European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

Representativeness of the European social partner organisations: Railways sector

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This report examines the operations of social partner organisations and collective bargaining in the railways sector. The first part, focusing on rail operations, was carried out in 2006, while the second part, on rail infrastructure, was completed in 2007. Each part consists of three main sections. The first section outlines the economic background of the railways sector. The second section analyses the social partner organisations in all Member States of the European Union, apart from Cyprus, Malta and (in the case of railway operations) Sweden, with particular emphasis on membership, role in collective bargaining and public policy, and national and European affiliations. The final section profiles the relevant European organisations, in particular their membership composition and capacity to negotiate. The aim of the EIRO representativeness studies is to identify the relevant national and supranational social partner organisations in the field of industrial relations in selected sectors. The impetus for these studies arises from the goal of the European Commission to recognise the representative social partner associations to be consulted under the EC Treaty provisions. Hence, this study seeks to provide the basic information required to establish sectoral social dialogue.

Part 1: Railway transport operations

Objectives of study

The goal of this **representativeness** study is to identify the relevant national and supranational associations – that is, the **trade unions** and **employer organisations** – in the field of industrial relations in the railways sector, and show how these actors relate to the sector's European interest associations of labour and business. The impetus for this study, and for similar studies in other sectors, arises from the aim of the **European Commission** to identify the representative social partner organisations to be consulted under the provisions of the EC Treaty. Hence, the study aims to provide the basic information needed to set up sectoral **social dialogue**. The effectiveness of the **European social dialogue** depends on whether its participants are sufficiently representative in terms of the sector's relevant national actors across the Member States of the European Union (EU). Therefore, only European organisations which meet this precondition will be allowed to join the European social dialogue.

Against this background, the study will first identify the relevant national and European social partner organisations, subsequently analysing the structure of the sector's relevant European organisations, in particular their membership composition. This involves clarifying the unit of analysis at both the national and European level of interest representation. The study includes only organisations whose membership domain is 'sector related' (see below). At both national and European levels, a multiplicity of associations exist which are not considered to be social partner organisations in the sense that they essentially deal with industrial relations. Thus, the need arises for clear-cut criteria which will enable analysis to distinguish the social partner organisations from other associations.

As regards the national-level associations, classification as a sector-related social partner organisation implies fulfilling one of two criteria: the organisations must either be a party to 'sector-related' collective bargaining or a member of a sector-related European association of business or labour that is on the Commission's list of European social partner organisations consulted under Article 138 of the EC Treaty. The alternative criterion is being a party to collective bargaining. Affiliation to such a European association and involvement in national collective bargaining are of the utmost importance to the European social dialogue. In line with the criteria for the national associations, this study includes those sector-related European associations that are on the Commission's list of consultation. In addition, the study includes any other sector-related European association which has sector-related national social partner organisations under its umbrella. Therefore, the objective to identify the sector-related national and European social partner organisations is both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'.

Definitions

For the purpose of this study, the railways sector is defined in terms of the classification of economic activities in the European Community ((*Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Communautés européennes*, NACE), to ensure cross-national comparability of the research findings. More specifically, the railways sector is defined according to NACE 60.1. The domains of the trade unions and employer organisations, and similarly the scope of relevant **collective agreements**, are likely to vary from this precise NACE demarcation. Therefore, the study includes all trade unions, employer organisations and multi-employer collective agreements that are 'sector related' in terms of any of the following four patterns:

- congruence – the domain of the organisation or scope of the collective agreement must be identical to the NACE demarcation, as specified above;
- sectionalism – the domain or scope covers only a certain part of the sector, as defined by the aforementioned NACE demarcation, while no group outside the sector is covered;
- overlap – the domain or scope covers the entire sector along with parts of one or more other sectors. However, it is important to note that the study does not include general associations which do not deal with sector-specific matters;
- sectional overlap – the domain or scope covers part of the sector as well as parts of one or more other sectors.

At European level, two sector-related organisations are currently on the Commission's list of European social partner organisations: the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF) and the Community of European Railways and Infrastructure Companies (CER). Thus, affiliation to either ETF or CER is a sufficient criterion for classifying a national association as a social partner organisation. However, it should be noted that the constituent criterion is one of sector-related membership domain. This is important in the case of ETF due to its multi-sectoral domain. This study will include only those sector-related organisations affiliated to ETF.

Collection of data

The collection of quantitative data, such as those on membership, is essential for investigating the representativeness of the social partner organisations. Unless cited otherwise, this study draws on the country studies provided by the EIRO national centres. It is often difficult to find precise quantitative data. In such cases, rough estimates are provided rather than leaving a question blank, given the practical and political relevance of this study. However, if any doubt arises over the reliability of an estimate, this will be noted.

Quantitative data, as documented in the country studies, may stem from three sources:

- official statistics and representative survey studies;
- administrative data, such as membership figures provided by the respective organisations, which are then used to calculate the density rate on the basis of available statistical figures on the potential membership of the organisation;
- personal estimates made by representatives of the respective organisations.

While the data sources of the economic figures cited in this report are generally statistics, the figures relating to the organisations are usually either administrative data or estimates. Furthermore, it should be noted that several country studies also present data on trade unions and business associations that do not meet the above definition of a sector-related social partner organisation, in order to give a complete picture of the sector's associational 'landscape'. For the above substantive reasons, as well as for methodological reasons of cross-national comparability, such trade unions and business associations will not be considered as part of this report.

Report structure

The study consists of three main parts, beginning with a brief summary of the sector's economic background. The report then analyses the relevant social partner organisations in 24 of the current 27 EU Member States following EU enlargement in May 2004 and January 2007, with the exception of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Romania and Sweden. The third part of the study looks at the representative social partner organisations at European level. Each section will contain a brief introduction, explaining the concept of representativeness in greater detail, followed by the study findings. As representativeness is a complex issue, it requires separate consideration of the national and European levels for two reasons. First, account has to be taken of how national regulations and practices capture representativeness. Secondly, the national and European organisations differ in their tasks and scope of activities. The concept of representativeness must thus be suited to this difference.

Finally, it is worth highlighting the difference between the research and political aspects of this study. While the report provides data on the representativeness of the organisations under consideration, it does not reach any definite conclusion on whether the representativeness of the European social partner organisations and their national affiliates is sufficient for admission to the European social dialogue. The reason for this is that defining criteria for sufficient representativeness is a matter for political decision rather than an issue for research analysis.

Economic background

The railways sector has undergone a process of **restructuring** across the EU Member States. Originally organised as a form of state-controlled infrastructure, railways is currently undergoing a process of transformation into a business sector as a result of ongoing deregulation of market entry and liberalisation of services, sometimes accompanied by full or partial privatisation of the former state-owned operator. Despite these reforms, however, the sector has maintained its monopoly-like structure in that one single principal operator, often still state-owned, dominates the product market and employs the majority of the sector's employees. Depending on the stage of restructuring, the reforms have, nevertheless, affected labour relations mainly in two ways. Echoing the transfer of the state-owned operator from a public law undertaking into a private law company, the employment relationship is shifting from public sector regulations to private law status. Moreover, the sector has undergone a thoroughgoing process of labour shedding.

Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the socioeconomic development in the railways sector from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, presenting a few indicators which are important to industrial relations and social dialogue. Despite the measures to open up the markets, the number of companies substantially increased only in some countries, such as Latvia and Poland. In six of the 24 countries looked at in this research, one single company continues to operate in the railways sector. The scale of employment, as well as the number of employees, decreased in all countries, apart from Bulgaria and Luxembourg, where both remained relatively constant. Likewise, the sector's share of employment and employees as a proportion of a country's total employment and employees generally declined. In the early 2000s, these shares were 2% or lower in all cases. Male employment clearly prevails in the sector in all 24 countries under examination.

Table 1: Total employment in railway operation, 1993 and 2004

	Number of companies		Total employment		Male employment		Female employment	
	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004
AT	13	18[a]	~68,000	~45,800[a]	96–97	94[a]	3–4	6[a]
BE	2[b]	2[c]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
BG	1	1[a]	n.a.	17,910[a]	n.a.	12,905[a]	n.a.	5,005[a]
CZ	n.a.	46[d]	118,600	78,900	78,800	53,900	39,800	25,000
DE	n.a.	526[a]	248,000[e]	174,000[a]	202,000[e]	141,000[a]	46,000[e]	32,000[a]
DK	19	17[h]	17,173	12,285[n]	13,483	8,905[n]	3,690	3,251[n]
EE	7[f]	10[a]	7,109[f]	3,900[a]	n.a.	2,600[g]	n.a.	1,100[g]
EL	1	1[h]	11,830	7,637[h]	11,225	7,002[h]	605	635[h]
ES	n.a.	180[h]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
FI	4	4	17,945	6,339	15,200	5,388	2,745	951
FR	1[b]	2	183,000[b]	178,000	90[b]	82.9	10[b]	17.1
HU[g]	n.a.	13	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
IE	n.a.	1	n.a.	5,398	n.a.	4,653	n.a.	739
IT	105[i]	103[j]	204,667[i]	79,958[j]	n.a.	73,195[j]	n.a.	6,763[j]
LT	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU	1[k]	1[c]	3,240[k]	3,249[c]	92.34[f]	92.26[a]	7.66[f]	7.74[a]
LV	2[l]	14[a]	18,828[l]	15,377[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
NL	5	12[o]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
PL	1	51	261,000	133,000	174,000	n.a.	79,000	n.a.
PT[g]	n.a.	n.a.	19,227	16,465	16,319	13,449	2,908	3,016
RO	1	5	179,300	65,667	n.a.	50,150	n.a.	15,517
SI[g,m]	1	1[a]	10,568	8,098[a]	8,746	n.a.	1,822	n.a.
SK	1[p]	10[a]	51,495[p]	38,077[a]	37,344[p]	n.a.	14,151[p]	n.a.
UK[m]	n.a.	697	130,008	54,141	116,790	47,657	13,218	6,484

Notes: n.a. = not available; [a] = 2005, [b] = 1994, [c] = 2002, [d] = 2003, [e] = 1999, [f] = 1998, [g] = the average of 2003–2005, [h] = 2006, [i] = 1991, [j] = 2001, [k] = 1995, [l] = 1997, [m] = years documented are not strictly comparable, [n] = 2005, [o] = 2004, [p] = 1996.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

Table 2: Total employees in railway operation, 1993 and 2004

	Total employees		Male employees		Female employees		Total sectoral employment as % of total employment in economy		Total sectoral employees as % of total employees in economy	
	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004
AT	67,000–68,000	41,000[a]	96–97	94[e]	3.4	6[a]	1.90	1.20[a]	2.20	1.30[a]
BE	29,002[b]	25,444[c]	27,582[b]	22,834[c]	1,420[b]	2,610[c]	n.a.	n.a.	0.92[b]	0.73[c]
BG	n.a.	17,910[a]	n.a.	12,905[a]	n.a.	5,005[a]	n.a.	0.55[a]	n.a.	0.82[a]
CZ	118,500	78,900	78,700	53,900	39,800	25,000	2.40	2.40	2.70	2.00
DE	150,841[e]	118,045[a]	116,964[e]	92,180[a]	33,877[e]	25,865[a]	0.70[e]	0.50[a]	0.50[e]	0.40[a]
DK	17,173	12,285[n]	13,483	8,905[n]	3,690	3,251[n]	0.66	0.47[n]	0.73	0.51[n]
EE	n.a.	3,800[a]	n.a.	2,600[g]	n.a.	1,100[g]	1.17[f]	0.65[a]	n.a.	0.87[a]
EL	11,830	7,637[h]	11,225	7,002[h]	605	635[h]	0.30	0.20[h]	0.50	0.20[h]
ES	n.a.	37,235[h]	n.a.	88.6[h]	n.a.	11.4[h]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.38[h]
FI	17,945	6,339	15,200	5,388	2,745	951	0.87	0.27	1.00	0.30
FR	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.70[b]	0.60	n.a.	n.a.
HU[g]	n.a.	46,855	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.20	n.a.	1.70
IE	n.a.	4,537	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.27	n.a.	0.22
IT	204,429[i]	79,801[j]	n.a.	73,060[j]	n.a.	6,741[j]	1.50[i]	0.50[j]	2.20[i]	0.80[j]
LT	n.a.	11,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU	3,240[k]	3,249[c]	92.34[f]	92.26[a]	7.66[f]	7.74[a]	1.51[k]	1.12[c]	1.51[k]	1.12[c]
LV	18,828[l]	15,029[a]	11,875[l]	9,183[a]	6,953[l]	5,846[a]	2.55[l]	1.67[a]	2.55[l]	1.66[a]
NL	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
PL	261,000	133,000	174,000	n.a.	79,000	n.a.	1.80	1.10	2.80	1.40
PT[g]	18,687	15,727	15,894	12,905	2,793	2,822	0.50	0.40	0.60	0.40
RO	179,300	65,667	n.a.	50,150	n.a.	15,517	1.70	0.80	2.70	1.50
SI[g,m]	10,568	8,098[a]	8,746	n.a.	1,822	n.a.	1.70	1.00[a]	1.70	1.10[a]

	Total employees		Male employees		Female employees		Total sectoral employment as % of total employment in economy		Total sectoral employees as % of total employees in economy	
	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004
SK	51,495[p]	38,077[a]	37,344[p]	27,872[a]	14,151[p]	10,205[a]	2.30[p]	1.70[a]	2.50[p]	1.80[a]
UK[m]	130,008	53,524	116,790	47,657	13,218	5,867	0.50	0.20	0.60	0.20

Notes: n.a. = not available; [a] = 2005, [b] = 1994, [c] = 2002, [d] = 2003, [e] = 1999, [f] = 1998, [g] = the average of 2003–2005, [h] = 2006, [i] = 1991, [j] = 2001, [k] = 1995, [l] = 1997, [m] = years documented are not strictly comparable, [n] = 2005, [o] = 2004, [p] = 1996.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

National level of interest representation

In many of the EU Member States, statutory regulations explicitly refer to the concept of representativeness when assigning certain rights of interest representation and public governance to trade unions and/or employer organisations. The most important rights addressed by such regulations include: formal recognition as a party to collective bargaining; extension of the scope of a multi-employer collective agreement to employers not affiliated to the signatory employer organisation; and participation in public policy and tripartite bodies of social dialogue. Under these circumstances, representativeness is normally measured by the membership strength of the organisations. For instance, statutory extension provisions usually allow for a collective agreement to be extended to unaffiliated employers only when the signatory trade union and employer organisation represent 50% or more of the employees within the agreement's domain.

As outlined above, the representativeness of the national social partner organisations is of interest in this study in terms of the capacity of their European umbrella organisations for participation in the European social dialogue. Hence, the role of the national actors in collective bargaining and public policymaking constitutes another important component of representativeness. The effectiveness of the European social dialogue tends to increase with growing ability of the national affiliates of the European organisations to regulate employment terms and to influence national public policies affecting the sector.

As cross-national comparative analysis, a generally positive correlation emerges between the bargaining role of the social partners and their involvement in public policy (see Traxler, F., 'The metamorphoses of corporatism', in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2004, pp. 571–598). Social partner organisations that are engaged in multi-employer bargaining play a significantly stronger role in state policies than their counterparts in countries where multi-employer bargaining is lacking. One explanation for this finding is that only multi-employer agreements matter in macroeconomic terms, setting an incentive for governments to persistently seek the cooperation of the social partner organisations. If single-employer bargaining prevails in a country, none of the collective agreements will have a noticeable effect on the economy due to their limited scope. As a result, the basis for generalised tripartite policy concertation will be absent.

In summary, representativeness is a multi-dimensional concept that embraces three basic elements: 1) the membership domain and membership strength of the social partner organisations; 2) their role in collective bargaining; and 3) their role in public policymaking.

Membership domain and strength

The membership domain of an organisation, as formally established by its constitution and/or its name, demarcates its potential members from other groups which the organisation does not claim to represent. As explained above, this study considers only organisations whose domain relates to the railways sector. For reasons of space, it is impossible to outline in detail the domain demarcations of all of the organisations. Instead, the report notes how they relate to the sector by classifying them according to the four patterns of 'sector-relatedness', as specified earlier. Regarding membership strength, a differentiation should be made between strength in terms of the absolute number of members and strength in relative terms. Research usually refers to relative membership strength as 'density' – that is, the ratio of actual to potential members.

Furthermore, a difference also arises between trade unions and employer organisations when measuring membership strength. Trade union membership simply means the number of persons who are unionised. In addition to taking the total membership of a trade union as an indicator of its strength, it is also reasonable to break down this membership total according to the sex of its members. However, the situation regarding employer organisations is more complex since they organise collective entities, namely companies that employ employees. Hence, in this instance, two possible measures of membership strength may be used – one referring to the companies themselves, and the other to the number of employees working in the member companies of an employer organisation.

For a sectoral study such as this, measures of membership strength of both the trade unions and employer organisations also have to take into account how the membership domains relate to the sector. If a domain is not congruent with the sector demarcation, the organisation's total density – that is, density referring to its overall domain – may differ from sector-specific density – in other words, the density referring to the sector. This report will first present the data on the domains and membership strength of the trade unions, followed by the corresponding data for the employer organisations.

Trade unions

The trade union data on both the domains and membership strength are shown in Table 3. This table lists all of the trade unions meeting the two criteria for classification as a sector-related social partner organisation, as outlined earlier. Notably, detailed data are not available on the trade unions' bargaining practices in France. In this case, the nine trade unions are listed, because they are formally recognised as being representative (and therefore recognised for collective bargaining) of all staff of French National Railways (Société nationale des chemins de fer français, SNCF) or certain occupations of SNCF. Congruent and sectionalist domain demarcations are most frequent. The very large number of sectionalist domain demarcations is the main reason for the pronouncedly pluralist structure of most national trade union systems. In 10 of the 24 countries under consideration – the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia – six or more sector-related trade unions exist. In addition to the three trade unions documented for Slovakia, eight smaller local and occupational trade unions operate in the country. One single trade union represents the sector only in Austria, Greece and Latvia. Sectionalism usually means domain demarcation by such sector-specific occupations as conductors. Of these occupations, locomotive drivers most frequently have their own trade union. Overlapping domains result in most cases from the fact that the trade union covers broader areas of the transport sector. Sectionalist overlaps are usually caused by domain specialisation in terms of employee status and qualifications, such as white-collar employees, blue-collar employees and engineers – for example, Finland and Portugal. In Germany, two trade unions – namely Transport, Service and Networks (Transport, Service und Netze, Transnet) and the United Services Union (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di) – concentrate on certain railway operators within broader sectoral domain demarcations.

