Strikes in the transport sector analysed

Source: Guarantee Authority conflict observatory

Commentary

Traditional conflict indicators (number, participants, days lost and so on) do not fully capture the scope of conflict in essential services. Often, forms of disputes short of strikes are widespread in services, such as non-cooperation and working to rule, which are more harmful for companies and customers and less expensive for unions and workers. Furthermore, the "announcement effect" (ie, the forced changes in customers' travel schedules and itineraries caused by a strike call) makes it possible to achieve the maximum advantage in terms of difficulties for companies and discomfort for customers, at the minimum cost: it is enough to call a strike and later withdraw it. Besides, some specific groups of workers (like air traffic controllers) have a very significant power to cause damage that the usual quantitative data cannot catch. This sort of power can in some cases lead to the creation of the most prominent examples of "particularistic" unions, which are notably present in Italy. Such small occupational unions, often in a monopoly position, may act in an individualist manner, without taking into consideration the effects of their action on other groups of workers or the community at large, and at relatively little cost to themselves. All these elements together diminish any direct relationship between the sacrifice faced by workers and the damage that urban, regional or national communities have to bear.

Despite the abovementioned limitations, official data on strikes allow us to identify some relevant characteristics of conflict in the transport sector and, more generally, some significant features of the transformation of the industrial relations system. The data help identify an anomaly in the transport sector: in the framework of a generalised fall in conflict for many reasons - such as the rise in unemployment, but also more efficient bargaining systems and structures - chaotic and uncontrolled conflict behaviour persists in services and transport.

The data supplied by the Guarantee Authority's conflict observatory confirm the turbulent nature of the transport sector and support some further interesting considerations. Firstly, we can suggest the hypothesis that the frequent respect of notice terms in transport could be explained by the widespread practice of calling "virtual strikes", which are effective thanks to the "announcement effect". It is clear that a precise strike call issued well in advance is essential in order to take advantage of this effect, otherwise it would lose its potential effect.

Secondly, we can identify three differing "strike behaviours". Confederal unions observe the minimum service requirements set by the law, since, due to their affiliations, they are obliged to take into account the effects of their actions on the transport system as a whole and thus other groups of workers, though they are less inclined to respect notice periods. Occupational unions profit more openly from the announcement effect and, consequently, observe notice periods more, though not minimum services. Autonomous unions violate more frequently the rules on the duration of strikes.

In conclusion, we can state that the announcement effect, which is used by confederal and autonomous unions as well as occupational unions, is the most troublesome source of confusion and difficulties. From this point of view, it is not possible to support the view that a strike call which has been withdrawn, even at the last minute, is always better than a strike which has taken place. If we can draw from these considerations an objective for the regulation of conflict in transport, it is that there should arguably be an increase in the cost of conflict for unions which call a strike - for instance, by imposing economic sanctions whenever a strike call is withdrawn without appropriate reasons. Through introducing costs, even for strike calls, a decrease in the number of conflicts could be obtained, representing a real defence of customers and of the transport system. (Gian Primo Cella and Roberto Pedersini, Fondazione Regionale Pietro Seveso)