Lengthy conflict continues at RENFE
Published: 27 January 2000
Since late 1998, management and trade unions in Spain's national railway company (RENFE) have been involved in a dispute over a new collective agreement, which had not yet been resolved in January 2000. The social partners have different views on the future of the company and there are also divisions between the trade unions.
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Since late 1998, management and trade unions in Spain's national railway company (RENFE) have been involved in a dispute over a new collective agreement, which had not yet been resolved in January 2000. The social partners have different views on the future of the company and there are also divisions between the trade unions.
The National Network of Spanish Railways, (Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles,RENFE) provides goods and passenger transport for the whole of Spain. Passenger transport has been separated into clearly differentiated divisions: high-speed trains, long-distance trains, regional lines and local lines. In many metropolitan areas, local trains are a fundamental part of the urban transport system. In 1998, RENFE transported over 409 million travellers, which shows its importance for passenger transport in Spain. RENFE still controls a large share of goods transport, which has increased in the last few years. In 1998, it transported over 29 million metric tonnes of freight.
At the beginning of the political transition to democracy in the 1970s, regional and local lines were hived off to form separate companies, but RENFE still represents around 75% of rail transport.
With 35,000 workers, RENFE is one of the largest Spanish employers, though more than 23,000 jobs have been lost in the last 11 years; in 1988 it had a workforce of 58,600. Technological and organisational innovation – and in particular computerisation – have made it possible to reduce staffing in all areas - ticket sales, train driving, ticket control, rail infrastructure, station staff, maintenance, administrative tasks etc.
Although the company has been separated into clear divisions and has regional branch offices, industrial relations are highly centralised. The company agreement is at national level and does not allow for complementary agreements at regional level. There is a multi-plant workers' committee that deals with most collective bargaining and industrial relations issues, although there are provincial committees that deal with day-to-day aspects. The central personnel management issues guidelines to the equivalent regional structures, whose function is basically to apply them. At present the trade unions represented on the multi-plant committee are, in order of importance: CC.OO, UGT, CGT and the Spanish Union of Train Drivers and Rail Workers (Sindicato Español de Maquinistas y Ayudantes Ferroviarios,SEMAF).
Deficit and programme contract
RENFE has traditionally had a high deficit that is covered by the annual state Budget. The business shows a deficit in three areas: infrastructure, local lines and regional lines. In the last few years, the state transfers to RENFE have been carried out through a "programme contract" which lays down objectives of modernisation, productivity and repairs. Under this contract, high-speed trains and long-distance lines are self-financing and the fares are unregulated, while the state contribution is assigned to regional and local lines in order to guarantee the public service. For the former services, public funding is justified as a "necessity of territorial integration", while the latter are seen as an "essential public service for access to large cities".
Rail transport is still considered as an essential public service. The trade unions, the company and the government agree on this, though there are differences of opinion on how it should be developed.
Negotiation of an agreement for 1999-2000
In order to understand the serious conflict that has arisen over the negotiation of a new company collective agreement for 1999-2000, two developments of the past few years should be borne in mind.
The first is the loss of purchasing power of wages that the workers have suffered over 10 years in which the actual retail prices index has been higher than the government target. The wage increases of RENFE workers are subject to a recommendation set out in the state Budget, a recommendation that is practically always imposed in bargaining by the company management, with the argument that the cost of transport cannot be increased because it is a public service.
The second is a high increase in productivity arising from the reduction of the workforce, multi-skilling and greater work intensity, and from the technological changes mentioned above. Up to now, this increase in productivity has been treated as being outside the discussion on pay because it had been accepted by the unions partly in exchange for the good pre-retirement provisions and the voluntary redundancy schemes through which the workforce had been reduced.
However, now that this reduction has been achieved, and in a new context of economic growth, RENFE workers want to increase their wages. Wage increases are being demanded by trade unions in all sectors of the railways, arguing that the workers have lost part of their purchasing power in the last few years. Both an increase in the agreed wages and a productivity bonus are seen as appropriate mechanisms for this. Therefore, before beginning the negotiation of the new agreement the multi-plant workers' committee requested a productivity bonus. Dissatisfied with the company's response, it called a strike in December 1998 (ES9812293N).
Later, with the negotiations for the agreement underway, several strikes were called during 1999. The aim was initially to demand the productivity bonus and later also to protest against what were seen as excessively high minimum services laid down by the company and the Ministry of Development during the strikes, and against disciplinary procedures against trade unionists for not respecting the minimum services (ES9912167N).
Industrial conflict and disagreement between unions
The management of RENFE has maintained a firm position throughout the conflict: wage increases should be in line with the government's RPI target for 1999 and 2000 (although the real RPI in 1999 was 1 percentage point higher than the target); and productivity bonuses should be negotiated during the duration of the agreement. The company claims that the new programme contract, with the aim of improving the public service, forces the company to control expenditure and to obtain maximum efficiency.
Within the unions, on the other hand, there are two positions: UGT accepts the employer's proposal but reserve the right to strike if the controversy over productivity bonuses is not resolved during the agreement; while CC.OO, in this case allied with CGT and SEMAF, demands a quantified bonus and a higher wage increase than the one offered. The tension between the two majority unions, habitual allies in bargaining in all sectors and companies, has been accentuated as the months go by and as the management of RENFE has tried to weaken the strikes called by CC.OO, CGT and SEMAF by imposing high minimum services and sanctions on workers that do not respect them. UGT accuses CC.OO of "politicisation" because "the minority faction in CC.OO that is dominant in RENFE wants to use the conflict as a platform for the union confederation's next congress." CC.OO accuses UGT of "bending to the employer's proposals because it accepts the company's policy on modernisation".
An agreement was signed on 13 January 2000 between the company and UGT. However, this is of an "extra-statutory nature", that is to say effective only for the members of this union and for those workers who individually wish to adhere to it, since it has been signed by a union that represents a minority on the workers' committee. CC.OO, CGT and SEMAF have called partial strikes on several days in January and state that they "will continue to press the management of the company to negotiate".
Commentary
The new 1999-2000 programme contract summarises well the philosophy of liberalisation with which the government approaches the future of the company. Over two years, it will invest PTA 300 billion to prepare RENFE for the future liberalisation of the rail system, which is promoted by the European Commission. This investment will consolidate the basic infrastructures and prepare some lines for privatisation.
The predominant idea in the government, it is stated, is that the network of infrastructures should be under public management, and that the lines can be operated by public or private operators, without prejudice to what may in fact happen. The chair of RENFE states that the company wishes to be present in all services, in some exclusively and in others in alliance with private operators, which would guarantee a public train service.
Obviously the unions wish to keep the railways public, but there are differences between them. CC.OO simply states that the operator should always be public. UGT is willing to negotiate providing that it does not mean that the public nature of the service will cease. This discrepancy has increased the distance between the two unions (Fausto Miguélez. QUIT).
Eurofound recommends citing this publication in the following way.
Eurofound (2000), Lengthy conflict continues at RENFE, article.