Positions of the social partners on the labour relations bill

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In July 1998, both trade unions and employers' organisations reacted to the Greek Government's draft bill on the regulation of labour relations. Both sides made their own criticisms, while a number of common views were expressed.

The Greek Government presented a draft bill on the regulation of labour relations on 24 June 1998 (GR9807181F). The bill contains provisions concerning issues such as working time, "atypical" forms of employment and the distinction between dependent and independent labour. On 16 July, after emergency consultations within the Economic and Social Committee (OKE) a proposed opinion on the industrial relations bill was drawn up (Regulation of industrial relations and other provisions (draft bill), OKE Opinion No. 18, July 1998). It contains the relevant views, both common and divergent, of the social partners.

Employers' views

In their overall assessment of the bill, employers claim that an important parameter is absent from its objectives - that is, facilitation of the flexible operation of undertakings with a view to increasing their competitiveness. Instead of creating the conditions for a process of harmonisation of industrial relations on the national and European level and promoting the notion of flexibility, say the employers, the basic provisions of the bill ignore European and international reality. Imbued with elements of compromise and characterised in each thematic unit by interventionist regulations, these provisions - it is claimed - create problems of implementation.

Employers believe several regulations, particularly those regarding working time, to be in large measure impossible to implement and foresee unfavourable consequences for small enterprises. At the same time, in their view, the bill does not facilitate use of atypical forms of labour, part-time employment or new working time arrangements. Instead, their implementation is made difficult by bureaucratic procedures which fail to ensure any additional positive results for workers. In view of the fact that collective agreements are the favoured tools for implementing any sort of new arrangements in these areas in undertakings, a lack of consent from the workers' side deprives undertakings of the ability to adopt such arrangements.

Trade union views

In the unions' view, the draft bill does not seem to serve the goal of increasing the number of full-time jobs. Its provisions, in fact, reinforce employment flexibility, mainly by bypassing branch-level collective agreements in certain areas and promoting temporary employment and low labour costs. However, these provisions are not accompanied by measures encouraging full-time employment. For the unions, the bill also ignores the role which reduction of working time (without a simultaneous reduction in pay) can play in increasing employment. New working time arrangements not accompanied by working time reductions are of benefit only to enterprises, which thereby reduce labour costs and increase profitability, without increasing jobs and without distributing benefits equally among workers and management. In any case, new working time arrangements could help save jobs only in undertakings threatened with closure. Another alleged serious weakness of the bill is that it fails to deal with the lack of collective representation in small and medium-sized enterprises, despite the fact that they constitute the overwhelming majority of enterprises in Greece.

The unions claim that the bill fails to list and define atypical forms of employment, or to lay down special provisions guaranteeing worker protection. Reference to some atypical forms of employment (teleworking, piecework and homeworking) is seen as fragmentary and aimed at dealing with one problem only, that of their wrongful inclusion in the concept of independent employment. The particularities of atypical forms of work are not dealt with globally in conjunction with the social insurance, trade union and broader labour rights of workers. This need, stemming from gaps or inadequate provisions in existing legislation, was underlined in the recent social dialogue process (GR9704112N) and also recorded in the November 1997 Confidence pact for the year 2000 (GR9711138F)

Common positions

Both unions and employers recognise as positive the effort (Article 1) to combat the phenomenon of "pseudo-independent" employment, whereby several types of employment relationships are dubbed contracts for projects or independent services, when in reality they conceal a relationship of dependence. Also positive, in the view of both sides, is increasing worker protection in part-time employment and extending it to state-run utilities and organisations and private entities in the public sector. However, they note that there are provisions which either make this difficult to implement or undermine the objective of full-time employment.

Given that the bulk of part-timers are women, it is stated that, as part-time employment increases, care should be taken to prevent it from becoming a form of discrimination based on sex, offering women lower pro rata pay. Similar guarantees of equal treatment should be given, as regards use of both atypical employment and new working time arrangements, because women are more likely to be adversely affected by implementation of such measures. Both sides still express reservations about the degree to which the incorporation of the concepts of split work schedules and shiftworking in the concept of part-time employment and their inclusion in its legal regime will work in favour of workers, and particularly the degree to which the problem of their insurance coverage has not been dealt with (through reform of Article 39 of Law 1892/1990). At the same time, it is seen as doubtful whether the utilisation of these forms of work is facilitated, as there is no provision for what will happen in the event that consultations betwene management and workers over their introduction are unsuccessful.

The return of the Labour Inspectorates to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and their reorganisation into a unified, centrally controlled body is also regarded as positive. However, it is noted that, in addition to qualitative enhancement of their role, efforts should also be made to ensure that they are provided with the proper scientific staff in all specialisms.

Commentary

The industrial relations bill seeks to take steps to increase total labour market flexibility and extend it to the public sector of the economy, as well as to legalise some currently illegal flexibility. At the same time, it is the product of compromises, in view of the pressure brought to bear by employer and union organisations, especially since each side rejects the bill for different reasons: the unions because they believe it increases labour flexibility with negative repercussions for the content of employment and industrial relations; and the employers because it contains no substantial measures to increase flexibility favourable to increased competitiveness of the Greek economy and employment. It is obvious, however, that these measures are a first step towards a further increase of flexibility. In the run-up to Greece's inclusion in EMU, and even more so after it becomes a member, the content of labour relations will change in the direction of flexibility, since pressures leading to such a development are strong. (Giannis Kouzis and Eva Soumeli, INE/GSEE)