enlarged Europe.*
Note: Positive values indicate that mean actual number of children exceeds mean ideal; negative values indicate that actual number of children falls short of ideal.

5. When the social characteristics of those who under-attain and over-attain are analysed (with reference particularly to their level of education), it would appear that under-attainment is more common among the better-off while over-attainment is more common among the less well-off (see table 14). Thus, under-attainment is less a matter of lack of resources in an absolute sense than of opportunity cost in terms of a mother's time, while over-attainment would appear to be part of a general syndrome associated with limited control over the circumstances of one's life.

6. Analysis of the relationship between fertility ideal attainment and life satisfaction produced mixed results. On the one hand, over-attainment seemed to be associated with reduced global life satisfaction while under-attainment was not. On the other hand, both under-attainment and over-attainment were associated with reduced satisfaction with family life, though the under-attainment relationship in this instance was the stronger and more consistent across men and women.

Three key lessons emerge for policymakers seeking to promote higher birth rates in Europe.

1. There is a strong cultural dimension to the decline in fertility in Europe, in that European cultural values have turned decisively away from the ideal of the large family in favour of much smaller family size ideals. Such cultural shifts are difficult to alter through public policy and so the challenge of raising birth rates through government intervention is made all the more difficult.

2. However, although most women now have small family size ideals, about one-third of women fail to fulfil those ideals in their own childbearing. One should be slow to conclude that this failure is a cause of serious concern to the women involved. Nevertheless, it may reveal some scope for government intervention to encourage an increase in birth rates, particularly through measures designed to reduce the economic cost and risks over the life course (loss of career, low pension, etc.) of having children.

3. Pro-natalist measures designed to enable women attain their fertility ideals would have a different

Table 14 – Fertility ideal fulfilment among women with completed fertility aged 40-64

School-leaving age	%	Under-attainment	Ideal number	Over-attainment	Total %	Number
EU 15						
Up to 15 years		26	58	16	100	1,266
16-19 years		28	59	12	100	1,616
20+ years		41	52	8	100	753
AC 10						
Up to 15 years		20	58	22	100	254
16-19 years		31	58	11	100	361
20+ years		42	53	6	100	177
ACC 13						
Up to 15 years		17	45	38	100	354
16-19 years		24	64	12	100	170
20+ years		41	55	5	100	88

Source: Fahey, T. and Spéder, Z., *Fertility and family issues in an enlarged Europe*.

character from those designed to avoid child poverty, since under-attainment of fertility ideals is greatest among women with high education levels. Such measures would have the greatest effect if targeted on families where the opportunity cost of children is highest, i.e. where women have high earning power. In addition, they need to be based on principles of horizontal equity, where the aim is to transfer resources from those without children to those with children, rather than on principles of vertical equity, where the aim is to transfer resources from the well-off to the less well-off.

The report also examines a range of perceptions of gender roles in the family and of the measures governments could most usefully take to support family life. These generally revealed an absence of an ACC-EU divide in ideas associated with the family, particularly regarding gender role-sharing in child-rearing tasks. Thus the notion of a common family culture across Europe was reinforced. But data also show important differences among countries on this issue, with northern European countries on one end (reporting a more equal distribution of tasks) and Turkey on the other end. Perceptions of what governments should do to support family life were difficult to interpret since adequate contextual information about current levels of state supports for families in the various countries was lacking. In addition, consistent cross-country patterns in the responses were difficult to detect. It is notable, however, that in the ACC 13, respondents widely identified the fight against unemployment rather than family policy measures as the most important means for governments to promote family life.