Table 3: Interest representation of trade unions in railway operation, 2004–2005

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
AT								
GdE (now vida)	C	47,000[b]	6%[b]	95%[b]	95%[b]	Yes	No	*ÖGB*, ETF
BE								
CGSP/ACOD[a]	C	19,522	8%	50%	50%	Yes	Yes	*FGTB/ABVV*, ETF
'Transcom' section of CSC/ACV[a]	O	90,000	8%	41%	41%	Yes	Yes	*CSC/ACV*, ETF
SLFP-C/VSOA-S[a]	C	n.a.	8%	10%	10%	No	Yes	*CGSLB/ACLVB*, (ETF)[c]
BG								
TURWB[a]	C	10,500	28%	58.6%	58.6%	Yes	No	*CITUB*
UTTUB[a]	O	1,200	0	6.7%	6.7%	Yes	No	*CITUB*, ETF
FTW[a]	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	*CL Podkrepa*, ETF
NRTU[a]	C	11,000	24.2%	6.1%	6.1%	Yes	No	*CL Podkrepa*, *FTW*
CZ								
OSŽ[a]	C	48,000	31%	n.a.	60.8%	Yes	Yes	*ASO ČR*, ETF
FS ČR[a]	S	7,000	n.a.	n.a.	8.9%	Yes	Yes	ALE
FVČ[a]	S	600	20%–30%	n.a.	0.8%	Yes	Yes	-
UZZ[a]	C	370	n.a.	n.a.	0.5%	Yes	Yes	-
FV CT[a]	S	330	n.a.	n.a.	0.4%	Yes	Yes	-
FŽ ČR[a]	C	220	n.a.	n.a.	0.3%	Yes	Yes	-
DE								
Transnet[a]	SO	259,955	20.8%	50%–60%	50%–60%	Yes	Yes	*DGB*, ETF

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
GDBA[a]	S	50,000	10.8%	10.7%	10,7%	Yes	Yes	*DGB*, ETF
GDL[a]	S	35,000	n.a.	75%	75%	Yes	Yes	*DGB*, ALE
ver.di[a]	SO	2,359,392	20%	n.a.	50%	Yes	Yes	*DGB*, ETF
DK								
DJ[a]	O	5,607	13%	92%	92%	Yes	No	*SEK*, *DKK*, *LO*, ETF
HK Trafik[a] and Dansk Jernbane	O	3,145	52%	70%	67%	Yes	No	*HK*, *StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, ETF
Dansk Metal[a]	O	138,948	5%	80%	80%–85%	Yes	No	*StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, ETF
3F[a]	O	350,444	32%	75%	95%	Yes	No	*StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, ETF
DEF[a]	SO	30,016	1%	75%	80%	Yes	No	*StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, EMCEF
TL[a]	SO	30,413	41%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	*StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, UNI-Europa, EPSU
TIB[a]	SO	68,194	9%	80%	95%	Yes	No	*StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, EFBWW
Malerforbundet[a]	SO	13,475	25%	70%	95%	Yes	No	*StK*, *DKK*, *LO*, EFBWW
AC	SO	165,905	41%	65%	n.a.	Yes	No	Eurocadres
LH	SO	73,897	21%	35%	n.a.	Yes	No	*StK*, *KTO*, CEC
EE								
ERAÜ[a]	C	1,970	61%	51%	51%	Yes	Yes	*EAKL*, ETF
Edelaraudtee TU[a]	S	183	63%	26%–30.5%	4.7%	Yes	No	*ERAÜ*, *EAKL*, (ETF)[c]
Koostöö TU[a]	S	189	54%–57%	26%–31.5%	4.8%	Yes	No	-
EVA[a]	C	225	0	5.8%	5.8%	Yes	No	*EAKL*
Elektriraudtee TU[a]	S	60	60%	60%	1.5%	Yes	No	*ERAÜ*
EVKL[a]	S	163	0	27.2%	4.2%	Yes	No	-

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
EL								
POS	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*GSEE*, ETF
ES								
FETCM-UGT/ Railways[a]	C	15,059	18.9%	40.4%	40.4%	Yes	No	*UGT*, ETF
FCT-CC.OO/Railways[a]	C	9,449	7.4%	24.6%	24.6%	Yes	No	*CC.OO*, ETF
CGT/ Railways[a]	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SEMAF[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	ALE
ELA Hainbat	S	659	5.6%	22.3%	0.02%	Yes	No	*ELA/STV*, ETF
FI								
RAUTL[a]	SO	6,961	22%	96%	96%	Yes	Yes	*SAK*, ETF
RVL[a]	S	1,654	61%	95%	95%	Yes	Yes	*SAK*, *KAF*
VML[a]	SO	1,948	0.3%	100%	100%	Yes	Yes	*SAK*, ETF
Pardia[a]	SO	70,000	53%	60%	97%	Yes	Yes	EPSU
VR-AKAVA RY[a]	SO	270	10%	87%	87%	Yes	Yes	*AKAVA*, *YTN*
FR								
FNTCTC-CGT[a]	O	29,000–30,000	10%–13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[e]	*CGT*, ETF
FSTR-SUD[a]	C	4,000	10%–13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[e]	*SUD*
FC-CFDT[a]	C	4,000	10%–13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[e]	*CFDT*, (ETF)[c]
FSC-CGT-FO[a]	C	1,000–1,200	10%–13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[e]	*CGT-FO*, ETF
FC-UNSA[a]	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[e]	*UNSA*, ETF
FC-CFTC[a]	C	600–700	10%–13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[e]	*CFTC*, (ETF)[c]
SNPCC-CFE-CGC[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[f]	*CFE-CGC*
FGAAC[a]	S	600–700	10%–13%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[f]	ETF

Country	Domain cover-age	Membership		Density (%)		Collec-tive bargain-ing	Consulta-tion	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female member-ship (% of total member-ship)	Dom-ain	Sector			
SNCS[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[f]	-
HU								
VSZ[a]	C	12,000	n.a.	25%	25%	Yes	Yes	*MSZOSZ*, ETF
VDSZSZ[a]	C	10,000	n.a.	21%	21%	Yes	Yes	*LIGA*, ETF
PVDSZ[a]	S	5,000	n.a.	n.a.	10%	Yes	Yes	*ASZSZ*
MOSZ[a]	S	4,300	n.a.	85%	9%	Yes	Yes	*ASZSZ*, ALE
MTSZSZ[a]	SO	6,700	n.a.	n.a.	6%	Yes	Yes	*ESZT*
IE								
SIPTU[a]	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*, ETF
NBRU[a]	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	-
ATGWU	O	n.a.	n.a.	65%	65%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
TSSA[a]	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
GMB	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
NUSMWI	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
UCATT	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
TEEU	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
BATU	O	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
IT								
FILT-CGIL[a]	O	140,651	11%	22%	32%	Yes	Yes	*CGIL*, ETF
FIT-CISL[a]	O	>100,000	10.5%	n.a.	24%	Yes	Yes	*CISL*, ETF
UILT-UIL[a]	O	103,000	15%	10%	11%	Yes	Yes	*UIL*, ETF
UGL AF[a]	O	3,800	17%	18%	4%	Yes	Yes	-
ORSA[a]	O	26,660	25%	75%	15%	Yes	Yes	-
FAST[a]	O	2,900	2%	25%	3%	Yes	Yes	*CONFSAL*, ALE
LT								
LGPF[a]	C	2,560	50%	23%	23%	Yes	Yes	*LPSK*, ETF
LGPSS[a]	C	1,500	40%	14%	14%	Yes	Yes	*LDF*
LGPS	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	ETF

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
LU								
FNCTTFEL[a]	O	6,000	27.5%	30%	55.4%	Yes	Yes	*CGT-L*, ETF
FCPT-SYPROLUX[a]	O	860	n.a.	n.a.	24.5%	Yes	Yes	ETF
LV								
LDzSA	O	15,793	33.5%	78%	100%	Yes	Yes	*LBAS*, ETF
NL								
FNV Bondgenoten[a]	O	470,000	n.a.	n.a.	36.9%	Yes	No	*FNV*, ETF
CNV Bedrijvenbond[a]	O	90,000	n.a.	n.a.	10.1%	Yes	No	*CNV*, ETF
VVMC[a]	SO	4,000	n.a.	n.a.	9.6%	Yes	No	ALE
VHS[a]	SO	500	n.a.	n.a.	1.4%	Yes	No	*CHMF*
PL								
SKK-NSZZ Solidarność[a]	C	34,340	30%	27%	27%	Yes	Yes	*NSZZ Solidarność*, ETF
FZZP PKP[a]	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	ETF
ZZM[a]	S	10,000	n.a.	60%	6%	Yes	Yes	ALE
ZZDR PKP[a]	S	9,864	45%	19%[d]	8%	Yes	Yes	-
FZZPAT[a]	O	3,240	n.a.	38%	2.5%	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
FZZMK[a]	S	2,500	n.a.	20%	2%	Yes	Yes	*FZZ*
AZZTK[a]	C	1,619	n.a.	1.3%	1.3%	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
ZZDKRP[a]	S	1,350	20%	8%	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
ZZA PKP[a]	S	500	50%	n.a.	0.5%	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
ZZDR[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
SKK-NSZZ Solidarność 80[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*FZZ*
ZZPW[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*FZZ*
OMZZSOK[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
MZZRT[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
ZZDPKP[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
NSZZ PSD PKP[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
NSZZ SW PKP	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
KZZP FMIS-PKP[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
KSKFRKZS 80[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
MWZZK[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
PT								
SNSTF[a]	C	4,200	13%	18.9%	5.1%	Yes	No	*CGTP*
SINDEFER[a]	C	980	10%	4.4%	1.6%	Yes	No	*UGT*, ETF
SINAFE[a]	C	1,450	n.a.	6.5%	3.7%	Yes	No	*UGT*
SINFA[a]	C	700	n.a.	3.1%	1.8%	Yes	No	*UGT*
SINFESE[a]	C	350	n.a.	1.6%	0.9%	Yes	No	*UGT*
ASCEF[a]	S	250	n.a.	1.5%	0.8%	Yes	No	-
SINFB[a]	S	400	0	2%	0.5%	Yes	No	-
SITRENS[a]	S	300	n.a.	n.a.	1.9%	Yes	No	-
SFRCI[a]	S	400	n.a.	n.a.	2.5%	Yes	No	-
SIFOCTA[a]	S	50	n.a.	n.a.	0.3%	Yes	No	-
ASSIFECO[a]	S	50	n.a.	n.a.	0.1%	Yes	No	-
SENSIQ[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SNET[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SETN[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SNAQ[a]	SO	1,400	n.a.	100%	8.9%	Yes	No	-
SETAA[a]	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SERS[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SE[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SQTD[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SICONT[a]	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	-
SMAQ[a]	S	1,400	n.a.	100%	8.9%	Yes	No	ALE

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
RO								
CSNTR[a]	O	125,000	10%	63%	91%	Yes	Yes	-
FNDF[a]	C	13,707	14.7%	48.6%	20.9%	Yes	Yes	*CNSLR Frăția*, ETF
Elcatel[a]	O	5,793	37%	7.6%	7.6%	Yes	Yes	*CSNTR*, *BNS*
FMLR[a]	S	14,970	8%	22.8%	22.8%	Yes	Yes	*Cartel Alfa*, *CSNTR*, ALE
FISMC[a]	C	31,820[b]	15%	48.5%	48.5%	Yes	Yes	*CSN Meridian*
FSRV[a]	C	6,600[b]	4.5%	14.7%	14.7%	Yes	Yes	*CNSLR Frăția*
SI								
SSSLO[a]	S	1,590	7.2%	86%	19.7%	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*, *Alternativa*, ETF
SDZDS[a]	C	1,650	27.3%	20.4%	20.4%	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*
SZTS[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*, *Alternativa*, ETF
SZS[a]	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*, *Solidarity*, ETF
SVPS[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*
SVZVSS[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*
SVLM[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*
SZPS[a]	C	1,500	13.3%	n.a.	18.6%	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*, *KNSS*, ETF
SVZIS[a]	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*, *KNSS*
SK								
OZŽ[a]	O	32,143	21.7%	78%	84%	Yes	Yes	*KOZ SR*, ETF
FSSR[a]	S	2,700	0	7.1%	7.1%	Yes	Yes	ALE
OAVD[a]	S	870	n.a.	2.3%	2.3%	Yes	Yes	-
UK								
ASLEF[a]	SO	18,274	3.2%	96%–98%	14.1%	Yes	Yes	*TUC*, ETF

Country	Domain coverage	Membership		Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
		Members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
RMT[a]	O	67,476	10.9%	n.a.	33.8%	Yes	Yes	*TUC*, ETF
TSSA[a]	SO	32,426	30%	>50%	13.8%	Yes	Yes	*TUC*, ETF

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

*n.a. = not available; * National affiliations are in italics. For the European level, only affiliations to sectoral European organisations are listed.*

[a] = Inter-union domain overlap, [b] = 2006, [c] = Indirect affiliation via national higher-order organisation, [d] = PLK SA only, [e] = Formal recognition as being representative of all staff of SNCF, [f] = Formal recognition as being representative of certain occupations of SNCF.

O = Overlap, SO = Sectional overlap, S = Sectionalism, C = Congruence

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

As the trade unions' domains often overlap with the sector demarcation, so too do their domains with one another in the case of most countries. The results presented in Table 3 also give an insight into these inter-union domain overlaps. The latter are endemic despite the relatively high degree of domain specialisation by sectionalist demarcations. This is mainly because at least one trade union's domain relates to the sector in either congruent or overlapping terms, such that its domain intersects with the domains of the more specialised trade unions. However, even when congruent or overlapping trade union domains are not established in countries like Germany, certain unions share subgroups of employees as their constituency. Depending on the scale of mutual overlap, this can result in competition between the unions for members.

Looking at the membership data of the trade unions, it emerges that the women constitute the minority of members in most of the unions. Only a few trade unions in Denmark, Estonia, Finland and Lithuania deviate from this pattern. This predominance of male trade union members echoes the gender-related structure of the employees.

Trade union membership is voluntary. In the Irish example, Irish Rail (Iarnród Éireann) employees, in the case of operative grades involving the majority of employees, have a choice between being members of the Services, Industrial, Professional, and Technical Union (SIPTU) or the National Bus and Rail Union (NBRU). However, industrial agreements stipulate that workers must be members of one union or the other. For the other grades, closed-shop arrangements are in place, some with SIPTU and some with other trade unions, such as Amicus or the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA). Only senior management grades are not subject to some form of closed-shop arrangement. However, compliance with a closed-shop arrangement can be averted, and trade union sources estimate that, at any one time, several hundred workers (5%–10% of those subject to compulsory trade union membership) are not union members.

The absolute numbers of the unions' members differ considerably, ranging from more than one million members to fewer than one hundred members. This considerable variation reflects the differences in the size of the economy and the comprehensiveness of the membership domain, rather than the trade unions' ability to attract members. Therefore, density is a more appropriate measure of membership strength for drawing a comparative analysis. Domain density is 50% or higher in almost half of the trade unions which document figures on density. The vast majority of trade unions register very high densities, with 75% and more. Almost a third of all trade unions report a density of 15%–49%. About a quarter of the trade unions record a density of less than 15%. Compared with the density ratio referring to the trade unions' total domain, the unions' density in railways tends to be lower. Sectoral density is 50% or higher in the case of almost a third of the trade unions for which data are available. More than two thirds of the trade unions record a sectoral density of more than 75%. Sectoral density of more than half of the trade unions is lower than 15%. Less than 20% of trade unions register a density of between 15% and 49%. In contrast to this first glance, these figures do not indicate that the trade unions have specific problems with organising employees in the sector.

The lower sector-specific densities relative to domain density mainly emanate from the sectionalist domain, which characterises numerous trade unions. If a trade union organises a small group of workers within the railways sector, such as locomotive drivers, domain density is usually higher than sectoral density. Overall, the figures indicate that the railways sector is a highly unionised sector in almost all of the countries under examination. In Slovakia, for instance, total trade union membership accounts for a sector-wide density of more than 95%. Several sector-specific factors contribute to this high level of unionisation. Above all, employment in the sector in generally concentrated in one single and usually state-owned operator. Since railways are a key transport system in the economy, strikes are more effective in this sector than in most other sectors of the economy. As a result, this has strengthened the solidarity of the sector's employees and the level of self-confidence of their representative trade unions.

Employer organisations

Tables 4 and 5 present the membership data on employer organisations. Only 12 of the 24 EU countries under consideration register employer organisations in the railways sector. In the other countries, no association meets the definition of a social partner organisation, as previously introduced. The UK Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) qualifies as social partner organisation only through its affiliation to the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER). In functional terms, ATOC does not have any industrial relations remit. Business interest organisations which specialise in matters other than those relating to industrial relations are commonly designated as trade associations (see **TN0311101S**). The associations from the 11 other countries operate as employer organisations which are all engaged in collective bargaining. In contrast to the trade union system, the employer side shows a high degree of concentration. More than one employer organisation exists only in Denmark, Germany and Italy.

Table 4: Domain coverage, membership and density of employer organisations in railway operation, 2004–2005

Country	Domain coverage	Membership			Density			
		Type	Companies	Employees	Companies		Employees	
					Domain	Sector	Domain	Sector
AT								
FVS	O	oblig.	79	62,000	100%	100%	100%	100%
BE	n.e.							
BG	n.e.							
CZ	n.e.							
DE								
AGVDE[a]	S	vol.	120	12,000–13,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Agv MoVe[a]	O	vol.	67	n.a.	n.a.	80%	85%–90%	n.a.
DK								
Perst	SO	vol.	n.a.	156,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	86%
Danish Regions	SO	vol.	n.a.	160,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3%
JA	SO	vol.	17	1,350	100%	100%	90%	11%
EE	n.e.							
EL	n.e.							
ES								
AGESFER	O	vol.	6	1,500	n.a.	n.a.	68.4%	4%
FI								
LTY	O	vol.	15	18,680	90%	100%	95%	100%
FR	n.e.							
HU	n.e.							
IE	n.e.							
IT								
AGENS	O	vol.	80	n.a.	n.a.	90%	n.a.	95%
ASSTRA	SO	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LT	n.e.							
LU	n.e.							
LV								

Country	Domain cover-age	Membership			Density			
		Type	Companies	Employees	Companies		Employees	
					Domain	Sector	Domain	Sector
LDzDDO	C	vol.	6	n.a.	43%	43%	>60%	>60%
NL								
KNV	O	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	16%	n.a.	76%
PL								
ZPK	C	vol.	29	133,163	n.a.	n.a.	100%	95%
PT	n.e.							
RO								
APTF	O	vol.	5	65,000	100%	95%	98%	98%
SI	n.e.							
SK								
ZZDPT	O	vol.	25	67,400	50%	30%	55%	99%
UK								
ATOC	C	vol.	22	n.a.	100%	3%	100%	n.a.

