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In early 1999, the Spanish social partners made a positive assessment of collective bargaining in 1998, but expressed major differences of opinion on the direction it should be taking. Whilst collective bargaining still focuses principally on pay and working time, other issues - such as employment and training - are beginning to grow in importance.
As usual at the beginning of each year, the principal Spanish trade union confederations - CC.OO and UGT- and the main employers' organisation - CEOE- have published their reports on trends in collective bargaining over the previous year. The reports on 1998 from the three organisations are as follows:
In the context of the intersectoral agreements signed in April 1997 (ES9706211F), the main aim of the unions in 1998 was to increase the quantity and quality of employment through collective bargaining. A second aim was to further the scope of collective bargaining in terms of both the level at which it was conducted and the breadth of issues it covered (ES9712137F). CEOE, meanwhile, was interested in greater collective and individual autonomy rather than legislation to regulate industrial relations, and advocates a more important role for collective bargaining, in line with the labour reform of 1994.
The trade unions approve of the commitments on employment reached through collective bargaining in 1998 (ES9809280F). There has been an increase in the number of clauses on job creation, job conservation and converting temporary contracts into permanent contracts, as a development of the April 1997 intersectoral agreement on employment security. Commitments have been made on job creation and limiting temporary recruitment, and although there is a great lack of precision in the texts of these clauses, committees have been set up to monitor their application, or monitoring has been delegated for inclusion among the responsibilities of existing committees.
The trade unions are critical of how bargaining has dealt with increasing the quality of employment, and believe that the regulation of the different kinds of temporary contract and the use of temporary employment agencies have not been dealt with properly. Although some progress has been observed, "relief contracts", contracts for services, "temporary contracts for circumstances of production" and training contracts are hardly covered in collective bargaining. Detailed provisions for their use are inadequately laid down, no limits are established and rights are not improved beyond the legal provisions. Sectoral agreements do not properly specify rules, types and guarantees. The unions are also critical of the treatment of subcontracting and outsourcing, of which they stress the negative effects: the fragmentation of bargaining units and the segmentation of working conditions. However, they point out that in 1998 more agreements contained "subrogation" clauses to maintain employment levels. Finally, they criticise the lack of established procedures for disclosing information and for monitoring dismissals on objective grounds.
CEOE is not particularly enthusiastic about employment in its report. It states that 25% of collective agreements contain employment commitments and that the 78% of agreements that include pacts to convert temporary jobs into permanent ones do not do so on the basis of the April agreements. Regarding the different types of temporary and part-time contracts, the employers' association rejects the restrictions imposed by the intersectoral agreement on employment security on the duration of "temporary contracts for circumstances of production" as well as those imposed by the 1999 royal decree regulating part-time employment and "discontinuous permanent" employment. It claims that these regulations are regressive with respect to the 1994 reforms because they limit collective bargaining. This view can be explained by a figure referred to in the CEOE survey, which reveals the lack of effectiveness of collective bargaining to impose restrictions on recruitment: 94% of collective agreements fail to limit any type of employment contract.
The three social partners agree that collective bargaining in 1998 did not increase working hours. An overall increase registered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, MTAS) is explained by the redistribution of employment toward subsectors with longer working hours.
The trade unions favourably assess 1998's agreements on working hours. They point out that there have been more agreements on shorter working hours and that they cover more workers. However, they believe that there is still a long way to go before the general 35-hour week is introduced (ES9902297F). They are critical of the treatment of overtime, which they feel should be reduced with a view to net job creation. They recognise that a reduction in working hours has involved accepting greater flexibility in the distribution of working time, and state that without suitable controls this has meant an increase in the availability of workers, which has a negative effect on their quality of life and individualises industrial relations. They therefore propose the introduction of proper work schedules and greater attention to the structure of working time.
The employers' association is pleased that 63% of company agreements deal with working hours on an exclusively annual basis rather than the traditional weekly basis, because this facilitates the irregular distribution of working hours. However, it alleges that there are too many restrictions (for example, on the maximum number of hours to be worked per day and on compensation) and that the irregular distribution of hours is therefore too structured. Rather than "static" irregular distribution (established by means of a work schedule), the CEOE argues for "dynamic" irregular distribution (changing working time schedules during the year) and increasing the maximum number of hours per day. It states that this would give employers a reasonable margin of freedom and reduce labour costs because it would avoid the use of overtime.
