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Growth without resilience: Europe’s hidden social fracture
Macroeconomic indicators suggest a continent on the mend. Inflation has been close to the 2% target, and labour markets across the European Union remain remarkably resilient. Yet, the findings from the 2025 Living and Working in Europe e-survey reveal a profound contradiction. In the world of aggregate data, the storm appears to have passed; in the lived reality of millions, the recovery has yet to arrive.
This divergence raises questions for the social contract. After half a decade of cumulative shocks — a global pandemic, the return of war to the continent, and a punishing cost-of-living crisis — a chronic stress has taken root among respondents. This is no longer an acute response to a passing crisis; it is a gradual erosion of financial resilience and institutional trust that demands a shift in perspective from the headline numbers to the household level.
The most troubling trend is the widening gulf between those who have weathered the recent volatility and those who are struggling. In 2023, 40% of low-income respondents reported difficulties making ends meet. By 2025, that figure had climbed to 61%. Meanwhile, high-income households have remained largely stable. The implication is stark: the benefits of macroeconomic stability are failing to reach the bottom half of the income distribution.
A squeezed middle is emerging, too — one more precarious than headline employment figures might suggest. Nearly 40% of those aged 35 to 64, the traditional backbone of the workforce and tax base, report difficulties managing monthly expenses. Financial buffers have all but evaporated: a full quarter of respondents report having no savings at all, and another quarter have only enough to last three months. For close to half of respondents, financial resilience has become a luxury.
Housing now stands as the primary social risk of the current era, acting as a powerful mechanism for the upward transfer of wealth and the entrenchment of inequality. Within this landscape, the private rental sector bears a disproportionate share of the burden.
The data show that 61% of private renters have little or no financial cushion. Unlike homeowners, they are immediately exposed to price shocks and rental increases, often with limited stability. This is not merely an economic issue; it is a source of profound housing insecurity that prevents long-term planning. When a household cannot guarantee the roof over its head, optimism is the first casualty.
Perhaps most alarming is the state of collective mental health. Measured via the WHO-5 index, the survey findings point to a crisis: 57% of respondents – nearly 6 in 10 – are currently presenting a risk of depression.
The evidence suggests that mental health cannot be cordoned off as a separate medical concern; it is inextricably linked to socio-economic conditions. There is a strong alignment between financial stress, housing instability and declining psychological well-being. The optimism that was expected to return following the pandemic has failed to materialise. Instead, geopolitical uncertainty and a perceived lack of fairness in the recovery have left respondents in a state of chronic psychological strain.
This economic insecurity is contributing to the erosion of faith in democratic and institutional frameworks. Consistently, respondents in vulnerable positions –unemployed people, low-paid workers, and those with disabilities – report the lowest levels of trust in national governments and the legal system.
A middle-aged disillusionment is setting in. While younger cohorts still look to the EU to address global externalities such as climate change, middle-aged respondents have markedly less trust in institutions. A gap is opening between the rhetoric of a resilient Europe and the reality of daily life. Without tangible improvements in household security, this declining optimism serves as a warning sign for future social polarisation and democratic disengagement.
The takeaway from these trends is that aggregate growth figures are insufficient to measure the health of a society. To restore the optimism currently in such short supply, the approach must move beyond the macro-level perspective.
First, housing must be treated as a social priority. General economic growth does not solve a housing crisis that is actively draining the resilience of the lower and middle classes. Second, well-being must be integrated into social policy. The mental health crisis cannot be resolved without addressing the financial precarity that fuels it. Finally, trust must be rebuilt through experience. Trust is not cultivated through communication strategies alone; it grows when people see their financial situation improve at the kitchen table, not just on a balance sheet.
Time is of the essence. If the disconnect between macroeconomic data and household reality is not addressed, the resulting polarisation may become a lasting feature of the European landscape.
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Author
Eszter Sándor
Senior research managerEszter Sandor is a senior research manager in the Social Policies unit at Eurofound. She has extensive experience in survey management, including questionnaire design and scripting, data preparation (processing, cleaning, weighting), and statistical analysis using R. She manages Eurofound’s e-survey (Living and working in the EU) and contributes to the preparation and management of the European Quality of Life Survey. Her research focuses on the quality of life of young people and families, including subjective well-being, mental well-being and living conditions.
Before joining Eurofound, she worked as an economic consultant in Scotland, specialising in economic impact assessments, evaluations, and input-output analysis. She has a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from the Budapest University of Economics and Business and a Master’s degree in Economics and International Relations from Corvinus University of Budapest.
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