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

C = Congruence, O = Overlap, SO = Sectional overlap, S = Sectionalism; vol. = voluntary membership; oblig. = obligatory membership; n.a. = not available; n.e. = non-existent; [a] = Inter-associational domain overlap.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

Table 5: Collective bargaining, consultation and national/European affiliations of employer organisations in railway operation, 2004–2005

Country	Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
AT			
FVS	Voluntary	Voluntary	*WKO*, ERFA
BE	n.e.		
BG	n.e.		
CZ	n.e.		
DE			
AGVDE[a]	Voluntary	Voluntary	*BDA*
Agv MoVe[a]	Voluntary	Voluntary	*BDA*
DK			
Perst	Voluntary	Obligatory	CEEP

Country	Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
Danish Regions	Voluntary	Obligatory	CEEP
JA	Voluntary	Obligatory	CEMR
EE	n.e.		
EL	n.e.		
ES			
AGESFER	Voluntary	Obligatory	-
FI			
LTY	Voluntary	Voluntary	*EK*, CEEP
FR	n.e.		
HU	n.e.		
IE	n.e.		
IT			
AGENS	Voluntary	Voluntary	*Confindustria*, *Federtrasporto*
ASSTRA	Voluntary	Voluntary	-
LT	n.e.		
LU	n.e.		
LV			
LDzDDO	Voluntary	n.a.	-
NL			
KNV	Voluntary	Obligatory	*VNO-NCW*
PL			
ZPK	Voluntary	Voluntary	*KPP*
PT	n.e.		
RO			
APTF	Voluntary	Voluntary	-
SI	n.e.		
SK			
ZZDPT	Voluntary	Voluntary	*RUZ SR*, CEEP
UK			
ATOC	Obligatory	Obligatory	CER

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

** National affiliations are in italics; only affiliations to sectoral European associations are listed; n.a. = not available; n.e. = non-existent; [a] = Inter-associational domain overlap.*

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

The way in which the employer organisation's domain relates to the sector differs somewhat. Domain overlaps are most frequent and usually occur among domains that include other areas of transport, for example, in the case of Austria's Federal Organisation of Rail Transport (Fachverband der Schienenbahnen, FVS) or Italy's Confederal Transport and Services Agency (Agenzia Confederale dei Trasporti e Servizi, AGENS). Overlapping domains are also common among services associated with railways as in the case of Germany's Employers' Association of Mobility and Transport Service Providers (Arbeitgeberverband der Mobilitäts- und Verkehrsdienstleister, Agv MoVe), or in the public sector as in the case of Finland's Employers' Association for Transport and Special Services (Liikenne- ja Erityisalojen Työnantajat, LTY). Sectionalism is based on specialisation by type of operator and/or ownership (for example, in the case of the Employers' Association of German Railway Companies (Arbeitgeberverband Deutscher Eisenbahnen, AGVDE), the employer organisation Danish Regions (Danske Regioner) and the Danish Railways Employers' Association (Jernbanernes Arbejdsgiverforening, JA)), company size (Spain's Railway Services Employers' Association (Asociación de Empresas de Servicios Ferroviarios, AGESFER)), and passenger train operators (ATOC in the UK). Membership of employer organisations is voluntary with the exception of FVS in Austria, which is under the umbrella of the public law Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, WKO). Available data suggest that employer density is particularly high, usually with scores of 80% or higher with regard to all density measures. Exceptions in this regard include the Latvian Railway Sector Employers' Organisation (Latvijas Dzelzceļa nozares darba devēju organizācija, LDzDDO), Spain's AGESFER, and both Danish Regions and JA in Denmark. The very low sectoral employee density in AGESFER, Danish Regions and JA reflects the narrow domain demarcation of the organisations.

These characteristics of employer representation can be traced to the monopolistic or oligopolistic structure of the sector's product market, as manifested in the presence of one particularly large operator. This fosters either the rise of single-employer bargaining, leaving no role for employer organisations, or the formation of one single-employer association which can easily organise the few important operators in the sector.

Collective bargaining and its actors

Almost all of the trade unions listed in Table 3 are engaged in sector-related collective bargaining. The large number of trade unions as well as the numerous domain overlaps have entailed rivalries over bargaining rights in several countries, namely Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Romania. These rivalries become manifest in two main ways. On the one hand, the trade unions compete over bargaining goals, something which usually tends to inflate their demands, while it dampens them in fewer cases, when employers manage to play off specific trade unions against each other. On the other hand, certain trade unions may formally be excluded from collective bargaining, as is the case in Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Lithuania. In Italy, in particular, this has fuelled labour disputes, since the smaller trade unions that are excluded from bargaining try to enforce their recognition as a bargaining party by undertaking strike activity.

Employer organisations, which conduct sector-related collective bargaining, exist in fewer than half of the countries under consideration (Table 5). Since only three countries have more than one employer organisation, issues of inter-associational relations recede into the background. Rivalries between the two coexisting employer organisations do not occur in any of these countries.

System of collective bargaining

Table 6 presents an overview of the system of sector-related collective bargaining in the 24 EU countries under consideration. The standard measure of the importance of collective bargaining as a means of employment regulation is obtained by calculating the total number of employees covered by collective bargaining as a proportion of the total number of employees within a certain sector of the economy (see Traxler, F., Blaschke, S., Kittel, B., *National labour relations in internationalised markets*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). Accordingly, the sector's rate of collective bargaining coverage is defined as the ratio of the number of employees covered by any kind of collective agreement to the total number of employees in the sector.

To delineate the bargaining system, two further indicators are employed. The first indicator refers to the relevance of multi-employer bargaining compared with single-employer bargaining. Multi-employer bargaining is defined as being conducted by an employer organisation on behalf of the employer side. In the case of single-employer bargaining, the company or its subunit(s) is the party to the agreement; this includes cases where two or more companies jointly negotiate an agreement. The relative importance of multi-employer bargaining, measured as a percentage of the total number of employees covered by a collective agreement, thus indicates the impact of the employer organisations on the overall collective bargaining process.

The second indicator considers whether statutory extension schemes are applied to the railways sector. For reasons of brevity, this analysis is limited to extension schemes designed to extend the scope of a collective agreement to the employers not affiliated to the signatory employer organisation; it does not deal with extension regulations targeting employees. The latter are not relevant to this particular analysis for two reasons. On the one hand, extending a collective agreement to employees who are not unionised in the company covered by the particular agreement is a standard of the International Labour Organization (ILO), aside from any national legislation. On the other hand, employers have good reason to extend a collective agreement concluded by them even when they are not formally obliged to do so. Otherwise, they would create an incentive for their workforce to unionise.

Table 6: System of sectoral collective bargaining in railway operation, 2004–2005

Country	Collective bargaining coverage (CBC)	Proportion of multi-employer bargaining (MEB) as % of total CBC	Extension practices
AT	4% (100%)[a]	100%	(Limited/exceptional)
BE	100%	0%	None
BG	93.4%	0%	None
CZ	95%	0%	None
DE	n.a.	MEB prevailing	None
DK	95%	10%	None
EE	95.5%	0%	None
EL	n.a.	0%	None
ES	100%	6%	None
FI	90%	100%	Pervasive
FR	100%	0%	None
HU	100%	0%	None
IE	99.9%	0%	None
IT	99.9%	95%	(Pervasive)
LT	100%	0%	None
LU	n.a.	0%	None
LV	100%	100%	Pervasive
NL	80%–100%	n.a.	Pervasive
PL	95%	MEB prevailing	None
PT	36.2%[b]	0%	None
RO	98%	MEB prevailing	Limited/exceptional
SI	100%	100%	None
SK	90%–95%	0%	None
UK	99.9%	0%	None

Notes: Collective bargaining coverage (CBC) means employees covered as a percentage of the total number of employees in the sector. Multi-employer bargaining (MEB) is noted relative to single-employer bargaining (SEB). Extension practices include functional equivalents to extension provisions, that is, obligatory membership and labour court rulings – cases of functional equivalents appear in parentheses. n.a. = not available. [a] = Coverage rate adjusted for employees *excluded from collective bargaining in parenthesis. [b] = Coverage rate may be underestimated.*

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

Compared with employee-related extension procedures, schemes that target employers are thus far more important to the strength of collective bargaining in general and to multi-employer bargaining in particular. This is because the employers are capable of refraining both from joining an employer organisation and from entering single-employer bargaining in the context of a purely voluntary system. Therefore, employer-related extension practices increase the coverage of multi-employer bargaining. Moreover, when it is pervasive, an extension agreement may encourage more employers to join the controlling employer organisation; such a move then enables them to participate in the bargaining process and to benefit from the organisation's related services in a situation where the respective collective agreement will bind them in any case (see Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel, 2001).

Collective bargaining coverage

In terms of collective bargaining coverage in the railways sector, 18 of the 21 EU countries for which data are available record extremely high coverage rates of 90% or more (see Table 6 above). In the case of Austria, the figures misleadingly suggest a very low coverage rate, while they actually conceal a seemingly special arrangement. Since the public sector is formally excluded from collective bargaining, the railways sector – namely, the principal state-owned operator, Austrian Federal Railways (Österreichische Bundesbahnen, ÖBB) – was also excluded when it formed part of the public sector. After the transformation of ÖBB into a private law company, its employees nevertheless maintained their public law employment status, such that they continued to be excluded from bargaining. As a consequence, a sector-wide collective agreement is regularly concluded only for the new employees who are employed under the terms of private law. While private law employees represent about 4% of the sector's labour force, all of them are covered by the sector-wide collective agreement. This is due to obligatory membership of the signatory employer organisation in rail transport, FVS. The employment terms of the vast majority of public sector employees are still under the scope of a special collective 'service employment regulation'. Thus, adjusting for employees formally excluded from collective bargaining, the collective bargaining coverage rate can reach up to 100%. Portugal remains the only country whose collective bargaining coverage is below 80%.

For 23 countries, at least a rough estimate can be made with regard to the relative importance of multi-employer bargaining. This type of bargaining usually prevails in those countries where employer organisations conduct collective bargaining (Table 5). There are, however, three exceptions. In Spain and Denmark, the employer organisations each represent only a small segment of the railways sector, therefore covering only a small proportion of the sector's employees. In Slovenia, the government itself as the owner of the main operator in the sector negotiates a sector-wide agreement with the trade unions. This means that multi-employer bargaining is predominant in little more than a third of the countries for which data are reported. In several countries, such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania and Slovenia, only single-employer bargaining occurs and involves only one company. Nevertheless, the bargaining coverage rate is above 90% in all of these cases.

It could be concluded from the generally high level of collective bargaining coverage that cross-national differences in the majority of either multi-employer bargaining or single-employer bargaining do not strongly affect the overall bargaining coverage rate. However, this outcome contrasts significantly to the situation in other economic sectors. For instance, the coverage rate is higher than 90% in almost all countries. As outlined above, railways are characterised by economic properties supportive of a high rate of unionisation, which in turn gives rise to a high bargaining coverage rate, regardless of the type of collective bargaining established. This causal link between unionisation and collective bargaining also applies in the case of Portugal. Although no data are available on total trade union density across the sector, the union-specific densities in Table 3 suggest that the overall level of unionisation is low in Portugal, compared with other countries. However, trade union density, as well as bargaining coverage, may be underestimated in the case of Portugal due to inflated employment figures.

Since extension schemes can only be applied only to multi-employer agreements, the widespread practice of single-employer bargaining limits their use even in cases where labour law provides for such schemes. Furthermore, conditions in the sector are so conducive to collective bargaining that there is little need for extension schemes. Extension practices are common in Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands and Romania. When looking at the aim of extension provisions – that is, to make multi-employer agreements generally binding – the provisions for obligatory membership in Austria's FVS, which is under the umbrella of the chamber organisation of business, should also be considered. Obligatory membership creates an extension effect, since the chambers are parties to multi-employer bargaining. Another functional equivalent to statutory extension schemes can be found in Italy. According to the country's constitution, minimum conditions of employment must apply to all employees. The labour court rulings relate this principle to the multi-employer agreements, to the extent that they are regarded as generally binding.

Participation in public policymaking

Interest associations may partake in public policy in two basic ways: they may be consulted by the authorities on matters affecting their members; or they may be represented on 'corporatist', that is tripartite, committees and boards of policy concertation. This study considers only cases of consultation and corporatist participation that are suited to sector-specific matters. Consultation processes are not necessarily institutionalised, meaning that the organisations consulted by the authorities may vary according to the issues being addressed and also over time, depending on changes in government. Moreover, the authorities may initiate a consultation process on an occasional rather than on a regular basis. Given this volatility, Tables 3, 4 and 5 designate only those sector-related trade unions and employer organisations that are usually consulted.

Trade unions

The trade unions are usually consulted by the authorities in the majority of countries. No regular consultation is reported for Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Despite the accentuated multi-union system in most countries, the authorities tend to include all trade unions, if organised labour is consulted at all. Preferential treatment of one particular trade union is reported only for Estonia. In the case of Portugal, access to sector-related consultation processes is bound to a trade union's affiliation to one of the major union confederations – such as the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses, CGTP) and the General Workers' Union (União Geral de Trabalhadores, UGT) – that are represented on the country's chief board of corporatist cross-sectoral policy concertation, namely Portugal's tripartite Economic and Social Council (Conselho Económico e Social, CES).

Employer organisations

Due to their monopoly-like position in most countries, conflict over participation rights does not appear to be an issue in the case of the sector-related employer organisations. In the majority of countries where employer organisations exist, they are usually consulted on sector-related matters. Where trade unions and employer organisations coexist, generally the two sides of industry are both consulted or not consulted at all in relation to sector-specific matters. Austria deviates from this pattern in that the former Union of Railway Employees (*Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner*, GdE), now vida, complains that the government seeks more advice on various issues from its employer counterpart. As noted above, employer organisations in the sense of the definition presented of a social partner organisation are not established in 12 of the 24 countries under consideration. This does not mean that business is excluded from consultation procedures in these countries. Under these circumstances, the companies themselves are involved in the consultation process. Moreover, the fact that the largest operators in the sector are owned by the state in most countries results in close relations between these operators and the government. In this case, some trade unions criticise the government for treating business interests more favourably than those of labour.

Tripartite participation

Turning from consultation to tripartite participation, it appears that sector-specific tripartite bodies are established only in Italy and Poland. Such bodies deal with matters of sectoral restructuring and industrial relations. In some countries – for example, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia and Slovakia) – tripartite bodies for more encompassing economic sectors exist, including railways. In Bulgaria, the subsectoral council specialised in railways is defunct, since the monopoly operator is not affiliated to the business association represented on this body. Table 7 summarises the main properties of the active tripartite boards of public policy.

Table 7: Tripartite sector-specific boards of public policy in railway operation

Country	Name of body and scope of activity	Origin	Participants	
			Trade unions	Business associations
IT	Cabina di Regia dei Trasporti – railways division – FS: investment, health and safety, industrial relations, network management	Agreement	FILT-CGIL FIT-CISL UILT-UIL UGL AF	AGENS
PL	Tripartite body for railways: Social dialogue, sectoral restructuring and privatisation	Agreement	SKK-NSZZ Solidarność, FZZP PKP, ZZM, ZZDR PKP, FZZPAT, ZZDR, ZZDKRP, SKK-NSZZ Solidarność 80, ZZPW, OMZZSOK, ZZA PKP, MZZRT, AZZTK, FZZMK	ZPK

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

European level of interest representation

At European level, eligibility for consultation and participation in social dialogue is related to three criteria, as defined by the European Commission. Accordingly, a social partner organisation must have the following attributes:

- be cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at European level;
- consist of organisations which are an integral and recognised part of Member States' social partner structures and with capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member States, as far as possible;
- have adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation process.

In terms of social dialogue, the constituent property of these structures is the ability of an organisation to negotiate on behalf of its members and to conclude binding agreements.

Against this background, the following section on the European organisations of the railways sector will analyse their organisations' membership domain, the composition of their membership and their ability to negotiate.

As already noted above, one sector-related European organisation exists on each of the two sides of industry which is listed by the European Commission as a social partner organisation – ETF represents the employee side, while CER represents the employer side. Hence, the following analysis will concentrate on these two associations, while providing supplementary information on other organisations which are linked to the sector's national industrial relations actors.

Membership domain

Since ETF, which is affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), organises the entire transport sector, its membership domain is overlapping relative to the railways sector. In contrast to other European business associations, CER's standard unit of membership is the company itself. There is, however, one notable exception: membership from the UK embraces ATOC, aside from the English, Welsh and Scottish Railway (EWS). As in the case of ETF, the domain of CER is overlapping relative to the sector, since CER embraces not only the railway operators but also other infrastructure companies.

Membership composition

In terms of membership composition, the countries covered by ETF and CER extend beyond the 24 countries examined in this study. However, this report only considers membership of the 24 countries under consideration. Furthermore, the study is confined to the sector-related affiliates only. In other words, in the case of CER, those member companies specialised in managing rail infrastructure are not listed. Table 8 lists the membership of ETF and CER. Both organisations have members in all of the 24 countries under consideration.