Migration trends

Migration, like fertility, poses a considerable policy challenge for the EU. The goals of economic growth and economic convergence between regions in Europe can be supported by high levels of labour mobility, in addition to new trade relationships and the movements of capital and public investments under EU regional policy. In addition, high levels of labour migration create economic and social challenges (e.g. the integration of unskilled workers) and opportunities (e.g. cultural and social enrichment contributing to entrepreneurship, innovation and employment) in the receiving societies, as well as sometimes depleting the human capital resources of sending societies. The growth of marginalised ethnic minorities within the advanced societies of the EU represents one form of the possible social strain which can result from labour migration. The dilemma here, then, is that while labour mobility may be good for economic growth and cohesion across the EU regions as a whole, it may put pressure on social cohesion at the local level within national societies if not accompanied by a holistic approach of integration.

The study of migration intentions in the ACC 13 calculated likely migration flows based on respondents' answers to a number of questions about their likely future movements (Krieger, 2004). Responses to individual questions gave widely different estimates of migration potential across countries and sometimes the volume of likely migration predicted by these estimates was high. However, when the responses were combined to form an index measuring the 'firm intention to migrate', the results were more consistent with the findings of recent econometric studies of migration potential and other survey-based comparative studies. More inclusive indices were also computed, which were termed the 'general intention to migrate' and the 'basic intention to migrate'.

Using these composite indices and focusing especially on the 'firm intention to migrate' (see Table 15), the report concluded that the volume of labour migration to the EU 15 after enlargement is likely to be small, amounting to gross movement of around 1.0% of the population stock in the ACC 13 within the next five years under conditions of free movement. This represents an emigration of around 1.1 million from the 10 central and eastern acceding and candidate countries (that is, excluding Malta, Cyprus and

Table 15 – Migration intentions among the ACC

%

	General inclination		Basic intention		Firm intention	
Poland	3.7	(63)	1.6	(27)	1.0	(16)
Bulgaria, Romania	5.0	(84)	3.2	(57)	2.0	(31)
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	2.1	(38)	0.8	(14)	0.7	(11)
Turkey	6.2	(136)	0.8	(18)	0.3	(7)
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	2.4	(59)	0.8	(26)	0.6	(17)
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	3.5	(112)	2.0	(58)	0.8	(25)
AC 10	3.1	(272)	1.3	(125)	0.8	(69)
ACC 13	4.6	(492)	1.5	(200)	0.9	(107)

Source: Krieger, H., *Migration trends in an enlarged Europe*.

Note: Figures in parentheses represent real numbers.

Turkey). Since free movement will be achieved only gradually over the next five to seven years, actual migration is likely to be well below one million up to 2006. Taking return migration into account, net movement could be considerably smaller still. The highest migration potential is from Bulgaria and Romania.

Thus, the study indicated that the potential 'flood' of migration as a consequence of EU enlargement is unlikely to materialise. Furthermore, the impact of such migration as does occur is likely to be mitigated by a high incidence of short-term migration and of return migration to ACC 13 countries which should counter-balance outward flows. Other research indicates that particular receiving countries could nevertheless be strongly affected (e.g. Germany and Austria), since the target country destinations of migrants are unevenly distributed.

The sample numbers of those identified as having a likely migration potential were small and therefore only provide broad indications of the likely social structure of migration from the ACC 13. On the basis of such indications, there is a real risk of significant brain drain. Potential migrants are most likely to be young, and better educated. In most of the ACC 13, migration among the young could be as high as 2%-5%, and in Bulgaria and Romania that figure could rise to 10%. That also translates into similar, or even higher, levels of migration among those with third-level education. Migration is unlikely to have much value as a means to reduce unemployment in the ACC 13, however, since only 2%-3% of unemployed people want to migrate.

Remarkable also is the trend toward an increasing 'feminisation' of migration. Traditionally, the vast majority of potential migrants has been male. Looking at the widest migration potential category, a greater proportion of the female population than the male population expressed a general inclination to migrate in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In the Baltic countries, an equal proportion of men and women expressed this inclination. The older pattern of predominantly male migration prevails in Poland and Turkey. The emerging feminisation includes a transient form of labour migration which enables women to combine mainly domestic work in the receiving countries for parts of the year with family responsibilities in their home country.