CC.OO and UGT are pleased with 1998 pay increases that were higher than rises in the retail prices index, and have led to an increase in purchasing power for workers, above all in the private sector. They are also satisfied with: the inclusion of clauses on wage revision; better specification of "get-out" clauses; agreed minimum wages (though they recognise that this does not mean a guaranteed wage;) and an increase in "deferred pay". "Get-out" clauses (cláusulas de descuelgue) are those that allow companies in difficulties exemption from the terms of a collective agreement, whilst "deferred pay" refers to benefits that are not immediately available, such as occupational pension provision. However, the unions consider wage regulation to be deficient because of a lack of regulation of incentive payments, which leads to an individualisation of industrial relations.
CEOE is critical because the methods of determining pay have not been revised and are still not linked to productivity or performance. Although half the 1998 agreements have clauses that contain variable payment systems, these involve bonuses that do not reflect the individual results of workers. The employers therefore do not believe that variable systems have yet been properly tried out.
The trade unions deal briefly with job grades and functional and geographical mobility in their reports, noting only the increase in the number of clauses that regulate these issues. CEOE, on the other hand, makes a thorough analysis of them and expresses its concern over the slow rate of progress in amending systems of occupational grading, from those based on individual occupational categories to those based on groups (ES9706110F). CEOE observes that occupational structure over recent years has been increasingly based on occupational groups. However, it notes that detailed analysis reveals that the division into groups does not fulfil the role assigned to it because job content varies so widely that it often limits internal functional mobility. This problem is compounded, asserts CEOE, because collective agreements act as a "straitjacket" when functional mobility is agreed through bargaining. This is because it lays down limits on "ordinary" functional mobility, whereas according to the law this is required only in cases of "substantial" functional mobility. The CEOE refers to a similar situation with respect to geographical mobility.
The social partners all make a positive assessment of clauses on training, recognising the increase in the number of agreements that regulate training plans in the framework of the 1996 national agreement on continuing vocational training (Acuerdo nacional de formación contínua, ANFC) (ES9702101F). However, they criticise clauses on health and safety at work, most of which refer to the Law on the Prevention of Labour Risks (Ley de prevención de riesgos laborales, LPRL) or include traditional clauses covering issues like medical check-ups. However, on health and safety (ES9806157F) the trade unions do observe slight progress, mainly in the sectors with the highest accident rates. They note: an increase in mandatory training and disclosure of information; work systems that reduce risks; and greater rights for safety delegates. Equal opportunities for men and women are covered in the union reports and not in that of the employers' association: little progress is observed.
The unions also see little development in the involvement of workers' representatives in work organisation. Although there has been an increase, only 13% of agreements contain clauses that limit the exclusive powers of employers, and in most cases these clauses do not involve the obligation to negotiate (only consultation or guidance is agreed). However, the unions have detected an increase in the role played by joint committees in other areas.
Finally, though from different standpoints, both CEOE and the trade unions make a negative assessment of the structure of Spanish collective bargaining, which they feel needs greater coordination between levels ("articulation" in the jargon). CEOE warns that 84% of agreements do not refer to other agreements and 59% of agreements fail to make full use of bargaining at lower levels. Meanwhile the unions see a need for more agreements at levels higher than the company and are satisfied with the increase in the number of national sectoral agreements.
Collective bargaining in Spain still concentrates excessively on working hours and pay. Nevertheless, more and more agreements are beginning to deal with other aspects, even though they only copy and reflect changes in law or higher-level social concertation. The 1994 reform and especially the April agreements of 1997 do seem to have enriched collective bargaining. The trade unions use collective agreements to counter the effects of the new regulatory framework that they consider harmful. Managerial strategies designed to fragment bargaining units and working conditions in a context of high unemployment arguably create a panorama of inequalities that is deepened by the deregulation and decentralisation of collective bargaining promoted by the 1994 reform. Collective bargaining is used to reduce external flexibility (to reduce the number of temporary contracts and dismissals, and to conserve, improve and/or create employment) in exchange for greater internal flexibility, which centres mainly on the type of work organisation (irregular distribution of working hours, longer shifts and so on) rather than on functional mobility.
The reports from the trade unions show a great capacity for self-criticism, which will be necessary in order to meet the challenge of deregulation of industrial relations at a time when the winds are not blowing in their favour.
A comparison of the reports shows great discrepancy between the partners. Perhaps they risk little with the reports and therefore feel that they can express conflicts of interest that are otherwise concealed from the public during the rest of the year. (Clara Llorens, QUIT-UAB)