Table 8: Members of ETF and CER in railway operation, 2005–2006

Country	Members of ETF [a]	Members of CER
AT	GdE	ÖBB, SLB
BE	CSC/ACV Transcom, CGSP/ACOD, CGSLB/ACLVB	SNCB/NMBS
BG	FTW Podkrepa, UTTUB (UTWSB)	BDZ
CZ	OSZ	CD
DE	GDBA, Transnet, ver.di	DB
DK	3F, DJ (DJF), Dansk Metal, HK Privat, HKT&J [b]	DSB, Railion Danmark A/S
EE	ERAÜ	EVR
EL	POS (FPdC)	OSE
ES	FCT-CC.OO, ELA Hainbat, FETCM-UGT	RENFE
FI	RAUTL, VML (VETURI)	VR
FR	CFTC, FNTCTC-CGT, FGAAC, FGTE CFDT, FSC-CGT-FO, FC-UNSA	SNCF, Eurotunnel, Veolia, THALYS
HU	VDSZSZ, VSZ	MAV, GYSEV/ROEEE, ZRt
IE	SIPTU	CIE
IT	FILT-CGIL, FIT-CISL, UILT-UIL	FS
LT	LGPF (FRWTUL), LGPS	LG
LU	FCPT-SYPROLUX, FNCTTFEL	CFL
LV	LdzSA	LDZ
NL	CNV Bedrijvenbond, FNV Bondgenoten	NS, Railion
PL	SKK-NSZZ Solidarność, FZZP PKP (ZZD PKP)	PKP, Rail Polska Sp.zo.o
PT	SINDEFER	CP
RO	FNDF	CFR Calatori, CFR Marfa
SI	SSSLO, SZPS (RTWS), SZS, SZTS (RTUS)	SZ
SK	OZŽ	ŽSSK, ŽSSK Cargo
UK	ASLEF, RMT, TSSA	ATOC [c], EWS

Notes: List is confined to organisations in the 24 countries under consideration and includes only sector-related affiliates – that is, pure infrastructure companies *excluded in the case of CER. See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.*

[a] = ETF abbreviations for affiliates put in parentheses, if they strongly deviate from those used in the country studies, [b] = Affiliated to HK Privat, [c] = Associational affiliate.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2006

As far as available data on membership of the national trade unions provide sufficient information on their relative strength (see Table 3), it can be concluded that ETF covers the sector's most important labour representatives in the vast majority of countries. Some national trade unions of major importance appear to be unaffiliated only in the case of Finland, Portugal and Romania. Likewise, CER represents the principal railway operators in all 24 countries, along with smaller operators in some countries. According to CER's Annual Report 2005–2006, the affiliated railway operators from the countries included in this study have a total of about 996,000 employees. With direct company membership in almost all of the countries under consideration, with the exception of the UK, CER structures are not tied to the national systems of business associations. This raises the question of how these structures relate to the previously mentioned Commission criterion of representativeness, which requires European associations to cover organisations that are themselves an integral and recognised part of the Member States' social partner structures and with capacity to negotiate agreements.

As already highlighted, collective bargaining is conducted either mainly or exclusively at company level in most of the 24 countries (see Table 6). In these circumstances, the companies themselves are the agents of business in industrial relations, while employer organisations are absent. More specifically, the companies, particularly the state-owned principal operators, are the key actors and leaders of business in the sector's systems of single-employer bargaining; furthermore, they are usually affiliated to CER. In the case of the smaller number of countries where multi-employer bargaining is all-encompassing, CER can be linked indirectly to the national bargaining process insofar as CER members, when affiliated to the national employer organisations, can influence their goal formation and bargaining strategies.

Capacity to negotiate

The third criterion of representativeness at European level refers to the ability of an organisation to negotiate on behalf of its own members. Affiliation to ETF automatically implies giving a principle mandate to ETF for negotiations within the framework of the European social dialogue. In the case of the ETF railway section, this is further specified. Accordingly, the section's members vote on a negotiation mandate that lays down certain guidelines such as minimum and maximum demands and the expected content of an agreement. An agreement can be signed only if this mandate is supported by at least two thirds of the affiliates affected. CER does not have a general mandate of negotiations. Mandates that are given by a company's general assembly, composed of the central executive officers of the company members, are limited to negotiations about a particular issue.

In order to evaluate the weight of ETF and CER in European social dialogue, it is useful to make a comparison with other European associations that may be important representatives of the sector. This can be achieved by reviewing the European associations to which the sector-related trade unions and employer organisations are affiliated.

Regarding the trade unions, these affiliations are listed in Table 3. Seven European organisations, other than ETF, represent sector-related trade unions. The most notable of these organisations is the European Autonomous Train Drivers Unions (Autonome Lokomotivführer- Gewerkschaften Europas, ALE), whose domain comprises the occupational trade unions within the area of railways. ALE has 10 affiliations in 10 countries among the trade unions documented in Table 3.

Altogether, ALE, which is affiliated to the European Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (Confédération européenne des syndicats indépendants, CESI), covers 12 of the 24 countries under examination, with one trade union in each of these countries: these countries include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. In total, 10 of these affiliates meet the criteria of a social partner organisation, as introduced by the Commission.

Other European associations with members among those listed in Table 3 include the European Federation Public Service Unions (EPSU), with two affiliations covering two countries; the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW), with two affiliations in one country; and the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation (EMCEF), the Union Network International-Europa (UNI-Europa), the Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff (Eurocadres) and the European Confederation of Executives and Managerial Staff (CEC) each with one affiliation.

A similar overview of the employer organisations' memberships can be derived from Table 4. The findings show that only a minority of the employer organisations listed have organisational links with European federations. Leaving aside ATOC's affiliation to CER, it appears that the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP) has four affiliates from three countries. Furthermore, the European Rail Freight Association (ERFA) has one affiliation.

Commentary

In comparison to other sectors, the railways sector stands out in terms of its particularly high level of unionisation. This situation applies also to the new EU Member States (NMS) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, where trade unions are rather weak in many other sectors of the economy. Several factors in these countries are especially supportive to the trade unions in the railways sector. These factors relate to the sector's economic structure, namely its high economic concentration, which is manifested in the existence of one very large, principal operator which is usually still owned by the state. Such properties, together with the sector's nature as a key transport system in the economy, equip the trade unions with a particularly strong capacity for organising strikes. As a result, trade union strength makes industrial relations and their regulatory outcomes a core area when it comes to restructuring the sector.

The sector's economic properties have also had an influence on how employers advance their interests in the industrial relations system. Due to the high economic concentration of the sector, the operating companies have not banded together in employer organisations in the majority of countries, with the consequence that single-employer bargaining is more widespread than multi-employer bargaining.

Trade union strength, combined with economic concentration, has given rise to a relatively high rate of collective bargaining coverage, regardless of whether single-employer bargaining or multi-employer bargaining prevails in a country. As a comparison with recent figures on cross-sectoral collective bargaining coverage in the EU25 Member States prior to the entry of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 shows, the sector's adjusted bargaining coverage is higher in 14 of the 17 countries for which comparable data are available (see Marginson, P. and Traxler, F., 'After enlargement: Preconditions and prospects for bargaining coordination', in *Transfer*, Vol. 11, 2005, pp. 423–438). In Slovenia, the sector's collective bargaining coverage is equal to total coverage. Likewise, the two coverage rates are at a similar level in the Netherlands, whereas the sector's coverage may be lower than total coverage in the case of Portugal. As a rule, the sector's coverage rate is substantially higher than the total coverage rate particularly in the NMS, where only a small number of employees across the economy are covered.

At European level, the structure of employer organisations is strongly influenced by the prevailing pattern of national industrial relations. Reflecting the predominance of the sector's companies over business associations in most of the national industrial relations systems, CER, the sector-related voice of employers at European level, is based on direct company membership, instead of membership of national associations. Hence, employer organisations that are still the key industrial relations actors of business in a minority of countries are not affiliated. Regardless of this, CER and its labour counterpart, ETF, are unmatched as the sector's European representatives of employers and employees, particularly since no other European organisation can compare with them in terms of organising relevant sector-related industrial relations actors across the EU Member States.

Part 2: Railway infrastructure

Objectives of study

As highlighted in the first part of this representativeness study, the aim of the research is to identify the relevant national and supranational associational actors – namely, the trade unions and employer associations – in the field of industrial relations in the railway infrastructure sector, and how these actors relate to the sector's European interest associations of labour and business.

Against this background, this part of the study will first identify the relevant national social partner organisations, subsequently analysing the structure of the sector's relevant European organisations, in particular their membership composition. This involves clarifying the unit of analysis at both the national and European level of interest representation. The study includes only organisations whose membership domain is 'sector related' (see below). At both national and European levels, a multiplicity of associations exist which are not considered to be social partner organisations in the sense that they essentially deal with industrial relations. Thus, the need arises for clear-cut criteria which enable analysis to distinguish the social partner organisations from other associations.

As regards the national-level associations, classification as a sector-related social partner organisation implies fulfilling one of two criteria: The associations must be either a party to 'sector-related' collective bargaining or a member of a sector-related European association of business or labour that is on the Commission's list of European social partner organisations consulted under Article 138 of the EC Treaty. Affiliation to such a European organisation and involvement in national collective bargaining are of the utmost importance to the European social dialogue.

Following the criteria for the national organisations, this study includes those sector-related European organisations that are on the Commission's list of consultation. In addition, this report considers any other sector-related European association with sector-related national social partner organisations under its umbrella. Hence, the plan to identify the sector-related national and European social partner organisations is both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'.

Definitions

For the purpose of this study, the railway infrastructure sector is defined in terms of the classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), to ensure cross-national comparability of the research findings. More specifically, railway infrastructure is defined according to NACE 63.21 – 'other supporting land transport activities' – as far as such activities are related to the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure of railways. Activities related to railway infrastructure include, in particular, the operation of railway stations, cargo facilities and the railway network, as well as the maintenance of railway tracks and the rolling stock. The sector does not include transport activities in a narrower sense covered under NACE 60.1.

The domains of the trade unions and employer organisations and scope of the relevant collective agreements are likely to vary from this precise NACE demarcation. Hence, the study includes all trade unions, employer organisations and multi-employer collective agreements that are sector related in terms of any one of the following four aspects or patterns:

- congruence – the domain of the organisation or scope of the collective agreement is identical to the NACE demarcation, as specified above;

- sectionalism – the domain or scope covers only a certain part of the sector, as defined by the aforementioned NACE demarcation, while no group outside the sector is covered;
- overlap – the domain or scope covers the entire sector along with parts of one or more other sectors. However, it is important to note that the study does not include general associations which do not deal with sector-specific matters;
- sectional overlap – the domain or scope covers part of the sector as well as parts of one or more other sectors.

In line with the above conceptual remarks, this study proceeds at European level from three sector-related associations that are currently on the Commission's list of European social partner organisations: ETF, CER and the European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM). Hence, affiliation to either ETF, CER or EIM is one sufficient criterion for classifying a national association as a social partner organisation for the purpose of this study. It should be noted, however, that the constituent criterion is one of sector-related membership. This is important in the case of ETF due to its multi-sectoral domain, but also in the case of CER, which organises both train operators and infrastructure managers. This study will include only the sector-related affiliates to ETF and CER.

Collection of data

The collection of quantitative data, such as those on membership, is essential for investigating the representativeness of the social partner organisations. Unless cited otherwise, this report draws on the country studies provided by the EIRO national centres. It is often difficult to find precise quantitative data. In such cases, rough estimates are offered rather than leaving a question blank, given the practical and political relevance of this study. However, if any doubt arises over the reliability of an estimate, this will be noted.

Quantitative data may stem from three sources, namely:

- official statistics and representative survey studies;
- administrative data, such as membership figures provided by the respective organisation, which are then used to calculate the density or coverage rate on the basis of available statistical figures on the potential membership of the organisation;
- personal estimates made by representatives of the respective organisation.

While the data sources of the economic figures cited in the report are generally statistics, the figures relating to the organisations are usually either administrative data or estimates. Furthermore, it should be noted that several country studies also present data on trade unions and business associations that do not meet the above definition of a sector-related social partner organisation, in order to give a complete picture of the sector's associational 'landscape'. For the above substantive reasons, as well as for methodological reasons of cross-national comparability, such trade unions and business associations will not be considered in this report.

Report structure

The study consists of three main parts, starting with a very brief summary of the economic background of the sector. The report then analyses the social partner organisations in all EU Member States, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta. In other words, the study covers 25 of the current 27 EU Member States. The third part considers the representative associations at European level. Each section will contain a brief introduction, explaining the concept of representativeness in greater detail, followed by the study findings. As representativeness is a complex matter, it requires separate consideration at national and European level for two reasons. On the one hand, the method applied by national regulations and practices to capture representativeness has to be taken into account. On the other hand, the national and European organisations differ in their tasks and scope of activities. The concept of representativeness must thus be suited to this difference.

Finally, it is important to note the difference between the research and political aspects of this study. While the report provides data on the representativeness of the organisations under consideration, it does not reach any definite conclusion on whether the representativeness of the European social partner organisations and their national affiliates is sufficient for admission to the European social dialogue. The reason for this is that defining the criteria for adequate representativeness is a matter for political decision rather than an issue for research analysis.

Economic background

The railways sector has undergone a process of restructuring throughout the EU Member States. Originally organised as a form of state-controlled infrastructure, railways is currently undergoing a process of transformation into a business sector as a result of ongoing deregulation of market entry and liberalisation of services, sometimes accompanied by full or partial privatisation of the former state-owned operator. Restructuring has, in particular, meant decoupling network and infrastructure management from transport service activities, a process triggered by EU legislation in the early 1990s. The separation of transport service provision from railway infrastructure management has been accomplished in most EU countries thus far, as has been the establishment of bodies responsible for licences, safety certificates and the allotment of railway net capacities to transport operators. Despite these reforms, however, the sector has generally maintained its monopoly-like structure in that one single principal operator, often still owned by the state, dominates the product market and employs the majority of the sector's employees. Typically, the former state-owned monopoly provider today, after a process of market liberalisation, heads a group of subsidiaries – for example, in the form of a 'holding' company – which altogether carry out all former activities of the national railway company. This process of splitting up and 'subsidiarisation' under the head of the former monopoly provider usually meets the requirements of organisational separation of railway operations from infrastructure (see Pedersini, R., EIRO thematic feature – Industrial relations in the railway sector, Dublin, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2005). Depending on the stage of restructuring, the reforms have, nevertheless, affected labour relations mainly in two ways. Echoing the transfer of the state-owned operator from a public law undertaking into a private law company, the employment relationship is shifting from public sector regulations to private law status. Moreover, the sector has undergone a thoroughgoing process of labour shedding. According to the European Commission, the number of workers in the whole railway sector has declined by around 45% since the early 1990s (see European Commission, Recent developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue (1.35Mb PDF), Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006).

Tables 9 and 10 give an overview of the development from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s, presenting a few indicators which are important to industrial relations and social dialogue. Despite the measures to open up the markets, the number of companies substantially increased only in a few countries, such as the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland. In seven of the 25 countries considered in this part of the research, one single company continues to operate in the railway infrastructure sector. The scale of employment, as well as the number of employees, decreased in almost all countries for which data are available, apart from Denmark (and perhaps Sweden and the UK), where both increased. Likewise, the sector's share of employment and employees as a proportion of a country's total employment and employees generally declined. In the mid 2000s, these shares were considerably below 1% in all cases with accessible data. Male employment clearly prevails in the sector in all 25 countries under examination. It should be noted that in quite a number of countries no data for the sector are accessible. This is because the sector in question originates from a form of artificial 'split-off' from the traditional, encompassing railway sector (for which data are usually recorded) and is thus not congruent with a clearly demarcated economic activity according to the NACE classification system.

Table 9: Total employment in railway infrastructure, 1994 and 2005

	Number of companies		Total employment		Male employment		Female employment	
	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005
AT	13	18	n.a.	20,200[a]	97%[b]	95%[b]	3%[b]	5%[b]
BE	1[c]	1[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
BG	n.a.	1[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
CZ	338	1,258[b]	11,000	3,900[b]	8,900	3,100[b]	2,000	800[b]
DE	n.a.	851[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
DK	15	10	1,251	2,422	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
EE	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
EL	1	1[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
ES	2	n.a.	56,000[e]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
FI	1	60	4,200	3,100	95%	95%	5%	5%
FR	1	2[b]	61,000	54,800[b]	90%	78%	10%	22%[b]
HU	n.a.	90	n.a.	8,885[f]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
IE	1	1	n.a.	2,244	n.a.	2,114	n.a.	130
IT	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	35,714[g]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LT	n.a.	>/=4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU	n.a.	1[a]	n.a.	74[a]	n.a.	59[a]	n.a.	15[a]
LV	n.a.	n.a.	<2,122	<2,760	<1,169	<1,833	<953	<927
NL	330[c]	405	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
PL	1	157	n.a.	43,558	n.a.	30,000	n.a.	13,500
PT	1[d]	1[b]	6,365[d]	3,604[b]	5,089[d]	2,979[b]	1,276[d]	625[b]
RO	1	1[b]	70,000	29,000[b]	50,000	20,600[b]	20,000	9,000[b]
SE[i]	763	931[b]	12,822	15,015[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
SI	3	3[b]	4,520	4,449[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
SK	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
UK[h]	n.a.	n.a.	30,478	49,000	24,586	41,189	5,891	7,812

Notes: n.a. = not available; [a] = 2007, [b] = 2006, [c] = 1996, [d] = 1999, [e] = figure relates to the whole railways sector, not only to NACE 63.21, [f] = figure probably underestimated, [g] = figure relates to the Italian Rail Network (Rete Ferroviaria Italiana, RFI) only, the national railway infrastructure provider, [h] = figures relate to all 'other supporting land transport activities' according to NACE 63.21, not to those related to railway infrastructure only, [i] = figure relates to all 'other supporting transport activities' according to NACE 63.2.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