From the point of view of EU policy, the key finding of the analysis is the likely low level of east–west migration flows in the enlarged EU. This could be considered a positive finding from one point of view, as it would tend to ease the concerns of those who worry that migration flows might be so large as to put pressure on social networks and social inclusion in the receiving countries. On the other hand, it could be considered a negative finding from the point of view of EU policy on labour mobility and economic and social cohesion across regions. The policy aims to facilitate the free movement of workers across the Union, both as a prerequisite of economic efficiency and growth and as a means to promote economic convergence of the regions. The present findings suggest that likely movement of workers in the enlarged EU will be small despite wide differentials in levels of economic development across regions.

Care responsibilities in an ageing society

As life expectancy increases and fertility declines, a gap opens up between the growing number of elderly people who need care and the shrinking pool of younger children or grandchildren able to provide care within families and private households. As a result, there is growing demand for formal care services. However, tight budget constraints are increasingly imposing limits on the expansion of public services,

The analysis of this issue revealed a remarkable vital network of informal help throughout Europe. In acceding and candidate countries, roughly 25% of the respondents are engaged in some form of regular help on behalf of others. In the European Union, the figure is about 21%. The similar aggregate levels conceal somewhat different structures of help. In acceding and candidate countries, help is much more concentrated within private households and within the family system. On the other hand, EU citizens are more active outside their private households and outside the kinship system than respondents in the ACC 10.

In both parts of Europe, the informal care activities of citizens peak at prime age in the middle of the life cycle. The level of support is almost as high among economically active persons as among pensioners or the unemployed. In this sense, people outside the labour force do not effectively lower the burden for working people who frequently have to juggle work and caring roles. This puts individual care-givers under heavy strain and also contributes to diminishing productivity in the economy, as people who have care responsibilities are prone to higher levels of absenteeism, and more fragmented employment careers. Relieving economically active people of some of the care responsibilities or coordinating formal employment more effectively with the informal care activities would thus help companies to increase productivity levels.

While care outside private households is mainly carried out by people of working age, home care for co-residents is frequently given by people over 60. Older people are more active care-givers in acceding and candidate countries than in the EU. Their high activity level partly reflects the absence of effective formal care arrangements. In several of these countries, about one in five persons over 60 is engaged in giving care at home. Within the EU, only older people in Germany report a similarly high frequency of care responsibilities.

When Europeans are asked whether they would consider it good or bad if in future years working adults would have to look after their elderly parents more, remarkably different care orientations emerge. Whereas most EU citizens favour the idea of 'intimacy at a distance', the ACC 13 citizens tend to favour immediate mutual family support. Some 80% advocate extended family support in the future, whereas only 59% of the EU citizens support this view.

Throughout Europe, groups known to be the present or likely suppliers of care – women and younger persons – support the idea of family support to similar or even higher degrees than those who are likely recipients of care. Women who give care more frequently than men advocate extended family responsibilities even more frequently than males. Even among younger people, a majority is in favour of extended family support in the future. The survey also reveals that caring for elderly persons tends to foster positive thoughts about extended family responsibilities.

Similarly, arranging for elderly people to be cared for in nursing homes is a highly unpopular solution to the care problem across Europe. In 12 of the 13 acceding and candidate countries, more than 80% of the respondents say they would prefer social services which allow elderly people to remain in their own homes, and the figures for the EU are similar. When respondents were asked what care solution they would prefer for their own parents, the majority of citizens in acceding and candidate countries saw moving in with the parents as the best solution. Citizens in EU countries are quite divided on this issue, making attempts to coordinate European care policies in the future difficult.

How strongly family bonds mediate generational conflicts becomes evident when Europeans are asked who should pay for the care of elderly parents. The choice was between the options 'their children', 'the elderly parents themselves' and 'the state or other public authorities'. By far the least popular idea in acceding and candidate countries is to have elderly parents foot the bill. In this sense, the idea of sustainable social policies which take into account the interests of future generations has not yet gained much prominence in acceding and candidate countries. EU citizens are much more reluctant to have the children pay. However, they are also frequently in favour of state financing which means shifting the burden to the taxpayer and in this sense also to the economically active generation.