Table 10: Total employees in railway infrastructure, 1994 and 2005

	Total employees		Male employees		Female employees		Total sectoral employment as % of total employment in economy		Total sectoral employees as % of total employees in economy	
	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005
AT	n.a.	20,000	97%[b]	95%[b]	3%[b]	5%[b]	n.a.	0.5	n.a.	0.6
BE	15,244	14,072	92%[c]	95.7%[b]	8%[d]	4.3%	n.a.	n.a.	0.47	0.43
BG	n.a.	15,805[a]	n.a.	12,870[a]	n.a.	2,935[a]	n.a.	0.48[a]	n.a.	0.68[a]
CZ	10,200	3,500[b]	8,300	2,900[b]	2,000	700[b]	0.22	0.08[b]	0.24	0.09[b]
DE	n.a.	39,808[j]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.15
DK	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.06	0.1	n.a.	n.a.
EE	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
EL	8,500	6,000[b]	n.a.	5,880[b]	n.a.	120[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.2[b,g]
ES	44,000[f]	18,576	n.a.	67%	n.a.	33%	0.36	0.10	0.48	0.12
FI	3,500	2,800	90%	92%	10%	8%	0.22	0.13	0.22	0.14
FR	61,000	54,800[b]	90%	78%[b]	10%	22%	0.20	0.18[b]	0.20	0.18[b]
HU	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.32[h]	n.a.	n.a.
IE	n.a.	2,029	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.10	n.a.	0.1
IT	n.a.	35,714[i]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.21
LT	n.a.	>/=4,480	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
LU	n.a.	74[a]	n.a.	59[a]	n.a.	15[a]	n.a.	<0.025[a]	n.a.	0.025[a]
LV	<2,122	<2,712	<1,169	<1,801	<953	<911	<0.29	<0.29	<0.29	<0.29
NL	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
PL	n.a.	43,558	n.a.	30,000	n.a.	13,500	n.a.	0.34	n.a.	0.47
PT	6,350[e]	3,598[b]	5,803[e]	5,803[e]	1,267[e]	625[b]	0.20[e]	0.10[b]	0.20[e]	0.10[b]
RO	70,000	29,600[b]	50,000	20,600[b]	20,000	9,000[b]	0.70	0.10[b]	1.09	0.65[b]

	Total employees		Male employees		Female employees		Total sectoral employment as % of total employment in economy		Total sectoral employees as % of total employees in economy	
	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005	1994	2005
SE[k]	12,393	14,425[b]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.34	0.33[b]	0.36	0.38[b]
SI	4,520	4,449[b]	92%	91%[b]	8%	9%[b]	0.70	0.54[b]	0.70	0.54[b]
SK	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
UK[j]	28,972	47,513	23,080	39,701	5,892	7,812	0.12	0.17	0.13	0.19

Notes: n.a. = not available; [a] = 2007, [b] = 2006, [c] = 1996, [d] = 2001, [e] = 1999, [f] = figure relates to the whole railways sector, not only to NACE 63.21, [g] = figure probably inflated, [h] = figure probably underestimated, [i] = figure relates to the RFI only, the national railway infrastructure provider, [j] = figures relate to all 'other supporting land transport activities' according to NACE 63.21, not to those related to railway infrastructure only, [k] = figure relates to all 'other supporting transport activities' according to NACE 63.2.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

National level of interest representation

In many Member States, statutory regulations explicitly refer to the concept of representativeness when assigning certain rights of interest representation and public governance to trade unions and/or employer organisations. The most important rights addressed by such regulations include: formal recognition as a party to collective bargaining; extension of the scope of a multi-employer collective agreement to employers not affiliated to the signatory employer organisation; and participation in public policy and tripartite bodies of social dialogue. Under these circumstances, representativeness is normally measured by the membership strength of the organisations. For instance, statutory extension provisions usually allow for extending a collective agreement to unaffiliated employers only when the signatory trade union and employer organisation represent 50% or more of the employees within the agreement's domain.

As outlined above, the representativeness of the national social partner organisations is of interest in this study in terms of the capacity of their European umbrella organisations for participation in the European social dialogue. Hence, the role of the national actors in collective bargaining and public policymaking constitutes another important component of representativeness. The effectiveness of the European social dialogue tends to increase with the growing ability of the national affiliates of the European organisations to regulate employment terms and to influence national public policies affecting the sector.

As cross-national comparative analysis shows, a generally positive correlation emerges between the bargaining role of the social partners and their involvement in public policy (see Traxler, 2004). Social partner organisations that are engaged in multi-employer bargaining are involved in state policies to a significantly greater extent than their counterparts in countries where multi-employer bargaining is lacking. One explanation for this finding is that only multi-employer agreements matter in macroeconomic terms, setting an incentive for the governments to persistently seek the cooperation of the social partner organisations. If single-employer bargaining prevails in a country, none of the collective agreements will have a noticeable effect on the economy due to their limited scope. As a result, the basis for generalised tripartite policy concertation will be absent.

In summary, representativeness is a multi-dimensional concept that embraces three basic elements: 1) the membership domain and the membership strength of the social partner organisations; 2) their role in collective bargaining; and 3) their role in public policymaking.

Membership domain and strength

The membership domain of an organisation, as formally established by its constitution or name, demarcates its potential members from other groups which the organisation does not claim to represent. As explained above, this study considers only organisations whose domain relates to railway infrastructure. For reasons of space, it is impossible to outline in detail the domain demarcations of all the organisations. Instead, the report notes how they relate to the sector by classifying them according to the four patterns of 'sector-relatedness', as specified earlier. Regarding membership strength, a differentiation should be made between strength in terms of the absolute number of members and strength in relative terms. Research usually refers to relative membership strength as density, in other words the ratio of actual to potential members.

Furthermore, a difference also arises between trade unions and employer organisations in relation to measuring membership strength. Trade union membership simply means the number of persons who are unionised. In addition to taking the total membership of a trade union as an indicator of its strength, it is also reasonable to break down this membership total by sex. However, the situation regarding employer organisations is more complex since they organise collective entities, namely companies that employ employees. Hence, in this case, two possible measures of membership strength may be used – one referring to the companies themselves, and the other to the employees working in the member companies of an employer organisation.

For a sectoral study such as this, measures of membership strength of both the trade unions and employer organisations also have to consider how the membership domains relate to the sector. If a domain is not congruent with the sector demarcation, the organisation's total density – that is, density referring to its overall domain – may differ from sector-specific density – in other words, density referring to the particular sector. This report will first present the data on the domains and membership strength of the trade unions, followed by the corresponding data for the employer organisations.

Trade unions

Table 11 outlines the trade union data on domains and also on membership strength. This table lists all of the trade unions meeting at least one of the two criteria for classification as a sector-related social partner organisation, as outlined earlier. Notably, detailed data are not available on the trade unions' bargaining practices in France. In this case, the trade unions are listed because they are formally recognised as being representative (and therefore recognised for collective bargaining) of all staff of SNCF or certain occupations of SNCF. Likewise, two trade unions in Portugal, namely the Independent Union of Operational Railway (Sindicato Independente dos Operários Ferroviários e Afins, SIOFA) and the Independent Union of Information and Communication Workers (Sindicato Independente dos Trabalhadores da Informação e Comunicações, SITIC), are included and are representative in the sector, although to a very small extent in terms of members. However, no information on these unions' bargaining practices is available. In contrast to the railway transport services sector, where congruent and sectionalist domain demarcations are most frequent, overlapping and sectionalistically overlapping domain demarcations prevail in the railway infrastructure sector. This is because no trade union covers only railway infrastructure employees. Rather, most sector-related trade unions represent both transport service and infrastructure workers, since they were established before any organisational separation of these two fields of activities was carried out. Therefore, the vast majority of the trade unions are (sectionalistically) overlapping in relation to this subsector. Domain overlaps usually occur in the case of cross-sectoral trade unions (often covering broader areas of the transport sector) and unions covering the entire railways sector. Sectionalist overlaps are usually caused by domain specialisation in terms of employee status and qualifications, such as white-collar employees, blue-collar employees and engineers, which is the case in Finland and Portugal. In Germany, Transnet and ver.di each concentrates on certain railway operators within broader sectoral domain demarcations. The large number of sectionalist overlaps in the sector ensues from the pronouncedly pluralist structure of most national trade union systems. In six of the 25 countries under consideration in this part of the study – Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Portugal – six or more sector-related trade unions exist. One single trade union represents the sector only in Austria, Greece, Latvia and Luxembourg. Sectionalism usually means domain demarcation by such sector-specific occupations as maintenance work, security services, rolling stock auditing and railtrack services. Domain demarcations congruent with the railway infrastructure sector are virtually inexistent for the reasons mentioned above.

Table 11: Interest representation of trade unions in railway infrastructure, 2005–2006

Country	Type of membership*	Domain coverage	Membership			Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
AT										
Vida (formerly GdE)	vol.	O	166,000	19,000–20,000	29%	n.a.	95%	Yes	No	*ÖGB*, ETF, EFTAT, UNI-Europa
BE										
CGSP/ACOD[a]	vol.	O	19,522	9,500	8%	51%	67.5%	Yes	Yes	*FGTB*, ETF
'Transcom' section of CSC/ACV[a]	vol.	O	90,000	6,700	8%	42%	47.6%	Yes	Yes	*CSC/ACV*, ETF
SLFP-C/VSOA-S[a]	vol.	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	No	Yes	*CGSLB/ ACLVB*, ETF[b]
BG										
TURWB[a]	vol.	O	10,300	5,000	32%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	*CITUB*, ETF
UTTUB[a]	vol.	O	10,500	300	21%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	*CITUB*, ETF
FTW[a]	vol.	O	8,150	2,230	27%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	*CL Podkrepa*, ETF
NRTU[a]	vol.	O	2,000	648	22.8%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	*CL Podkrepa*
CZ										
OSŽ[a]	vol.	C	48,000	n.a.	31%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*ASO ČR*, ETF

Country	Type of membership*	Domain coverage	Membership			Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
FVČ[a]	vol.	S	600	n.a.	20%–30%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
UZZ[a]	vol.	C	370	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
FŽ ČR[a]	vol.	C	220	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
DE										
Transnet[a]	vol.	SO	248,983	27,300	21.1%	70%	70%	Yes	Yes	*DGB*, ETF
GDBA[a]	vol.	S	45,000	7,030	10.8%	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*DBB*, ETF
ver.di[a]	vol.	SO	2,274,731	1,000	49.8%	50%	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*DGB*, ETF
DK										
HK Trafik and Dansk Jernbane[a]	vol.	O	5,000	1,000	52%	70%	80%	Yes	No	*HK*, *OAO*, *LO*, ETF
DJ[a]	vol.	O	5,410	670	31%	92%	98%	Yes	No	*LO*, ETF
3F[a]	vol.	O	350,444	200	32%	75%	98%	Yes	No	*LO*, *OAO*, ETF
Dansk Metal[a]	vol.	O	138,948	40	5%	80%	90%	Yes	No	*LO*, *OAO*, ETF
DEF[a]	vol.	SO	30,016	42	1%	75%	90%	Yes	No	*LO*, *OAO*, EMCEF
TL[a]	vol.	SO	30,000	30	44%	n.a.	95%	Yes	No	*LO*, *OAO*, UNI-Europa, EPSU
AC	vol.	SO	170,000	213	42%	90%–100%	100%	Yes	No	EPSU, Eurocadres
EE										
ERAÜ[a]	vol.	O	1,900	650	61%	51%	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*EAKL*, ETF
Koostöö TU[a]	vol.	S	189	88	54%–57%	27%–31.5%	41%	Yes	No	-
EL										
POS	vol.	O	9,363	6,000	n.a.	100%	100%	Yes	Yes	*GSEE*, ETF
ES										
FCT-CC.OO/ Railways[a]	vol.	O	9,449	>3,944	7.4%	27%	27%	Yes	Yes	*CC.OO*, ETF
FETCM-UGT[a]	vol.	O	15,059	4,000	20%	27%	27%	Yes	Yes	*UGT*, ETF
CGT[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	2,000	19%	n.a.	13%	Yes	No	-

Country	Type of membership*	Domain coverage	Membership			Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
ELA Hainbat	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	ETF
FI										
RAUTL[a]	vol.	SO	6,961	1,300	22%	96%	98%	Yes	Yes	*SAK*, ETF
Rakennusliitto[a]	vol.	SO	83,017	200	4.5%	72%	70%	Yes	No	EFBWW, EMCEF
RTL-Pardia[a]	vol.	SO	630	450	4%	60%	90%	Yes	No	*FIPSU*, EPSU
VR-AKAVA RY[a]	vol.	SO	270	60	10%	87%	87%	Yes	No	*AKAVA*, *YTN*
TU[a]	vol.	SO	125,722	80	45.5%	79%	75%	Yes	No	*STTK*, ETF, EMF, EMCEF, UNI-Europa, EFBWW, ETUF-TCL, EFTAT
FR										
FNTCTC-CGT[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	18,000–20,000	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[c]	*CGT*, ETF
FC-CFDT[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	4,000	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[c]	*CFDT*, ETF[b]
FSC-CGT-FO[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	2,700	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[c]	*CGT-FO*, ETF
FC-CFTC[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	600–700	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[c]	*CFTC*, ETF[b]
FSTR-SUD[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	4,000	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[c]	*SUD*
FC-UNSA[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	-	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[c]	*UNSA*, ETF
SNPCC-CFE-CGC[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	-	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[d]	*CFE-CGC*
SNCS[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	-	18%–22%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.[d]	-
HU										
PVDSZ[a]	vol.	C	5,000	1,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
VSZ[a]	vol.	O	11,000–12,000	6,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*MSZOSZ*, ETF

Country	Type of mem-ber-ship*	Dom-ain cover-age	Membership			Density (%)		Collec-tive bargain-ing	Con-sul-tation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female member-ship (% of total member-ship)	Dom-ain	Sector			
VDSZSZ[a]	vol.	O	10,000	5,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*LIGA*, ETF
IE										
SIPTU[a]	vol.	SO	200,000	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*, ETF
NBRU[a]	vol.	SO	3,700	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	-
TSSA[a]	oblig.	SO	1,877	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
ATGWU	oblig.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
Amicus	oblig.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	-
TEEU	oblig.	SO	37,025	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
GMB	oblig.	SO	10,135	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
NUSMWI	oblig.	SO	800	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
UCATT	oblig.	SO	15,160	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
BATU	oblig.	SO	10,020	n.a.	n.a.	85%	85%	Yes	Yes	*ICTU*
IT										
FILT-CGIL[a]	vol.	O	143,696	n.a.	12%–13%	13.6%	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*CGIL*, ETF
FIT-CISL[a]	vol.	O	107,082	8,859	15%	10.1%	24.8%	Yes	Yes	*CISL*, ETF
UILT-UIL[a]	vol.	O	100,000	4,000	20%	8.3%	11.2%	Yes	Yes	*UIL*, ETF
UGL Trasporti[a]	vol.	O	80,676	4,044	45%	8.2%	11.3%	Yes	Yes	*UGL*
ORSA[a]	vol.	O	34,000	4,000	n.a.	n.a.	11.2%	Yes	Yes	-
FAST[a]	vol.	O	11,000	550	15%	1%	1.5%	Yes	Yes	*CONFSAL*, ALE
LT										
LGPF[a]	vol.	O	3,000	1,510	50%	25%	34%	Yes	Yes	*LPSK*, ETF
LGPSS[a]	vol.	O	1,200	540	40%	11%	15%	Yes	Yes	*LDF*
LGPS	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	No	n.a.	ETF
LU										
OGB-L	vol.	O	58,000	37	33%	n.a.	50%	Yes	n.a.	*CGT-L*, ETF
LV										
LDzSA	vol.	O	14,359	n.a.	25%	78%	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*LBAS*, ETF
NL										
FNV Bond-genoten[a]	vol.	O	470,000	1,200	20%	n.a.	10%	Yes	Yes	*FNV*, ETF

Country	Type of membership*	Domain coverage	Membership			Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
CNV Bedrijvenbond[a]	vol.	O	90,000	750	15%	n.a.	10%	Yes	Yes	*CNV*, ETF
VHS[a]	vol.	SO	500	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1%	Yes	No	*CHMF*
PL										
SKK-NSZZ Solidarność[a]	vol.	O	34,340	9,800	30%	27%	22%	Yes	Yes	*NSZZ Solidarność*, ETF
FZZP PKP[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*FZZ*, ETF
ZZDR PKP[a]	vol.	SO	9,864	n.a.	45%	19%[e]	8%	Yes	Yes	-
FZZPAT[a]	vol.	SO	3,240	n.a.	n.a.	38%	2.5%	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
AZZTK[a]	vol.	O	1,619	n.a.	n.a.	1.3%	1.3%	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
ZZA PKP[a]	vol.	S	500	n.a.	50%	n.a.	0.5%	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
ZZDR[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
SKK-NSZZ Solidarność 80	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*FZZ*
ZZPW[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*FZZ*
OMZZSOK[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
MZZRT[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
ZZDPKP[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
NSZZ PSD PKP[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
NSZZ SW PKP[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
KZZP FMIS-PKP[a]	vol.	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
KSKFRKZS 80	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
MWZZK	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	*OPZZ*
PT										
SNSTF[a]	vol.	O	3,900	1,500	13%	17.5%	33%–42%	Yes	No	*CGTP*
SINDEFER[a]	vol.	O	780	170–413	25%	3.5%	4.7%–11.5%	Yes	No	*UGT*, ETF
SINAFE[a]	vol.	O	1,450	n.a.	n.a.	7%	n.a.	Yes	No	*UGT*
SINFA[a]	vol.	O	700	n.a.	n.a.	3%	n.a.	Yes	No	*UGT*

Country	Type of membership*	Domain coverage	Membership			Density (%)		Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female membership (% of total membership)	Domain	Sector			
SINFESE[a]	vol.	O	350	n.a.	n.a.	2%	n.a.	Yes	No	*UGT*
ASCEF[a]	vol.	SO	250	67	0%	n.a.	1.9%	Yes	No	-
SINFB[a]	vol.	SO	400	n.a.	Near 0%	2%	1%	Yes	No	-
SNTVFP[a]	n.a.	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SENSIQ[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SNET[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SETN[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SNAQ[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SERS[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SE[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SQTD[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SICONT[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SIOFA[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	No	n.a.
SITIC[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	No	n.a.
SETAA[a]	n.a.	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
SIFOCTA	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	No	n.a.
RO										
FISMC[a]	vol.	O	31,820	13,600	15%	48.5%	45.9%	Yes	Yes	*CSN Meridian*
FNDF[a]	vol.	O	n.a.	11,000	14%	n.a.	32.7%	Yes	Yes	*CNSLR Frăția*, ETF
FAF	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	2,500	n.a.	n.a.	8.6%	Yes	Yes	-
Elcatel[a]	vol.	O	5,700[f]	1,500	37%	8.8[f]	5.1%	Yes	Yes	*CSNTR*, *BNS*
SE										
SEKO[a]	vol.	SO	150,000	5,000–6,000	30%	80%	90%	Yes	No	*LO*, ETF, UNI-Europa, EPSU
SACO[a]	vol.	SO	581,000	1,000	52%	50%	90%	Yes	No	-
ST[a]	vol.	SO	100,000	700	65%	41%	95%	Yes	No	*TCO*, ETF, UNI-Europa
SI										
SZS[a]	vol.	O	2,200	100	n.a.	n.a.	2.2%	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*,

Country	Type of mem-ber-ship*	Dom-ain cover-age	Membership			Density (%)		Collec-tive bargain-ing	Con-sul-tation	*National* and European affiliations**
			Members	Sectoral members	Female member-ship (% of total member-ship)	Dom-ain	Sector			
										Solidarity, ETF
SDZDS[a]	vol.	O	1,550	650	25%	n.a.	14.4%	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*, *Alternativa*
SVZIS[a]	vol.	O	550	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12.2%	Yes	Yes	*SSZ*
SZPS[a]	vol.	O	1,300	n.a.	13.3%	n.a.	28.9%	-	Yes	*SSZ*, *KNSS*, ETF
SK										
OZŽ[a]	vol.	O	28,000	15,000	20%	75%	83%	Yes	Yes	*KOZ SR*, ETF
OAVD[a]	vol.	S	870	810	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
FPP[a]	vol.	O	290	150	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes	Yes	-
UK										
RMT[a]	vol.	O	67,476	n.a.	10.9%	n.a.	30%–35%	Yes	Yes	*TUC*, ETF
TSSA[a]	vol.	SO	32,426	n.a.	30%	n.a.	10%–15%	Yes	Yes	*TUC*, ETF

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

*n.a. = not available; * vol. = voluntary membership, oblig. = obligatory membership; ** National affiliations are in italics. For the national level, only cross-sectoral (i.e. peak-level) organisations are listed; for the European level, only sector-related organisations are listed.*

[a] = Domain overlap, [b] = Indirect affiliation via national higher-order organisation, [c] = Formal recognition as being representative of all staff of SNCF, [d] = Formal recognition as being representative of certain occupations of SNCF, [e] = PKP PLK SA only, [f] = In railway sector only.

O = Overlap, SO = Sectional overlap, S = Sectionalism, C = Congruence

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

As the trade unions' domains often overlap with the sector demarcation, so too do their domains with one another in the case of most countries. The results presented in Table 11 also outline these inter-union domain overlaps. The latter may be considered as endemic, despite the relatively high degree of domain specialisation by sectionalist demarcations. This is mainly because at least one trade union's domain relates to the sector in overlapping terms, such that its domain intersects with the domains of the more specialised trade unions. Moreover, many specialised trade unions nevertheless share subgroups of employees as their constituency. Depending on the scale of mutual overlap, this can result in competition between the unions for members – this is the case, for instance, in Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Spain.

Looking at the membership data of the trade unions, it emerges that female employees are among the minority group in most of the unions. Only a few trade unions in Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden deviate from this pattern. In these exceptional cases, high female membership rates are likely to originate in areas of the trade unions' domains other than the railways sector. The predominance of male union members in the sector echoes the gender-related structure of the employees.

Trade union membership of is usually voluntary. In the Irish example, Irish Rail operative grade workers have a choice between being members of SIPTU or NBRU, but the industrial agreements stipulate that they must be members of one trade union or the other. For the other grades, closed-shop arrangements are offered, mostly with trade unions other than SIPTU and NBRU, such as Amicus or TSSA. Only senior management grades are not subject to some form of closed-shop arrangement. However, compliance with a closed shop can be averted, and trade union sources estimate that several hundred workers are not union members. In the case of Portugal, the membership regulations and procedures of a series of small sector-related trade unions could not be clarified.

The absolute numbers of the trade unions' members differ widely. Their records range from more than two million members to fewer than two hundred members. This considerable variation reflects differences in the size of the economy and the comprehensiveness of the membership domain, rather than the trade unions' ability to attract members. Therefore, density is a more appropriate measure of membership strength for drawing a comparative analysis. Domain density is 50% or higher in more than half (that is, 56%) of all trade unions which document figures on density. The vast majority (73%) of the trade unions register very high densities, with 75% and more. The group of trade unions reporting a density of 15%–49% represents a fifth (20%) of all unions. Almost a quarter (24%) of the trade unions record a density of less than 15%.

Compared with the density referring to the trade unions' total domain, the unions' density in railway infrastructure tends to be slightly lower. Sectoral density is 50% or higher in the case of almost half (48%) of the trade unions for which data are available. Almost all of them (87%), however, record a sectoral density of 75% and more. Sectoral density for about a third (32%) of the trade unions is lower than 15%. Around 20% of trade unions register a density of between 15% and 49%. In contrast to this first glance, these figures do not indicate that the trade unions have specific problems with organising employees in the sector.

The slightly lower sector-specific densities relative to the domain densities partially emanate from the fact that the trade union domain is often congruent with the whole railway sector, encompassing also transport services, where density is often even higher relative to infrastructure. Apart from this, available sector-related density figures of poorly organised trade unions seem to be overrepresented in the sample (Table 11) in relation to the figures on total density. This is evident from those trade unions for which figures on both measures are recorded. In most of these cases, sectoral density is either equal to or even slightly higher than total density, although a few trade unions show the reverse relationship between the two densities. This finding substantially questions the above evidence of the sectoral density being lower than density referring to the trade unions' domain. Overall, the figures indicate that railway infrastructure is a highly unionised sector in almost all of the countries under examination. In Austria, Greece and Sweden, for instance, membership of the different trade unions altogether accounts for a sector-wide density of more than 90%. Several sector-specific factors contribute to this high level of unionisation. Above all, employment in the sector is generally concentrated in one single and usually state-owned operator. Since railways are a key transport system in the economy, strikes are more effective in this sector than in most other sectors of the economy. As a result, this has strengthened the solidarity of the sector's employees and the level of self-confidence of their representative trade unions.

Employer organisations

Tables 12 and 13 present the membership data on the employer organisations. Only nine of the 25 countries under consideration register employer organisations. In the other countries, no association meets the definition of a social partner organisation, as previously introduced. Interestingly, all employer organisations qualify as social partner organisations through their industrial relations involvement. This means that no purely business interest organisation exists in the sector which specialises in matters other than industrial relations, that is trade associations (see **TN0311101S**). All associations operate as employer organisations which are all engaged in collective bargaining. In contrast to the trade union system, the employer side shows a high degree of concentration. More than one employer organisation exists only in Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

The way in which the employer organisations' domain relates to the sector differs only in that their domain is either overlapping or sectionalistically overlapping. These relationships usually occur among domains that include other areas of transport (as in the case of AGENS in Italy) and encompassing services associated with railways (for example, FVS in Austria and Agv MoVe in Germany). Overlapping domains are also common in the public sector – for example, in the case of the State Employer's Authority (Personalestyrelsen, Perst) in Denmark and the Swedish Agency for Government Employees (Arbetsgivarverket). Sectionalism (in the form of sectionalist overlaps only) is based on specialisation by type of operator and/or ownership (for example, in the case of JA in Denmark's, LTY in Finland and Arbetsgivarverket in Sweden) and by type of activities (as in the case of the Finnish Employers' Association of Infrastructure Companies (INFRA RY) and the Swedish Construction Federation (Sveriges Byggindustrier, BI)). Membership of employer organisations is voluntary with the exception of FVS in Austria, which is under the umbrella of WKO, and two public agencies organising public utilities, namely Perst in Denmark and the Arbetsgivarverket in Sweden. Available data suggest that employer density is particularly high, usually with scores of 80% or higher with regard to all density measures. Exceptions, albeit partial in some cases, to this rule are Finland's LTY and INFRA RY, Latvia's LDzDDO and the Swedish Employers' Association of Engineering Companies (Maskinentreprenörerna, ME).

These characteristics of employer representation can be traced to the monopolistic or oligopolistic structure of the sector's product market, as manifested in the presence of one particularly large operator. This fosters either the rise of single-employer bargaining, leaving no role for employer associations, or the formation of one single-employer association which can easily organise the few important operators in the sector. Only Sweden with its four sector-related employer organisations, each of which is specialised either by type of activity or by ownership, deviates somewhat from this pattern.

Table 12: Domain coverage, membership and density of employer organisations in railway infrastructure, 2005–2006

Country	Domain cover-age	Membership					Density			
		Type	Companies	Sectoral companies	Employees	Sectoral employees	Companies		Employees	
							Domain	Sector	Domain	Sector
AT										
FVS	O	oblig.	79	18	62,000	20,000	100%	100%	100%	100%
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Country	Domain coverage	Membership					Density			
		Type	Companies	Sectoral companies	Employees	Sectoral employees	Companies		Employees	
							Domain	Sector	Domain	Sector
BG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DE										
Agv MoVe	O	vol.	67	10	n.a.	n.a.	90%	90%	80%–85%	80%–85%
DK										
JA	SO	vol.	20	n.a.	1,200	250	100%	100%	100%	100%
Perst	SO	oblig.	n.a.	n.a.	156,000	2,200	100%	100%	100%	100%
EE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FI										
LTY[a]	SO	vol.	15	2	20,300	2,400	90%	17%	50%	85%
INFRA RY[a]	SO	vol.	1,565	50	11,900	400	35%	90%	65%	15%
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IT										
AGENS	O	vol.	18	9	100,000	n.a.	90%	90%	95%	95%
LT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LV										
LDzDDO	O	vol.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	43%	n.a.	>60%	n.a.
NL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PL										
ZPK	O	vol.	29	1	133,163	43,558	n.a.	100%	100%	100%
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RO										
APTF	O	vol.	5	1	65,000	28,500	100%	100%	95%	96.6%
SE										
ALMEGA[a]	O	vol.	8,600	41	350,000	13,199	>50%	100%	>50%	100%
Arbetsgivar-	SO	oblig.	270	1	240,000	6,700	100%	100%	100%	100%

Country	Domain cover-age	Membership					Density			
		Type	Companies	Sectoral companies	Employees	Sectoral employees	Companies		Employees	
							Domain	Sector	Domain	Secto
verket										
Teknik-företagen[a]	O	vol.	3,700	100–200	7,000–8,000	3,700	40%	50%	45%–50%	40%
BI[a]	SO	vol.	2,800	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
SI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SK	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UK	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

O = Overlap, SO = Sectional overlap; vol. = voluntary membership; oblig. = obligatory membership; n.a. = not available; [a] = Domain overlap.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

Table 13: Collective bargaining, consultation and national/European affiliations of employer organisations in railway infrastructure, 2005–2006

Country	Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
AT			
FVS	Yes	Yes	*WKO*, ERFA
BE	-		
BG	-		
CZ	-		
DE			
Agv MoVe	Yes	No	*BDA*
DK			
JA	Yes	No	*HTS*, *DA*
Perst	Yes	No	CEEP
EE	-		
EL	-		
ES	-		
FI			
LTY[a]	Yes	Yes	*EK*, CEEP
INFRA RY[a]	Yes	No	*RT-EK*, UEPG

Country	Collective bargaining	Consultation	*National* and European affiliations*
FR	-		
HU	-		
IE	-		
IT			
AGENS	Yes	Yes	*Confindustria, Federtrasporto*
LT	-		
LU	-		
LV			
LDzDDO	Yes	n.a.	-
NL	-		
PL			
ZPK	Yes	Yes	*KPP*
PT	-		
RO			
APTF	Yes	Yes	-
SE			
ALMEGA[a]	Yes	No	*Svenskt Näringsliv*
Arbetsgivarverket	Yes	No	CEEP
ME[a]	Yes	No	*Svenskt Näringsliv*
BI[a]	Yes	No	-
SI	-		
SK	-		
UK	-		

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

** National affiliations are in italics; only affiliations to sectoral European associations are listed; n.a. = not available; [a] = Domain overlap.*

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

Collective bargaining and its actors

Table 11 lists all of the trade unions engaged in sector-related collective bargaining. The large number of trade unions as well as the numerous domain overlaps have entailed rivalries over bargaining rights in several countries, particularly in Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania (at least in former times), Portugal and Spain. These rivalries become manifest in two main ways. On the one hand, the trade unions compete over bargaining goals, something which usually tends to inflate their demands, while it dampens them in fewer cases, when employers manage to play off specific trade unions against each other. On the other hand, certain trade unions may formally be excluded from collective bargaining, as is the case of Belgium and Lithuania.

Employer organisations, which conduct sector-related collective bargaining, exist in only nine out of the 25 countries under consideration (Table 13). Since only three countries have more than one employer association, issues of inter-associational relations recede into the background. None of these countries reports rivalries between the two or (in case of Sweden) four coexisting employer organisations.

System of collective bargaining

Table 14 gives an overview of the system of sector-related collective bargaining in the 25 countries under consideration. The standard measure of the importance of collective bargaining as a means of employment regulation is obtained by calculating the total number of employees covered by collective bargaining as a proportion of the total number of employees within a certain segment of the economy (see Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel, 2001). Accordingly, the sector's rate of collective bargaining coverage is defined as the ratio of the number of employees covered by any kind of collective agreement to the total number of employees in the sector.

To delineate the bargaining system, two further indicators are used. The first indicator refers to the relevance of multi-employer bargaining compared with single-employer bargaining. Multi-employer bargaining is defined as being conducted by an employer organisation on behalf of the employer side. In the case of single-employer bargaining, the company or its subunit(s) is the party to the agreement. This includes cases where two or more companies jointly negotiate an agreement. The relative importance of multi-employer bargaining, measured as a percentage of the total number of employees covered by a collective agreement, therefore indicates the impact of the employer organisations on the overall collective bargaining process.

The second indicator considers whether statutory extension schemes are applied to the railway infrastructure sector. For reasons of brevity, this analysis is confined to extension schemes designed to extend the scope of a collective agreement to the employers not affiliated to the signatory employer organisation; extension regulations targeting the employees are thus not included in the research. Regulations concerning the employees are not significant to this analysis for two reasons. First, extending a collective agreement to employees who are not unionised in the company covered by the collective agreement is a standard of the ILO, aside from any national legislation. Secondly, employers have good reason to extend a collective agreement concluded by them even when they are not formally obliged to do so. Otherwise, they would set an incentive for their workforce to unionise.

Table 14: System of sectoral collective bargaining in railway infrastructure, 2005–2006

Country	Collective bargaining coverage (CBC)	Proportion of multi-employer bargaining (MEB) as % of total CBC	Extension practices
AT	<10% (100%)[a]	100%	(Limited/exceptional)
BE	100%	0%	None
BG	63.2%	0%	None

Country	Collective bargaining coverage (CBC)	Proportion of multi-employer bargaining (MEB) as % of total CBC	Extension practices
CZ	95%	0%	None
DE	98%	MEB prevailing	None
DK	Almost 100%	MEB prevailing	None
EE	75%	0%	None
EL	100%	0%	None
ES	100%	0%	None
FI	90%	100%	Pervasive
FR	100%	0%	None
HU	100%	0%	None
IE	Almost 100%	0%	None
IT	100%	100%	(Pervasive)
LT	100%	0%	None
LU	90%	0%	None
LV	100%	100%	Pervasive
NL	Almost 100%	n.a.	Pervasive
PL	Almost 100%	MEB prevailing	None
PT	100%	0%	None
RO	96.6%	MEB prevailing	None
SE	100%	100%	None
SI	100%	0%	None
SK	95%–100%	0%	None
UK	Almost 100%	0%	None

Notes: Collective bargaining coverage (CBC) means employees covered as a percentage of the total number of employees in the sector. Multi-employer bargaining (MEB) is noted relative to single-employer bargaining (SEB). Extension practices include functional equivalents to extension provisions, that is, obligatory membership and labour court rulings – cases of functional equivalents appear in parentheses. n.a. = not available. [a] = Coverage rate adjusted for employees excluded from collective bargaining in parentheses.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

Compared with employee-related extension procedures, schemes that target employers are far more important to the strength of collective bargaining in general and multi-employer bargaining in particular. This is because employers are capable of refraining both from joining an employer organisation and entering single-employer bargaining in the context of a purely voluntary system.

Therefore, employer-related extension practices increase the coverage of multi-employer bargaining. Moreover, when it is pervasive, an extension agreement may encourage more employers to join the controlling employer organisation; such a move then enables them to participate in the bargaining process and to benefit from the organisation's related services in a situation where the respective collective agreement will bind them in any case (see Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel, 2001).

Collective bargaining coverage

In terms of collective bargaining coverage in the railway infrastructure sector, 22 of the 25 countries taken into account record extremely high coverage rates of 90% or more (see Table 14 above). In the case of Austria, the figures misleadingly suggest a very low coverage rate, while they actually conceal a seemingly special arrangement. Since the public sector is formally excluded from collective bargaining, the railway sector – namely, the principal state-owned operator ÖBB – was also excluded when it formed part of the public sector. After the transformation of ÖBB into a private law company, its employees nevertheless maintained their public law employment status, such that they continued to be excluded from bargaining. As a consequence, a sector-wide collective agreement is regularly concluded only for the new employees who are employed under the terms of private law. While private law employees continue to represent less than 10% of the sector's labour force, all of them are covered by the sector-wide collective agreement. This is due to obligatory membership of the signatory employer organisation in rail transport, FVS. The employment terms of the vast majority of public sector employees are still under the scope of a special collective 'service employment regulation'. Thus, adjusting for employees formally excluded from collective bargaining, the collective bargaining coverage rate can reach up to 100%. Bulgaria and Estonia remain the only countries whose collective bargaining coverage is below 80%.

For 24 countries, at least a rough estimate can be made with regard to the relative importance of multi-employer bargaining. This type of bargaining usually prevails in those countries where employer organisations conduct collective bargaining (Table 13). This means that multi-employer bargaining is predominant in little more than a third of the countries for which data are reported – that is, nine out of 24 countries. In most countries, single-employer bargaining exclusively occurs and involves only one company or one company group. Nevertheless, the bargaining coverage rate is above 90% in most cases.

It could be concluded from the generally high level of collective bargaining coverage that cross-national differences in the majority of either multi-employer bargaining or single-employer bargaining do not strongly affect the overall bargaining coverage rate. However, this outcome contrasts significantly to the situation in other economic sectors. For instance, the coverage rate is higher than 90% in almost all countries. As outlined above, railways in general (including infrastructure) are characterised by economic properties supportive of a high rate of unionisation, which in turn gives rise to a high bargaining coverage rate, regardless of the type of collective bargaining established. This causal link between unionisation and collective bargaining is also evident from the country reports. Although no data are available for each country on total trade union density across the sector, anecdotal evidence drawn from the country reports suggests that the overall level of sectoral unionisation is high in those countries with collective bargaining coverage rates close to 100%.