In ACC 13 and EU countries, older respondents tend to be more in favour of shifting the cost of care to elderly persons than younger persons. In 27 of the 28 European countries, shifting the burden of financing to the elderly is more popular among older than among younger respondents. Older citizens are willing to shoulder their part of the cost of care, and do not advocate shifting the cost to the younger generation any more frequently than do the young themselves. The younger generation, in turn, seems to be willing to shoulder care tasks and to advocate extended family responsibilities even where they would have to carry the resulting burdens themselves.

But the strength of family support in the ACC 13 is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can certainly help to unburden the welfare state and find new welfare mixes. On the other hand, it also puts a heavy dual burden on the shoulders of economically active persons who are increasingly likely to become a 'sandwich' generation which has to juggle work, family, and care responsibilities.

Key conclusions

Economic growth fundamental to well-being and life satisfaction

From a quality of life perspective, GDP per capita is often criticised as an overly materialistic indicator which neither captures the degree of political freedom nor varying patterns of social support or family integration. The comparisons of countries across Europe, however, found objective indicators of material well-being such as GDP per capita and key subjective indicators of life satisfaction to be strongly interrelated. In fact, the level of GDP per capita in the country in which the individual lives turn out to be the best predictor of individual life-satisfaction across the EU 28. Thus, deficits in ACC 13 on traditional economic indicators are matched by poor life satisfaction scores.

The focus of EU policy on economic convergence is therefore justified as a means to improve the quality of life of citizens in acceding countries. GDP growth and economic catch-up will over time result in improved life satisfaction in the ACC 13.

Full employment essential to quality of life

In European societies, dependent employment has become the predominant form of formal work and material well-being typically hinges on income from work. The social transfer payments from social security schemes depend on taxes and contributions from the economically active. Raising the employment rate to 70% of the working-age population is therefore an important objective of current EU economic and social policies.

This would have largely positive effects for quality of life, as work is fundamentally important as a source of income, as a mechanism of social integration, and as a basis for structuring workers' lives. Unemployment, the involuntary lack of work, has been shown to have extremely negative effects on a number of dimensions of well-being (poverty, deprivation, social exclusion, and dissatisfaction with life), and it is more widespread in ACC countries. Successfully extending the full employment strategy to new Member States would thus contribute hugely to achieving general well-being. The research findings revealed that having a job is usually perceived as the most important necessity for a good life in the ACC, ranked more highly than quality of employment.

Yet, a quantitative full employment strategy which simply aims at higher employment rates would have drawbacks. People can have too much work i.e. their jobs are extremely pressured or absorb too much of their time and energy. Or they can have poor quality work, which places them in unhealthy or dangerous work environments. Many people experience work-related stress and strain which give rise to negative effects on their quality of life. Insecure and physically or psychologically adverse work conditions are associated with higher stress levels, less health satisfaction, and reduced quality of life through less interaction with family, friends and neighbours. The findings thus support an integrated employment policy, which would combine higher employment rates and better jobs with an improved coordination of formal work and informal welfare production in families and voluntary associations.

Traditional inequalities remain

Inequalities such as income, education, and employment usually have a stronger impact on well-being than vertical inequalities related to gender, family status, or age. The findings showed that the most disadvantaged persons are likely to be those with poor education, low skill employment, and a high exposure to unemployment. Similarly, those with low income, low levels of education and lower occupational positions are most likely to have a negative self-image.

Against this background, policies must therefore continue to focus on these 'old' types of inequality and attempt to effectively forge equal opportunities for people from different social backgrounds. Given that these inequalities tend to be particularly sharp in the new Member States, enlargement would appear to sustain this traditional policy perspective.