Since extension schemes can only be applied to multi-employer agreements, the widespread practice of single-employer bargaining limits their use even in cases where labour law provides for such schemes. Furthermore, conditions in the sector are so conducive to collective bargaining that there is little need for extension schemes. Extension practices are common in Finland, Latvia and the Netherlands. When looking at the aim of extension provisions – that is, to make multi-employer agreements generally binding – the provisions for obligatory membership in the case of Austria's FVS, which is under the umbrella of the chamber organisation of business, should also be considered. Obligatory membership creates an extension effect, since the chambers are parties to multi-employer bargaining. Another functional equivalent to statutory extension schemes can be found in Italy. According to the country's constitution, minimum conditions of employment must apply to all employees. The labour court rulings relate this principle to the multi-employer agreements, to the extent that they are regarded as generally binding.

Participation in public policymaking

Interest associations may partake in public policy in two basic ways: they may be consulted by the authorities in matters affecting their members; or they may be represented on 'corporatist', in other words tripartite, committees and boards of policy concertation. This study considers only cases of consultation and corporatist participation that are suited to sector-specific matters. Consultation processes are not necessarily institutionalised, meaning that the organisations consulted by the authorities may vary according to the issues to be addressed and also over time, depending on changes in government. Moreover, the authorities may initiate a consultation process on an occasional rather than on a regular basis. Given this volatility, Tables 11, 12 and 13 designate only those sector-related unions and employer organisations that are usually consulted.

Trade unions

The trade unions are usually consulted by the authorities in the majority of countries. No regular consultation is reported for Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Portugal and Sweden. Despite the accentuated multi-union system in most countries, the authorities tend to include all trade unions, if organised labour is consulted at all. Preferential treatment of one or more specific trade unions is reported only for Finland, the Netherlands and Spain. In the case of Portugal, access to sector-related consultation processes is bound to a trade union's affiliation to one of the major union confederations – such as CGTP and UGT – that are represented on the country's chief board of corporatist cross-sectoral policy concertation, namely CES.

Employer organisations

Due to their monopoly-like position in most countries, conflict over participation rights is absent in the case of the sector-related employer associations. In only about half of the countries, where employer organisations exist and pertinent information is available, they are usually consulted by the relevant authorities on sector-related matters. This is the case in Austria, Italy, Poland and Romania. For Denmark, Germany and Sweden, no regular consultation with employer organisations is reported. In countries with a pluralistic structure in terms of employer organisations, only Finland records preferential treatment of one particular organisation with respect to consultation procedures. Where trade unions and employer organisations coexist, generally the two sides of industry are both consulted or not consulted at all in relation to sector-specific matters. Austria and Germany deviate from this pattern. In the case of Austria, the vida trade union argues that the government seeks more advice from its employer counterpart. In Germany, Agve MoVe, in contrast with the trade union side, denies being consulted on a regular basis. Finland is the only country with a differentiated or preferential consultation practice on both sides of industry, in that only one specific trade union and one employer organisation out of a multitude of each is regularly addressed by the authorities. As noted above, employer organisations in the sense of the earlier definition of a social partner organisation are not established in 16 of the 25 countries under consideration in terms of railway infrastructure. This does not mean that business is excluded from consultation procedures in these countries. Under these circumstances, the companies themselves are frequently involved in the consultation process. Moreover, the fact that the largest railway infrastructure operators are owned by the state in most countries results in close relations between these operators and the government. In this case, some trade unions criticise the government for treating business interests more favourably than those of labour.

Tripartite participation

Turning from consultation to tripartite participation, the research reveals that sector-specific tripartite bodies are established only in two countries, namely Italy and Poland. In general, such bodies deal with matters of sectoral restructuring and industrial relations. In some countries – for example, Bulgaria, Portugal and Slovakia – tripartite bodies for more encompassing economic sectors exist, including railway infrastructure. In Bulgaria, the subsectoral council specialised in railways is not considered as a sector-specific body, since the business association represented on this body is not sector related as defined in this study. The same holds true for Slovakia's track and railway transport body. Table 15 summarises the main properties of the active tripartite boards of public policy.

Table 15: Tripartite sector-specific boards of public policy in railway infrastructure

Country	Name of body and scope of activity	Origin	Participants	
			Trade unions	Business associations
IT	Cabina di Regia dei Trasporti – railways division – FS: investment, health and safety, industrial relations, network management	Agreement	FILT-CGIL FIT-CISL UILT-UIL UGL AF	AGENS
PL	Tripartite body for railways: Social dialogue, sectoral restructuring and privatisation	Agreement	SKK-NSZZ Solidarność, FZZP PKP, ZZDR PKP, FZZPAT, ZZDR, ZZDKRP, SKK-NSZZ Solidarność 80, ZZPW, OMZZSOK, ZZA PKP, MZZRT, AZZTK, ZZD PKP	ZPK

Notes: See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

European level of interest representation

At European level, eligibility for consultation and participation in the social dialogue is linked to three criteria, as defined by the Commission. Accordingly, a social partner organisation must have the following attributes:

- be cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at European level;
- consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member States' social partner structures and with capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member States, as far as possible;
- have adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation process.

Regarding social dialogue, the constituent property of these structures is the ability of an organisation to negotiate on behalf of its members and to conclude binding agreements.

Accordingly, this section on the European associations of the railway infrastructure sector will analyse their membership domain, the composition of their membership and their capacity to negotiate.

As will be outlined in greater detail below, one sector-related European association on the employees' side and two on the employers' side are significant in the railway infrastructure sector. All three of these associations are listed by the European Commission as a social partner organisation: ETF represents the employee side, while CER and EIM represent the employer side. Hence, the following analysis will concentrate on these three organisations, while providing supplementary information on other organisations which are linked to the sector's national industrial relations actors.

Membership domain

Since ETF, which is affiliated to **ETUC**, organises the entire transport sector, its membership domain overlaps relative to the railways sector. In contrast to other European business associations, both CER's and EIM's standard unit of membership is the company itself. A few exceptions to this rule exist only with respect to railway operators, but not with respect to infrastructure providers. As in the case of ETF, the domain of CER is overlapping relative to the sector, since CER embraces not only the railway infrastructure companies, but also, and in particular, the railway operators. In contrast, the membership domain of EIM is congruent with the subsector of railway infrastructure.

Membership composition

In terms of membership composition, the countries covered by ETF, CER and EIM extend beyond the 25 countries examined in this study. However, this report only considers membership of these 25 countries. Furthermore, the study will be confined to the sector-related affiliates only. In other words, in the case of CER, those member companies specialised in operating rail transport are not listed, even though the assessment of a company being mainly a railway operator sometimes remains uncertain. Table 16 lists the membership of ETF, CER and EIM. Both ETF and CER have members in all of the 25 countries under consideration, which, however, is not the case for EIM, covering only 11 out of the 25 countries. With respect to the latter, the majority of Member States are uncovered. This lack of affiliations to EIM in a number of countries may raise the question of whether representativeness according to the abovementioned Commission criterion in terms of coverage of a sufficient number of Member States is met.

Table 16: Members of ETF, CER and EIM in railway infrastructure, 2005–2006

Country	Members of ETF [a]	Members of CER	Members of EIM
AT	Vida (formerly GdE)	ÖBB, SLB, Wiener Lokalbahnen	-
BE	CSC/ACV Transcom, CGSP/ACOD, CGSLB/ACLVB	SNCB/NMBS	Infrabel (company responsible for managing the infrastructure of the Belgian railways)
BG	FTW Podkrepa, UTTUB (FTTUB), TURWB	BDZ, RailInfra, Bulgarian Railway Company	-
CZ	OSZ	CD, SŽDC	-
DE	GDBA, Transnet, ver.di	DB	-
DK	3F, DJ (DJF), Dansk Metal, HKT&J	DSB, Railion Danmark A/S	Banedenmark
EE	ERAÜ	EVR	-
EL	POS (FPdC)	OSE	-
ES	FCT-CC.OO, ELA Hainbat, FETCM-UGT	RENFE, ADIF	ADIF
FI	RAUTL	VR	RHK
FR	FC-CFTC, FNTCTC-CGT, FC-CFDT, FSC-CGT-FO, FC-UNSA	SNCF	RFF
HU	VDSZSZ, VSZ	MAV, MAV Cargo, GYSEV/ROEEE	-
IE	SIPTU	CIE	-
IT	FILT-CGIL, FIT-CISL, UILT-UIL	FS	RFI
LT	LGPF (FRWTUL), LGPS	LG	-
LU	OGB-L	CFL	-
LV	LDzSA	LDZ	-
NL	CNV Bedrijvenbond, FNV Bondgenoten	NS, Railion Nederland	ProRail
PL	SKK-NSZZ Solidarność, FZZP PKP (ZZD PKP)	PKP, Rail Polska Sp.zo.o, CTL Logistics	-
PT	SINDEFER	CP	REFER
RO	FNDF	CFR Calatori, CFR Marfa,	-

Country	Members of ETF [a]	Members of CER	Members of EIM
		GFR, Servtrans Invest	
SE	SEKO, ST	BT	Banverket
SI	SZPS (RTUS), SZS	SZ	AZP
SK	OZŽ	ŽSR, ŽSSK, ŽSSK Cargo	-
UK	RMT, TSSA	EWS	NetworkRail

Notes: List is confined to organisations in the 25 countries under consideration and includes only sector-related affiliates – that is, pure train operators in the case of CER and pure rolling stock trade unions in the case of ETF are excluded. See Annex for list of abbreviations and full names of organisations.

[a] = ETF abbreviations for affiliates put in parentheses, if they strongly deviate from those used in the country studies.

Source: EIRO national centres, 2007

As far as available data on membership of the national trade unions provide sufficient information on their relative strength (see Table 11), it can be concluded that ETF covers the sector's most important labour representatives in the vast majority of countries. Some national trade unions of major importance appear to be unaffiliated only in the case of Portugal and Romania. Likewise, CER and EIM represent the principal railway infrastructure managers (which are, in case of the former, frequently also or mainly railway operators) in the 25 countries, along with smaller companies in some countries. With direct company membership in all countries, CER and EIM structures are not tied to the national systems of business associations. This raises the question of how these structures relate to the Commission criterion of representativeness, which requires European associations to cover organisations that are themselves an integral and recognised part of the Member States' social partner structures and with capacity to negotiate agreements.

As already highlighted, collective bargaining is conducted either mainly or exclusively at company level in most of the 25 countries (see Table 14). In these circumstances, the companies themselves are the agents of business in industrial relations, while employer organisations are absent. More specifically, the companies, particularly the state-owned principal operators, are the key actors and leaders of business in the sector's systems of single-employer bargaining; furthermore, they are usually affiliated to CER and – for a smaller part – to EIM. In the case of the smaller number of countries, where multi-employer bargaining is all-encompassing, CER and EIM can be linked indirectly to the national bargaining process insofar as their members, when affiliated to the national employer organisations, can influence their goal formation and bargaining strategies.

Capacity to negotiate

The third criterion of representativeness at the European level refers to the capacity of an organisation to negotiate on behalf of its own members. Affiliation to ETF automatically implies giving a principle mandate to ETF for negotiations within the framework of the European social dialogue. For the various sections of ETF, such as the railway section, this is further specified. Accordingly, the section's members vote on a negotiation mandate that lays down certain guidelines such as minimum and maximum demands and the expected content of an agreement. An agreement can be signed only if this mandate is supported by at least two thirds of the affiliates affected. CER does not have a general mandate of negotiations. Mandates that are given by a company's general assembly, composed of the chief executive officers of the company members, are limited to negotiations about a particular issue. Likewise, EIM is equipped by its members with a mandate of negotiations as issues arise. Further information on procedural aspects concerning this empowerment is not available.

In order to evaluate the weight of ETF, CER and EIM in European social dialogue, it is useful to make a comparison with other European associations that may be important representatives of the sector. This can be achieved by reviewing the European associations to which the sector-related trade unions and employer associations are affiliated.

Regarding the trade unions, these affiliations are listed in Table 11. Nine European organisations, other than ETF, represent sector-related trade unions. The European association with the most affiliations among the national sector-related trade unions is UNI-Europa, with five affiliations covering four countries. Other European associations with members listed in Table 11 include: EPSU, with four affiliations covering three countries; EMCEF, with three affiliations covering two countries; the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT) with two affiliations and two countries; EFBWW, with two affiliations in one country; as well as Eurocadres, the European Trade Union Federation: Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUF-TCL), the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF) and ALE, each with one affiliation.

A similar overview of the employer organisations' memberships can be derived from Table 12. The findings show that only a minority of the employer organisations listed have organisational links with European federations. None of the national employer organisations listed is affiliated to CER, since the latter organises individual companies rather than employer associations. European associations representing sector-related national employer organisations include: **CEEP**, which has three affiliates from three countries; as well as ERFA and the European Aggregates Association (UEPG), each with one affiliation.

Commentary

In comparison with other sectors, rail infrastructure, like rail transport operation, stands out in terms of its very high level of unionisation. This situation applies also to the NMS that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, where trade unions are rather weak in many other sectors of the economy. Several factors in these countries are especially supportive to the trade unions in the whole railways sector – in practice, the unions usually organise all railworkers, regardless of the latter's area of activity, and do not distinguish between railway infrastructure and operation workers. These factors originate in the railway sector's economic structure, namely its high economic concentration, which is manifested in the existence of one very large, principal operator which is usually still owned by the state. Such properties, together with the sector's nature as a key transport system in the economy, equip the trade unions with a particularly strong capacity for organising strikes. As a result, trade union strength makes industrial relations and their regulatory outcomes a core area when it comes to restructuring the sector.

The sector's economic properties have had an influence also on how the employers advance their interests in the industrial relations system. Due to the high economic concentration of the sector, the operating companies have not banded together in employer organisations in the majority of countries, with the consequence that single-employer bargaining is more widespread than multi-employer bargaining.

Trade union strength, combined with economic concentration, has given rise to a relatively high rate of collective bargaining coverage, regardless of whether single-employer bargaining or multi-employer bargaining prevails in a country. As a comparison with recent figures on cross-sectoral collective bargaining coverage in the EU25 Member States prior to the entry of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 shows, the whole railway sector's adjusted bargaining coverage is higher in 14 of the 17 countries for which comparable data are available (see Marginson and

Traxler, 2005). In Slovenia, the railway sector's collective bargaining coverage is equal to total coverage. Likewise, the two coverage rates are at a similar level in the Netherlands, whereas the railway sector's coverage may be lower than total coverage in the case of Portugal. As a rule, the encompassing railway sector's coverage rate is substantially higher than the total coverage rate particularly in the NMS, where only a small number of the employees across the economy are covered. Although the findings of the abovementioned study by Marginson and Traxler refer to the entire railways sector, including both rail operations and rail infrastructure, it can be concluded that they also apply to the infrastructure subsector only. This is because the terms of employment of the railworkers in both areas of activity are usually equal. Moreover, most sector-related trade unions are universal transport or railway unions representing all categories of railworkers and occupations.

At European level, the structure of employer organisations is strongly influenced by the prevailing pattern of national industrial relations. Reflecting the predominance of the sector's companies over business associations in most of the national industrial relations systems, CER and EIM, the sector-related voices of the employers at European level, are based on direct company membership, instead of membership of national associations. Hence, employer organisations that are still the key industrial relations actors of business in a minority of countries are not affiliated. Regardless of this, CER and EIM, as well as their labour counterpart, ETF, are unmatched as the sector's European representatives of employers and employees, particularly since no other European organisation can compare with them in terms of organising relevant sector-related industrial relations actors across the EU Member States.

Conclusion

In the overall railway industry, one European association on the employees' side – ETF – and two on the employers' side – CER and EIM – are significant. All three organisations are listed by the European Commission as a social partner organisation consulted under Article 138 of the EC Treaty. As far as these European-level organisations are concerned, the aim of this study was to assess their representative status, since the effectiveness of the European social dialogue is contingent on their representativeness in terms of the sector's relevant national actors across the EU Member States. Therefore, the study examined whether these organisations meet the criteria granting eligibility for consultation and participation in the social dialogue, as defined by the Commission. In accordance with these criteria, the study had to analyse the relevant associations' scope of membership domain, their membership composition and their ability to negotiate.

In terms of membership domain, ETF overlaps relative to the entire railways sector, whereas CER is congruent and EIM sectionalist in relation to it. However, with regard to the subsectors of railway operations and railway infrastructure, the domain of CER is overlapping relative to each subsector and that of EIM is congruent with infrastructure.

Turning to membership composition, both ETF and CER have members in all of the countries under consideration, and both associations organise the principal industrial relations actors in the vast majority of countries. In contrast, EIM covers only 11 out of the 25 countries considered in part 2 of the study. The structure of both of the European employer organisations, namely CER and EIM, is mirrored by the prevailing pattern of national industrial relations. Collective bargaining in railways is conducted either mainly or exclusively at company level in most of the Member States. In line with this, the companies rather than employer organisations are the agents of business in industrial relations in these countries. Therefore, the sector-related voices of the employers at European level, CER and EIM, are based on direct company membership, instead of membership of national associations. However, under the conditions of prevailing single-employer bargaining in most countries, the lack of affiliations of employer organisations to both CER and EIM is no indication of their lacking representative status in terms of membership composition.

Regarding the third criterion of representativeness, that is the European associations' capacity to negotiate on behalf of their own members, it should be noted that these organisations are empowered by their members to negotiate in matters associated with the European social dialogue. Such a negotiating mandate is given to the organisations either on a general basis – that is, with affiliation of the members, as is the case of ETF – or on a per-topic basis, as is the case of CER and EIM.

Overall, ETF and its employer counterparts, CER and EIM, have to be considered as the unmatched European representatives of the two sides of industry in the railways sector, since no other sector-related European organisation of equal significance has emerged thus far.

Annex: List of abbreviations

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
Austria (AT)	FVS	Federal Organisation of Rail Transport
	GdE	Union of Railway Employees
	ÖBB	Austrian Federal Railways
	ÖGB	Austrian Trade Union Federation
	SLB	Salzburger Lokalbahn
	vida	Formed from the merger of the Union of Railway Employees (GdE), the Commerce and Transport Union (HTV) and the Hotels, Catering and Personal Services Union (HGPD)
	WKO	Austrian Federal Economic Chamber
Belgium (BE)	CGSLB/ACLVB	Federation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium
	CGSP/ACOD	General Confederation of Public Services, Railways section
	CSC/ACV	Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
	CSC/ACV Transcom	CSC/ACV Transport and Communications
	FGTB/ABVV	Belgian General Federation of Labour
	SLFP-C/VSOA-S	Free Trade Union of Civil Servants, Railways section
	SNCB/NMBS	Belgian National Railways
Bulgaria (BG)	BDZ	Bulgarian State Railways
	CITUB	Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria
	CL Podkrepa	Confederation of Labour Podkrepa
	FTW	Federation of Transport Workers
	FTW Podkrepa	Federation of Transport Workers Podkrepa
	NRTU	National Railway Trade Union
	TURWB	Trade Union of the Railway Workers in Bulgaria
	UTTUB	Union of the Transport Trade Unions in Bulgaria
	UTWSB	Union of Transport Workers’ Syndicates in Bulgaria
Czech Republic (CZ)	ASO ČR	National level: Association of Independent Trade Unions of the Czech Republic
	CD	Czech Railways
	FS ČR	Engine Drivers’ Federation of the Czech Republic

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	FVČ	Federation of Train Crews
	FV CT	Federation of Carriage Examiners
	FŽ ČR	Federation of Railway Workers of the Czech Republic
	OSŽ	Railway Workers' Trade Union
	SŽDC	Railway Infrastructure Administration, state organisation
	UŽZ	Union of Railways Employees
Denmark (DK)	3F	United Federation of Danish Workers
	AC	Danish Confederation of Professional Associations
	DA	Confederation of Danish Employers
	Dansk Metal	Danish Metalworkers' Union
	Danske Regioner	Danish Regions
	DEF	Danish Union of Electricians
	DJ	Union of Danish Railway Workers
	DKK (now OAO)	Danish Confederation of Municipal Employees (Det Kommunale Kartel, DKK) merged with Association of Danish State Employees' Organisations (Statsansattes Kartel, StK) in June 2007 to form Organisation of Public Employees in Denmark (Offentligt Ansattes Organisationer, OAO)
	DSB	Danish State Railways
	HK Privat	Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees in Denmark/Private
	HKT&J	Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees in Denmark/Traffic and Railways
	HTS	Confederation of Danish Commercial Transportation and Service Industries
	JA	Danish Railways Employers' Association
	KTO	Association of Local Government Employees' Organisations
	LH	Organisation of Managerial and Executive Staff in Denmark
	LO	Danish Confederation of Trade Unions
	Malerforbundet i Danmark	National Union of Painters
	Perst	State Employer's Authority

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	SEK	Association of Energy and Environment Offices
	StK (now OAO)	Association of Danish State Employees' Organisations (Statsansattes Kartel, StK) merged with Danish Confederation of Municipal Employees (Det Kommunale Kartel, DKK) in June 2007 to form Organisation of Public Employees in Denmark (Offentligt Ansattes Organisationer, OAO)
	TIB	Union of Wood, Industry and Building Workers
	TL	Danish Association of Professional Technicians
Estonia (EE)	EAKL	Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions
	Edelaraudtee TU	Edelaraudtee Trade Union
	Elektriraudtee	Elektriraudtee Trade Union
	ERAÜ	Estonian Railworkers' Trade Union
	EvA	Estonian Locomotive Workers' Trade Union
	EVKL	Estonian Locomotive Workers' Professional Association
	EVR	Estonian Railways
	Koostöö TU	Trade Union Koostöö
Finland (FI)	AKAVA	Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals
	EK	Confederation of Finnish Industries
	FIPSU	Finnish Public Services Unions' EU Working Party
	INFRA RY	Employers' Association of Infrastructure Companies
	KAF	Federation of Transport Workers Union
	LTY	Employers' Association for Transport and Special Services
	Pardia	Federation of Salaried Employees Pardia
	Rakennusliitto	Construction Trade Union
	RAUTL	Finnish Railway Workers' Union
	RHK	Finnish Rail Administration (Ratahallintokeskus)
	RT	Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries
	RTL-Pardia	Railway Technical Staff Union – Federation of Salaried Employees Pardia
	RVL	Railway Salaried Staff's Union
	SAK	Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions
	TU	Union of Salaried Employees

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	VML	Finnish Locomotive Drivers’ Union
	VR	Finnish Railways
	YTN	Federation of Professional and Managerial Employees
France (FR)	CFDT	French Democratic Confederation of Labour
	CFE-CGC	French Confederation of Professional and Managerial Staff – General Confederation of Professional and Managerial Staff
	CFTC	French Christian Workers’ Confederation
	CGT	General Confederation of Labour
	CGT-FO	General Confederation of Labour – Force ouvrière
	FC-CFDT	Federation of Railway Workers, affiliated to CFDT
	FC-CFTC	Federation of Railway Workers, affiliated to CFTC
	FC-UNSA	Federation of Railway Workers, affiliated to the National Federation of Independent Unions
	FGAAC	Independent Train Drivers’ Union
	FGAAC FGTE CFDT	Independent Train Drivers’ Union – Transport and Civil Engineering Federation – French Democratic Confederation of Labour
	FNTCTC-CGT	National Federation of French Railway Workers, Executives and Technicians, affiliated to CGT
	FSC-CGT-FO	Trade Union Federation of Railway Workers, affiliated to the General Confederation of Labour – Force ouvrière
	FSTR-SUD	Federation of Railway Workers’ Union Branches, affiliated to the Independent Union – Solidarity, Unity, Democracy
	RFF	French Railway Infrastructure Manager
	SNCF	French National Rail Company
	SNCS	National Union of Senior Managers
	SNPCC-CFE-CGC	National Union of Supervisory and Management Staffs of the Railways and Related Activities, affiliated to the CFE-CGC
	SUD	Independent Union – Solidarity, Unity, Democracy
	UNSA	National Federation of Independent Unions
Germany (DE)	Agv MoVe	Employers’ Association of Mobility and Transport Service Providers

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	AGVDE	Employers' Association of German Railway Companies
	BDA	Confederation of German Employers' Associations
	DB	German Railways
	DBB	German Federation of Career Public Servants
	DGB	Confederation of German Trade Unions
	GDBA	Union of German Railway Employees
	GDL	German Engine Drivers' Union
	Transnet	German Rail Workers' Union – Transport, Service and Networks
	ver.di	United Services Union
Greece (EL)	GSEE	Greek General Confederation of Labour
	OSE	Hellenic Railways Organisation
	POS	Pan Hellenic Federation of Railway Workers
Hungary (HU)	ASZSZ	Alliance of Autonomous Trade Unions
	ESZT	Confederation of Unions of Professionals
	GYSEV/ROEEE	Győr-Sopron-Ebenfurt Railway Co./ Raab-Oedenburg-Ebenfurter Eisenbahn AG
	LIGA	Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions
	MAV	Hungarian State Railways Co.
	MOSZ	Engine Drivers' Trade Union
	MSZOSZ	National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions
	MTSZSZ	Rail Section of Free Union of Engineers and Technicians
	PVDSZ	Union of Track Employees
	VDSZSZ	Free Trade Union of Railway Workers
	VSZ	Trade Union of Hungarian Railway Workers
	ZRt	Central-European Railway
Ireland (IE)	Amicus	Amicus Trade Union
	ATGWU	Amalgamated Transport and General Workers' Union
	BATU	Building and Allied Trades Union
	CIE	Irish Transport System (Córas Iompair Éireann)
	GMB	General, Muncipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	ICTU	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
	NBRU	National Bus and Rail Union
	NUSMWI	National Union of Sheet Metal Workers of Ireland
	SIPTU	Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union
	TEEU	Technical, Engineering and Electrical Union
	TSSA	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association
	UCATT	Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians
Italy (IT)	AGENS	Confederal Transport and Services Agency
	ASSTRA	Transport Association
	CGIL	General Confederation of Italian Workers
	CISL	Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions
	Confindustria	General Confederation of Italian Industry
	CONFSAL	General Confederation of Autonomous Workers' Trade Unions
	FAST	Autonomous Transport Trade Union Federation
	Federtrasporto	Transport Employers
	FILT-CGIL	Italian Federation of Transport Workers – General Confederation of Italian Workers
	FIT-CISL	Italian Federation of Transport – Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions
	FS	Italian State Railways
	ORSA	Independent and Rank-and-File Trade Unions Organisation
	RFI	Italian Rail Network
	UGL AF	National Railways Federation – General Workers' Union
	UIL	Union of Italian Workers
	UILT-UIL	Italian Union of Transport Workers – Union of Italian Workers
Latvia (LV)	LBAS	Latvia Free Trade Union Confederation
	LDz	Latvian Railways
	LDzDDO	Latvian Railway Sector Employers' Organisation
	LDzSA	Latvian Rail and Transport Industry Trade Union
Lithuania (LT)	LDF	Lithuanian Labour Federation

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	LG	Lithuanian Railways
	LGPF	Lithuanian Federation of Railway Workers
	LGPS	Trade Union of Lithuanian Railways
	LGPSS	Association of Trade Unions of Lithuanian Railway Workers
	LPSK	Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation
Luxembourg (LU)	CFL	Luxembourg Railways
	CGT-L	General Confederation of Labour – Luxembourg
	FCPT-SYPROLUX	Christian Transport Workers' Trade Union
	FNCTTFEL	National Federation of Railway and Transport Workers, Civil Servants and White-collar Workers
	LCGB	Luxembourg Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
	OGB-L	Luxembourg Confederation of Independent Trade Unions
Netherlands (NL)	CHMF	Federation of Middle and Higher Officials in Government, Education, Business and Institutions
	CNV Bedrijvenbond	Christian Industrial Trade Union Federation Bedrijvenbond
	FNV Bondgenoten	Allied Unions
	KNV	Transport Employers
	NS	Dutch national railway company
	VHS	Vereniging voor Hoger Spoorwegpersoneel
	VNO-NCW	Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers
	VVMC	Vereniging van Machinisten en Conducteurs
Poland (PL)	AZZTK	Autonomous Trade Unions of the Railway Transport
	FZZ	Trade Unions Forum
	FZZMK	Locomotive Drivers' Trade Unions Federation
	FZZP PKP	Federation of PKP Employees Trade Unions
	FZZPAT	Federation of Switching and Telecommunications Workers' Trade Unions
	KPP	Confederation of Polish Employers
	KSKFRKZS 80	National Railway Workers' Section of the Federation of Regions and Company-level Unions of the Solidarity' 80
	KZZP FMIS-PKP	National Trade Union of FMIS-PKP Employees

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	MWZZK	Multi-Entity Free Trade Union of Railway Workers
	MZZRT	Multi-Entity Trade Union of the Rolling Stock Auditors
	NSZZ Solidarność	Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ (NSZZ Solidarity)
	NSZZ PSD PKP	Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union of PKP Railtrack Service
	NSZZ SW PKP	Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union of PKP Carriage Service
	OMZZSOK	All-Poland Multi-Entity Trade Union of the Railway Security Service
	OPZZ	All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions
	PKP	Polish National Railways
	PKP PLK SA	Polish Railway Lines Company
	SKK-NSZZ Solidarność	National Railway Workers’ Section (Sekcja Krajowa Kolejarzy) of the Independent and Self Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’
	SKK-NSZZ Solidarność 80	National Railway Workers’ Section (Sekcja Krajowa Kolejarzy) of the Independent and Self Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ 80
	ZPK	Association of Railway Employers
	ZZA PKP	Trade Union of PKP Administrative Staff
	ZZDKRP	Trade Union of Travel Inspector Teams in the Republic of Poland
	ZZD PKP	Trade Union of PKP Dispatchers
	ZZDR	Traffic Controllers’ Trade Union
	ZZDR PKP	PKP Traffic Controllers’ Trade Union
	ZZM	Trade Union of Locomotive Drivers in Poland
	ZZPW	Trade Union of Technical Maintenance Workers
Portugal (PT)	ASCEF	Union Association of Intermediate Managers of Railways
	ASSIFECO	Independent Union Association of Railway Workers in the Commercial Career
	CGTP	General Confederation of Portuguese Workers
	CP	Portuguese Railways
	INTF	National Institute of Railway Transport

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	REFER	Portuguese Railway Infrastructure Managers
	SE	Union of Economists
	SENSIQ	Union of Managerial and Technical Staff
	SERS	Union of Engineers in the Southern Portugal
	SETAA	Union of Agriculture, Food and Forests
	SETN	Engineers' Union of the North (bachelors)
	SFRCI	Railway Union of Conductors and Commercial Services on Trains
	SICONT	Union of Accountants
	SIFOCTA	Independent Union of Operational Railway Personnel in Circulation and Transports
	SINAFE	National Union of Railway Workers (Moving)
	SINDEFER	National Democratic Union of Railways
	SINFA	National Union of Railway Workers
	SINFB	National Union of Manual Railway Workers
	SINFESE	National Union of Railway Workers (administration, technical staff and services)
	SIOFA	Independent Union of Operational Railway
	SITIC	Independent Union of Manufacturing and Communication Workers
	SITRENS	National Railway Union of Train Personnel
	SMAQ	National Union of Engine Drivers of the Portuguese Railways
	SNAQ	National Union of Technical Staff
	SNET	National Engineers' Union (bachelors)
	SNSTF	National Union of Workers in the Railway Sector
	SNTVFP	National Union of Portuguese Railway Workers
	SQTD	Union of Draughtsmen
	UGT	General Workers' Confederation
Romania (RO)	APTF	Employers' Association at Group-of-Companies Level in Rail Transport
	BNS	National Trade Union Bloc
	Cartel Alfa	National Trade Union Confederation Cartel Alfa
	CFR Calatori	Romanian Railways (passenger transport)

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	CFR Marfa	Romanian Railways (freight)
	CNSLR Frăția	National Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Romania – Frăția
	CSN Meridian	National Trade Union Confederation Meridian
	CSNTR	National Trade Union Convention of Transport Operators in Romania
	Elcatel	Elcatel National Federation of Trade Unions in Transport
	FAF	Railway Automation Federation
	FISMC	Independent Federation of Traffic/Trade in Rail Transport
	FMLR	Federation of Engine Drivers in Romania
	FNDF	Iron Railroad Federation
	FSRV	Federation of Trade Unions in the Train Carriage Branch
	GFR	Grup Feroviar Roman
Slovakia (SK)	FPP	Federation of Operational Employees
	FSSR	Federation of Engine-drivers
	KOZ SR	General Confederation of Trade Unions
	OAVD	Trade Union Association of Train Dispatchers and Traffic Controllers
	OZŽ	Railway Workers Trade Union Association
	RUZ SR	National Union of Employers
	ŽSR	Slovakian Railway Infrastructure Manager
	ŽSSK	Slovakian Railways
	ŽSSK Cargo	Slovakian Cargo Railways
	ZZDPT SR (now ÚDPT SR)	Association of Employers in Transport, Posts and Telecommunications – since April 2007, Union of Employers in Transport, Posts and Telecommunication
Slovenia (SI)	Alternativa	Slovene Union of Trade Unions Alternativa
	AZP	Slovenia’s Rail Transport Public Agency
	KNSS	Independence, Confederation of New Trade Unions of Slovenia
	SDZDS	Railway Activity Union of Slovenia

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	Solidarity	Union of Workers' Trade Unions of Slovenia – Solidarity
	SSSLO	Locomotive Drivers' Union of Slovenia
	SSZ	Slovenian Railways Unions
	SVLM	Locomotive Maintenance Workers' Union Moste
	SVPS	Railway Carriage Inspectors' Union of Slovenia
	SVZIS	Railway Infrastructure Maintainers' Union of Slovenia
	SVZVSS	Railway Rolling Stock Maintenance Workers' Union of Slovenia
	SZ	Slovenian Railways
	SZPS (RTWS)	Railway Traffic Union of Slovenia
	SZS	Railway Workers' Union of Slovenia
	SZTS (RTUS)	Railway Transport Union of Slovenia
Spain (ES)	ADIF	Railway Infrastructure Administration
	AGESFER	Railway Services Employers' Association (Asociación de Empresas de Servicios Ferroviarios)
	CC.OO	Trade Union Confederation of Workers' Commissions
	CGT/Railways	General Confederation of Labour/Railways
	ELA Hainbat	International Railway Workers Federation
	ELA-STV	Basque Workers' Solidarity
	FTC-CC.OO/Railways	Communication and Transport Workers' Federation - Trade Union Confederation of Workers' Commissions/Railways
	FETCM-UGT/Railways	Federación Estatal de Transportes, Comunicaciones y Mar de la Unión General de Trabajadores
	RENFE	Spanish National Railways
	SEMAF	Spanish Trade Union of Train Drivers and Assistants
	UGT	General Workers' Confederation
Sweden (SE)	ALMEGA	Swedish Service Employers' Association
	Arbetsgivarverket	Swedish Agency for Government Employees
	Banverket	Swedish Rail Administration
	BI	Swedish Construction Federation
	BT	Association of Swedish Train Operating Companies

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	ME	Employers' Association of Engineering Companies
	SACO	Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations
	SEKO	Swedish Union of Service and Communication Employees
	ST	Civil Servants' Union
	Svenskt Näringsliv	Confederation of Swedish Enterprise
United Kingdom (UK)	ASLEF	Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firefighters
	ATOC	Association of Train Operating Companies
	EWS	English, Welsh and Scottish Railway
	RMT	National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers
	TSSA	Transport Salaried Staffs' Association
	TUC	Trades Union Congress
Europe	ALE	Autonomous Train Drivers' Unions of Europe (Autonome Lokomotivführer Gewerkschaften Europa)
	CEC	European Confederation of Executives and Managerial Staff
	CEEP	European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest
	CEMR	Council of European Municipalities and Regions
	CER	Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies
	CESI	European Confederation of Independent Trade Unions
	EFBWW	European Federation of Building and Woodworkers
	EFFAT	European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions
	EIM	European Rail Infrastructure Managers
	EMCEF	European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation
	EMF	European Metalworkers' Federation
	EPSU	European Federation of Public Service Unions
	ERFA	European Rail Freight Association

Country	Abbreviation	Full name of organisation
	ETF	European Transport Workers' Federation
	ETUF-TCL	European Trade Union Federation: Textiles, Clothing and Leather
	Eurocadres	Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff
	UEPG	European Aggregates Association
	UNI-Europa	Union Network International – Europe

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