Poverty and social exclusion main areas of social concern

Since household incomes are much lower in AC 10 and CC 3 than in EU 15, those in the highest income quartile of the aspiring countries are in most cases on a lower absolute level of income than those who are in the lowest income quartile of the more prosperous EU countries. The acceding and candidate countries thus have higher proportions of people who live in poverty and feel excluded, and they also adhere more strongly to collective ideas than EU citizens. This combination may make the poor population in acceding and candidate countries easier to mobilise politically than their peers in western countries who are more likely to blame themselves than society. However, potential discontent in the acceding countries is mitigated as people appear to have better coping strategies when faced with economic pressures than their EU counterparts.

The studies raise the question as to whether the concept of social exclusion has as clear and valid a meaning in the ACC 13 as it has in the EU. Within the current EU, the socially excluded are thought of as marginalised minorities, cut off from the mainstream by virtue of their lack of material resources. In the ACC 13, however, it is evident that large 'mainstream' segments of the population have low incomes by EU standards, lack integration in the labour market, and feel dissatisfied with their situation. Thus, the boundaries between the marginalised population and the 'mainstream' may be more blurred in societies where much larger proportions of the population suffer significant quality of life deficits than is the case in the countries of the EU. Where deprivation is more widespread and customary, it is less stigmatising and entails less subjective feelings of exclusion than in societies which provide ample opportunities. Hence, unemployment was found to have a stronger impact on subjective feelings of exclusion in the EU than in the ACC.

Family life and civil society central to social integration

Combating social exclusion does not only mean reducing unemployment and poverty but also strengthening the ties with family, neighbourhood and voluntary associations which are all sources of emotional and social support. Being married and having children has been found to have a stabilising effect on self-confidence and on feelings of belonging to society. Hence families should be seen as the basic form of social integration which mediates between the individual and society. In addition, voluntary associations and civic society activities can serve as buffers against feelings of social exclusion.

Developing policies against social exclusion cuts across established administrative divisions of labour among various government agencies. It requires a revitalisation of civil society action and coordination between various policy fields, above all employment policy, educational policy, and family policy, as well as additional areas such as housing and neighbourhood policy. Respondents in the AC 10 and CC 3 frequently identified the fight against unemployment, rather than standard family policy measures, as the most important way for governments to help strengthen families.

Strong level of intergenerational support

25% of the respondents in ACC 13 countries and more than 20% in the EU are engaged in some form of informal care giving. Whereas EU citizens are more active care-givers outside their private households and outside the kinship system, people in the ACC 13 focus on the family. Most EU citizens favour the idea of intimacy at a distance, whereby elderly parents and their adult children live in separate households. In contrast, the vast majority of respondents in the ACC advocate that working adults should look after their parents in future years. Active involvement in care giving fosters positive rather than negative feelings about extended family responsibilities. In the ACC, those giving care to elderly persons advocate strengthening family responsibilities in the future.

In terms of paying for care, Europeans show a remarkable degree of inter-generational empathy. Older citizens advocate shifting the cost of care to elderly persons more frequently than those in the youngest generation and they are just as hesitant to put heavier burdens on younger generations. The younger generation, in turn, declares itself willing to shoulder care tasks and advocates extended family responsibilities even when this amounts to carrying the burden themselves. This suggests that Europe shows potential for reasonable political discourse on inter-generational justice.

From a policy perspective, the vitality of mutual family support must be considered a double-edged sword. On the one side, welfare production in families and neighborhoods fosters intergenerational support and helps to unburden the state, but on the other, informal care work frequently coincides with formal employment. This may lead to more stress and less productivity and it thus requires new forms of flexible coordination between work and family life.

Declining fertility and increasing migration major policy challenges

Low fertility is an important background concern for EU policy as it threatens the future vitality of European population structures. In some countries, a rise in the incidence of childlessness is an important factor, in others delay in the onset of child-bearing is more important, and a reluctance or inability to enter marital or long-term cohabiting unions is an influence in some countries. Thus, low fertility levels can be the result of different combinations of these factors in different countries, so that one single unified policy strategy could be counter-productive.

There is also a common trend away from large families, both in practice and at the level of individual fertility aspirations: women's individual fertility levels on average fall below their fertility expectations. This is regarded as an important policy issue by some commentators, as it gives rise to the possibility that measures to ease constraints on women's childbearing could evoke a favourable response among women and would have the effect of raising European birth rates. The findings suggest that about one third of women in Europe who have completed their child-bearing have fewer children than their ideal number, though there is also a significant proportion (up to 12%) who have more children than their ideal. There is quite a strong association between education levels and attainment of fertility ideals: the well-educated are more likely to under-attain while the poorly educated are more likely to over-attain.

The findings suggest that the policy significance of the gap between ideal and actual fertility can be overstated. There is no strong indication that this gap is a major source of concern to women and it cannot be assumed that they would respond strongly to measures designed to address it. Furthermore, while enabling women to attain their fertility aspirations would lead to an increase in the number of births for some women, it would entail a decrease for others and the net outcome would be relatively modest.

If policies to address under-attainment are to be considered, the positive association between high education and under-attainment found in the analysis should be taken into account. It suggests that those policies would be most effective if weighted towards women with high human capital for whom the opportunity costs of child-bearing (in terms of income, career or lifestyle) are greatest. Child-support measures which had a pro-natalist intent might differ from those with an anti-poverty intent, since the former would emphasise horizontal distribution from those without children to those with children, where the latter would emphasise vertical distribution from the better-off to the less well-off. However, these implications should not be pushed too far given the weak understanding of the processes involved. As a recent OECD review has concluded:

> '[P]olicy-makers should probably not expect too much from pro-natalist policies. We still do not understand fully why birth rates in OECD countries have declined so precipitously over the past three decades, and knowledge about the effects of policies and their complementarities is still too limited to guide the design of cost-effective interventions' (Sleebos, 2003, p.48).

The long-term risks for mothers over the life course should be reduced by measures combining sufficient income support, protection of mothers against career discrimination, measures to re-integrate parents into the labour market, better support for lone parents and a family friendly pension system. Interventions to improve childcare facilities could help reconcile employment and family tasks and improve work–life balance.

Some commentators have observed that the adverse effects of declining fertility could be compensated for by increasing immigration. Analysis of migration intentions in the ACC point to a rather modest flow of migrants from these areas into the EU – about one million over the next five years. Potential migrants are likely to be young and well educated. An increasing number will be female. The acceding and candidate countries could, thus, be negatively affected by a youth and brain drain to the west. In this case, too, the overall impact is likely to be modest, particularly given the likely temporary character of much migration and the possibility of return migration. From a social policy perspective, the temporary character of many migration plans provides an opportunity for policies which might support return and circular migration.

Differences and similarities between country groups

Two consequences of EU enlargement have been well established by previous research: first, the north–south gradient in levels of economic development and living standards found in the current EU will be superseded by a west–east gradient in the enlarged EU, and second, regional disparities between east and west will be much wider after enlargement than current EU regional disparities.

The present studies have generally confirmed these previous findings and have expanded them in a number of ways. The most essential socio-economic indictor, GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parities, is at 45% of the EU 15 average in the AC 10 (compared to 60% in Greece, Portugal, and Spain when they joined). Reflecting the economic diversity to some extent, differences in subjective well-being will be similarly pronounced, as nine of the 13 aspiring countries have lower satisfaction levels than the two countries which are at the rear of the current EU distribution of life satisfaction. The modest showing of AC 10 countries in GDP, family income, access to essential goods, and working conditions has a serious effect on conventional aspects of quality of life in Europe, and it highlights the serious cohesion challenge which the EU faces after enlargement.

The studies furthermore show that EU enlargement will also bring more inequality within countries. Even though the degree of income inequality between the EU and ACC is similar, most other dimensions of well-being show a higher degree of internal dispersion in ACC 13. Thus, life satisfaction differences between income groups are much more marked in aspiring countries than in the EU, where the largest satisfaction spreads used to be recorded in southern Europe.

In line with earlier research, the studies also found some noteworthy socio-cultural differences. According to the surveys, people in the ACC 13 are more traditional and less post-materialist in the sense of being more family-centred, more work-oriented, more deferential to the elderly, and less individualistic than EU citizens. They attribute greater importance to having children, to income, and to career chances, while respondents in the EU put comparatively more emphasis on leisure and social life outside the family. In both contexts, however, quality of life is obviously understood as a multi-dimensional concept hinging on several components rather than just one ingredient of well-being.

Since the studies also show strong national differences within the ACC group, the east–west divide should not be exaggerated. In many cases, the diversity across nations is higher in ACC 13 countries than is the case in the EU.

Finally, the studies also point to a number of important commonalities across the countries of the enlarging EU. People's basic priorities and values are similar across Europe. Most people in most countries are primarily concerned with making a living, being in good health and having family members who are there when needed. In this sense, they have very similar ideas about what contributes to quality of life. Inter-generational support and reliance on family integration as a buffer against social exclusion or isolation are also common. Low fertility and the accompanying cultural values are now almost universal in the enlarging EU, as are ideals of gender-sharing in child-rearing responsibilities.

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Annex

Table of variables and Eurobarometer sources

List of variables CC Eurobarometer 2002
Eurobarometer sources for corresponding variables for EU 15

	EB 50.1 1998	EB 51.0 1999	EB 52.1 1999	EB 54.2 2001	EB 56.1 2001	EB 56.2 2001
European Union						
Q1: Country membership: good or bad	none	none	none	none	none	none
Q2: Vote in possible referendum	none	none	none	none	none	none
Q3: Country could/could not benefit	none	none	none	none	none	none
Quality of life/satisfaction						
Q4: Satisfaction with specified life domains			Q13			
Q5: Changes over time: 2 years before/after			Q14			
Q6: 3 factors contributing most to current quality of life			Q15			
Q7: 3 factors that would contribute most to quality of life			Q16			
Family and children						
Q8: Ideal number of children						Q60
Q9: Personally preferred number of children						Q61
Q10: Wish 20 years ago						
Q11: All the children you wanted?						
Q12 Actual number of children						Q64
Q13: Age at birth of first child						Q65
Q14: How many more children do you plan to have?						Q66
Q15: Perceived family policy priorities/ responsibilities of government	Q31c					
Q16: Looking after children: task distribution	Q34					
Q17: Perceived role of the family	Q27ac/ Q27bc					
Elderly people						
Q18: Adults having to look after their parents: good or bad	Q33					
Q19: Care for the elderly – responsibilities		Q36				
Q20: Care for the elderly – best practice	Q36					
Q21: Who should pay for care	Q37					
Q22: Taking care of someone		Q37ac/ Q37bc				
Health						
Q23: Lifestyle habits			Q21			
Q24: Illness or disability			Q23			
Access to and quality of services						
Q25: Access to services/distance from home			Q17a/ Q17rc			
Q26: Satisfaction with social services	Q35b					
Satisfaction with health services	Q35c					
Q27: Care: who should be responsible?	Q40					

Household income and standard of living						
Q28: Lowest possible income necessary to make ends meet					Q3m	
Q29: Relationship of own household income to this threshold					Q4	
Q29a: How well do you manage on this income?					Q5	
Q30: How long in this financial situation?					Q6	
Q31: Economic problems in past 12 months					Q9	
Q32: Self-assessed standard of living			Q18			
Q33: Current ability to invest			Q19			
Q34a: Currently trying to improve standard of living			Q20a			
Q34b: Planning to improve standard of living			Q20bc/ Qcc			
Q35: Ownership of consumer goods	none	none	none	none	none	none
Social protection/exclusion/inclusion						
Q36: Perceived necessities of good life					Q20/Q21	
Q37: Availability of social network support					Q19	
Q38: Perceived alienation/depression/insecurity/ powerlessness					Q21	
Q39: Support given to others			Q26			
Q40: Responsibility to help the poor			Q27ac/ Q27bc			
Q41: Perceived reasons for being in need					Q13	
Q42: Three reasons for exclusion selected from list					Q14c	
Q43: Poverty risk: two statements					Q15	
Q44: Agreement with leftist ideas/solidarity			Q28			
Social and political participation						
Q45: Participation in listed organisations	Q32ac					
Employment, unemployment and quality of work						
D15: Current occupation	D15ar/ D15br	D15ar/ D15br	D15ar/ D15br	D15ar/ D15br	D15ar/ D15br	D15ar/ D15br
Q46: Unemployment experience					Q16_2m/Q16_2r	
Q47: Length of unemployment					Q17	
Q48: Desired job: full-time or part-time					Q22	
Q49: Firm size					Q26	
Q50: Employment branch					Q27r	
Q51: Actual working hours per week					Q29m	
Q52: Perceived quality of job					Q33	
Q53: Perceived stress at work					Q41	
Regional mobility						
Q54: Have you moved in last 10 years?				Q35		
Q55: How many times?				Q36+ Q36r		
Q56: Where have you moved to?				Q37a-Q37b		
Q57: Reasons for most recent move				Q38c		
Q58: Why have you not moved?				Q39c		
Q59: Intention to move in next 5 years				Q40		
Q60: Distance of intended move				Q41a-Q41e		
Q61: Motives for intended move				Q42c		
Q62: Reasons for moving in next 5 years				Q43c		
Q63: Willingness to move if unemployed				Q44		

Q64: Improved job prospects through moving?				Q45		
Q65: What would encourage you to move?				Q46		
Q66/67: Willingness to live in another European country				Q47		
	EB 50.1	EB 51.0	EB 52.1	EB 54.2	EB 56.1	EB 56.2
Demographics						
D10: Gender	D10	D10	D10	D10	D10	D10
D7: Family status	D7	D7	D7	none	D7	D7
D8: Age when finishing education	D8	none	none	D8	D8	D8
D3b: Level of education	none	none	none	none	none	none
D25: Place of residence	none	none	none	none	D25	D25
D26: Type of housing	none	none	D24	none	none	none
D27: Size of residence in square meters	none	none	D24b	none	none	none
D28: Number of household members	D12	none	none	none	none	none
D29: Net household income	D29_countrycode	D29_countrycode	D29_countrycode	D29_countrycode	D29_countrycode	D29_countrycode
D30: Sources of income and their importance	none	none	D31ac	none	none	none
D19: Who contributes most to household income	D19b	D19b	D19b	none	D19a	D19
D21: Current occupation of person who contributes most to household income	D21a/D21b	D21a/D21b	D21a/D21b	none	D21a/D21b	D21a/D21b
AGE: Age	D11	none	none	D11	D11	D11

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

Perceptions of living conditions in an enlarged Europe

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The Lisbon Summit highlighted social policy as a core element in Europe's strategy for becoming 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with better jobs and greater social cohesion' by 2010. The present report, a joint initiative of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, addresses several of the Lisbon challenges. It looks at issues like social exclusion and integration, income and deprivation, fertility and family size, health and care options, and migration trends. Drawing on the results of recent Eurobarometer surveys in 28 European countries, it provides a unique crucial analysis of the views and experiences of the citizens of the new Europe concerning various aspects of living conditions.

The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions is a tripartite EU body, whose role is to provide key actors in social policymaking with findings, knowledge and advice drawn from comparative research. The Foundation was established in 1975 by Council Regulation EEC No 1365/75 of 26 May 1975.

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